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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with reasoning by analogy within the context of auto¬
mated problem solving. In particular, we consider the provision of an analogical
reasoning component to a resolution theorem proving system. The framework
for reasoning by analogy which we use (called Basic APS) contains three major
components — the finding of analogies (analogy matching), the construction of
analogical plans, and the application of the plans to guide the search of a theorem
prover. We first discuss the relationship of analogy to other machine learning
techniques. We then develop programs for each of the component processes of
Basic APS.
First we consider analogy matching. We reconstruct, analyse and crticise
two previous analogy matchers. We introduce the notion of analogy heuristics
in order to understand the matchers. We find that we can explain the short¬
comings of the matchers in terms of analogy heuristics. We then develop a new
analogy matching algorithm, based on flexible application of analogy heuristics,
and demonstrate its superiority to the previous matchers.
We go on to consider analogical plan construction. We describe procedures
for constructing a plan for the solution of a problem, given the solution of a
different problem and an analogy match between the two problems. Again, we
compare our procedures with corresponding ones from previous systems.
We then describe procedures for the execution of analogical plans. We demon¬
strate the procedures on a number of example analogies. The analogies involved
are straightforward for a human, but the problems themselves involve huge search
spaces, if tackled directly using resolution. By comparison with unguided search,
we demonstrate the dramatic reduction in search entailed by the use of an ana¬
logical plan.
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We then consider some directions for development of our analogy systems,
which have not yet been implemented. Firstly, towards more flexible and power¬
ful execution of analogical plans. Secondly, towards an analogy system which can
improve its own ability to find and apply analogies over the course of experience.
ii
Published Papers
A paper entitled "Heuristics for Analogy Matching" was presented at the Euro¬
pean Conference in Artificial Intelligence, Brighton 1986, by the author of this
thesis. This paper covers the work described in Chapter 3 of this thesis. A
reprint of the paper may be found at the end of the thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter has three main purposes:
• To introduce the problem addressed in this thesis, namely that
ofproblem solving by analogy, including the terminology associ¬
ated with it, and to give some examples of the kind of analogies
with which the thesis is concerned.
• To explain the scope and structure of the thesis.
• To review previous work in the area, and explain how it relates
to the work described in the thesis.
1.1 Analogical problem solving
The subject of this thesis is problem solving by analogy, in particular the pro¬
vision of an analogical reasoning component to automated problem solving sys¬
tems. The goal is primarily a technical one, if only vaguely specified: to enable
an automated problem solving system to exploit its knowledge of the solution to
one problem when faced with a similar problem to solve. However, much of the
inspiration for the endeavour comes from the well-accepted human ability to rea¬
son by analogy — it is this apparently natural ability which, when set albngside
the inability of even a powerful theorem prover to make use of its experience,
motivates the study of analogical reasoning in Artificial Intelligence (AI).
1
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The previous paragraph gives an informal definition of analogical problem
solving: the solution of a problem using knowledge of the solution to a similar
problem as a guide. As we shall see, we will require to refine this definition later,
for example to exclude reasoning by inductive generalisations, which certainly
fits the definition given. However, the definition given forms the focus of this
thesis.
The provision of such analogical ability to an automated problem solver would
be a major step towards an ambitious goal: to develop an extensible reason¬
ing system — one which would improve its own problem solving ability over
the course of its experience. Previous solutions would be retained for use as
analogues in the solution of new problems; as experience developed, the chances
of finding a good analogy would increase, and problem solving ability would be
enhanced. Such a system remains a long term aim. Many hard problems will
have to be overcome before one is built; some of these problems are addressed in
this thesis, some are not. Section 1.4 discusses the scope and limitations of the
thesis.
Figure 1-1 illustrates schematically the operation of an analogical reasoning
component. The problem solver is set problem Pi to solve (the target prob¬
lem). It finds, or is directed towards, another problem P2 (the base problem)
whose solution S2 it knows. A match is found between the two problem state¬
ments; the match represents the similarities, and perhaps differences, between
the problems. Given such an analogy match, the system constructs out of S2 a
plan, X, for the solution of the target problem; as noted above, an analogy is
used to guide the problem solver; the guidance is encapsulated in the analogical
plan. The system then attempts to apply the plan, which means following the
guidance encoded in the plan, as far as possible, in the hope of constructing a
solution to the target problem. In the language of search, the problem solver
uses the analogical plan to choose which steps to take in attempting to solve P\.
If the analogy is a good one, the steps suggested will, on the whole, be the right
ones, and the search required to solve Pi will have been greatly reduced. We
will call this approach to analogical problem solving (APS) Basic APS.




Figure 1—1: Basic APS
Diversity of analogy
It is well accepted that people are able to use analogies in diverse ways, not all
fitting into Basic APS. We briefly consider some alternatives; each possibility
has its counterpart among potential applications of analogy within AI.
Conjectures are often made by analogy: given an analogy between two do¬
mains and a known property of one of them, we might suspect there to be an
analogous property in the other; we could conjecture an analogous property to
hold in the latter domain, and then attempt to verify the conjecture by analogy
to the demonstration of the known property. This can give a useful focus to the
exploration of an unfamiliar domain. A discovery and reasoning system such as
that proposed in [Bundy 85] might well be able to make use of such a conjecture
making and verifying ability.
Similarly, definitions are frequently made by analogy: given an analogy be¬
tween an unfamiliar domain which is being explored and a better understood
domain, we might make a definition of a new concept in the former domain by
analogy to one which has proved useful in the latter. We hope that the analogy
remains fruitful, and the new concept leads to interesting-results. Again, such
an ability might prove useful in a discovery and reasoning system.
Another major area where analogies are frequently used by humans is in
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teaching and explanation: we often explain an unfamiliar situation by analogy to
another situation more familiar to the recipient of the explanation. For example,
we might explain electricity using the flow of fluids as an analogy. Explanation
by analogy has been proposed as a potentially useful part of the explanation
facilities of expert systems and tutoring systems.
An ability to perform Basic APS can also be embedded within larger scale
reasoning activity. For example, when attempting to solve a problem, a sub-
problem may be produced which we can solve by analogy, while using different
techniques on the rest of the problem; we may use different analogies on dif¬
ferent subproblems. We may also solve a subproblem by analogy to another
subproblem of the same overall problem.
Emphasis on Basic APS
There are many uses of analogy made by humans, and many corresponding
potential uses within AI. This thesis focusses on the Basic APS model described
above; in addition, in Chapter 7 we do consider conjecture by analogy in some
detail, but no such facility has been implemented yet. We concentrate on Basic
APS for two main reasons: firstly, it is probably the simplest, in structure, of the
uses of analogy; thus it is natural to consider it first. Secondly, although Basic
APS is only one among many possible activities with analogy, it seems to have a
central position among them. The acid test of an analogy comes down to whether
problems on one side can be solved in similar ways to those on the other. This is
just what is directly addressed in Basic APS. For example, the usefulness of an
explanation made by analogy to the person receiving it depends on whether, in
future, the analogy will enable him to tackle new problems better than he could
have done without it; that is, whether new problems can be solved in similar
ways to corresponding ones in the familiar domain. Similarly, the usefulness of a
definition made by analogy depends on whether it leads to interesting theorems
on one side whose proofs are suggested by those on the other side. Thus, a system
which could exploit definitions (and likewise conjectures) made by analogy would
need to be competent at Basic APS. It is more obvious that systems which embed
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Basic APS within a richer framework rely on the power of Basic APS for their
own power.
1.2 Some Examples
We give here some examples of the kind of analogies which we would wish an
analogy system to handle. There are several purposes in giving examples at
this point. First, to give a feel for the task that we face in building an analogy
system; in particular to realise the kind of variation between problems which
even a fairly modest analogy system will have to cope with. Second, so that
we can define and illustrate the essential notion of an analogy match; all AI
accounts of analogy, including this one, have the same basic idea about what an
analogy match is, although there are important differences in how the idea is
developed. Third, so that we can understand the limitations of some of the work
on analogy reviewed in section 1.3, when applied to our domain of mathematics.
Consider first the following two theorems of Boolean algebra1:
x U 0 = x and x D 1 = x
These are quite separate problems, involving different functions and constants.
However, they have the same structural form. The structural correspondence
extends from the theorems to their proofs (which we do not show here); while
different sequences of axioms are applied, the proofs have the same structural
similarity that the theorems do — that is, the proofs are analogous. A person
learning about Boolean algebra soon finds that proofs of theorems such as the
second of those above can be directly modelled on known proofs of corresponding
theorems such as the first. This is an example of a very close analogy — the
1Free variables are implicitly universally quantified in the examples throughout the
thesis.
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proofs proceed in ■precisely corresponding ways — and we would certainly hope
that an analogy system would be able to find and exploit it.
We can express the structural similarity that exists between the above theo¬
rems by defining a correspondence between symbols occurring in the formulae,
which preserves the syntactic structure of the formulae. Such a correspondence
is graphically illustrated as follows:
x U 0 = x
Example 1
x fl 1 = x
The notion of a symbolic correspondence intuitively expresses well the sim¬
ilarities (and differences) between the two formulae; we call symbolic corre¬
spondences between formulae analogy matches. The basic notion of analogy
matches as symbolic correspondences between formulae is common to all of the
AI accounts of analogy; the nature of the correspondences differs between differ¬
ent accounts, though, as we will see in section 1.3.
We can also express the match between the formulae above as a symbolic




It is often easier to think of analogies in this way; we can clearly compute the
latter presentation from the former, but not vice-versa, in general. The structural
correspondence discarded from the second presentation is an important factor in
the analogy.
As a second example, consider the following two propositions of elementary
real number theory:
1. The sum of a rational number and an irrational number is irrational.
Chapter 1. Introduction 7
2. The product of a non-zero rational number and an irrational number is
irrational.
A potential analogy is immediately suggested by reading these two propositions
together. The following match between formal representations of the proposi¬
tions makes the correspondence explicit:
A ( rational (x), -> rational (y) ) —> -> rational (x + y)
A ( rational (x), ~>x = 0, —• rational (y) ) ► -> rational (x ■ y)
The first proposition can be thought of as one about addition, and the second
as a corresponding one about multiplication. It turns out that these propositions
can in fact be proved in corresponding ways (again, we do not give the proofs
here, but leave them until Chapter 6). However the correspondence is not so
precise as it was in the first example — some of the symbols of one of the
propositions are left unmatched, those that make up the 'non-zero' condition.
This is because there is nothing in the other proposition which corresponds to
the non-zero condition — it is part of the difference between the propositions.
There is a corresponding mismatch between the proofs: at least one extra step
needs to be put into the proof of the second proposition to handle the non-zero
condition (see Chapter 6). However, the mismatches between the propositions
and between the proofs do not seriously disrupt our intuitions that there is an
analogy here (apart from the extra step, the proofs correspond closely). Many
intuitively close analogies turn out to involve unmatched symbols, sometimes,
as here, unmatched atoms, sometimes unmatched arguments to predicates or
functions. Thus we take the view that an analogy system will have to allow
matches of this form if it is to be useful.
To illustrate another property of analogy matches, we consider an example
involving one of the most famous theorems in mathematics:
1. The square root of 2 is- irrational.
Chapter 1. Introduction
2. The cube root of 2 is irrational.
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Again, we can immediately recognize a potential analogy, which, given formal
representations, we can make explicit as follows:
Example 3
rational ( root (2,2))
rational (root (3,2))
Our suspicion is again borne out by the fact that the two propositions can be
proved in very similar ways. However, notice that the match between the propo¬
sitions is, in a sense, inconsistent; that is, a symbol on one side, 2, is associated
with two different symbols on the other side, 2 and 3. Just as with unmatched
symbols, there is nothing about this situation which prevents a person from
recognising the analogy. Inconsistencies frequently occur in analogies. We there¬
fore take the view that we cannot rule out inconsistent matches, such as this
one, from our analogy system without seriously restricting its generality.
Another frequent feature of analogy matches, illustrated by the following
example, is that predicates and functions which are associated can have their
arguments permuted by the match:
x < x U y
Example 4
x D y < x
Here the arguments to < are swapped in the match. The analogy is closely
related to the first example given above, and is just as close. In general, the
ordering of arguments is the result of an arbitrary choice, and there is no reason
why analogy matches should preserve the order.
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1.3 Related Work
Now that we have introduced the problem to be addressed in this thesis, we
look at previous work which is relevant to the problem. In the previous section,
we looked at examples which indicated the variety of matches which an analogy
system will need to be able to find. When looking at other work on analogy,
we will be particularly concerned with the variety of matches permissible by the
systems.
There is much work on analogy in the literature; some in AI, some on the bor¬
ders between AI and psychology, some in philosophy, particularly the philosophy
of science. We will not attempt a comprehensive review of all work that has any
connection with analogy. We will first mention some of the AI accounts which
are less closely related to the concerns of this thesis; we chose these because of
their influence on the field. We then mention in more detail the AI accounts
which are more relevant to the thesis. Those accounts which are particularly
relevant are discussed in much more detail in subsequent chapters. We leave the
work in psychology and philosophy to be mentioned in later chapters where it is
relevant.
[Miller 82] gives a more detailed account of some of the accounts, and also
includes some we do not mention.
1.3.1 Less relevant work
Many of the attempts to model analogy in AI have not been concerned with
reasoning by analogy (i.e. using analogies to solve problems in a domain); they
have mainly restricted themselves to the initial matching stage of the analogy
process. This does not in itself make them irrelevant to this thesis, as we will
be much concerned with analogical matching in Chapters 3 and 4. However the
notions of analogy matches and algorithms for constructing them have tended to
be over-simplified in these accounts. This seems to be because they operate in
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domains which have no accepted conventions for formal representation; thus the
authors have defined their own somewhat idealised representations within which
the analogies axe simple. Within problem solving domains, such as mathematics,
the problem representations are largely dictated by convention, and thus cannot
be devised specially by the designer of an analogy system.
Winston
Winston [Winston 80] has considered analogies between simple representations of
the plots of stories. He restricts his analogies to be 1-1 correspondences between
objects from the plots, which are considered analogous by virtue of bearing some
of the same relations to each other in one story as in the other. For example,




Both of these requirements on analogies are too restrictive for the types of anal¬
ogy with which we are concerned in this thesis: examples 2 and 3 indicate that
analogical correspondences need not be bijective; example 1 shows that the re¬
lations and functions which give an analogy strength need not be the same on
one side as the other.
Evans
f£vavts (£3
EvansJ^wrote a program which attempted to solve geometric analogy problems
of the kind which occur in intelligence tests. These problems test the ability
to perceive relations and analogies, or rather the ability to perceive the same
analogy as the person who set the problem. The analogies are not used for any
external purpose. Evans' concept of an analogy match is similar to Winston's:
a bijective relation between objects such that identical relations hold between
corresponding objects. An example of such a match is the following
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onJop(circlei,trianglei), inside(square\,circlei)
onJ,op(triangle2, square2), inside(circle2, triangle2)
which represents the following correspondence between geometrical figures:
Thus Evans' notion of analogy match is again too restrictive for the purposes of
this thesis. However, Evans' early work on analogy nevertheless is an important
part of the development of analogy within AI - as far as the present author is
aware, Evans was the first person to articulate analogies as symbolic correspon¬
dences between formal representations. This notion of what an analogy is exists
implicitly in the work of both Hesse [Hesse 63] and Polya [Polya 54], but is not
developed to the stage of being made explicit.
1.3.2 More relevant work
Inderkhya
Inderkhya [Indurkhya 85] describes a knowledge representation scheme, very sim¬
ilar to first-order logic, and defines a notion of analogy within it. While Inderkhya
does consider the problem of reasoning with an analogy, both his problems and
his concept of analogy are idealised: he requires an analogy to be an isomorphism
between formulae; i.e. predicates and objects may be associated with different
predicates and objects"(unlike in the accounts mentioned above), but only in a
strictly consistent manner. There can be no permutation of arguments between
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associated terms and formulae, and there can be no unmatched arguments. Thus
most of the examples given above cannot be captured in Inderkhya's system.
Carbonnell
Carbonnell has discussed how a problem solving system can be augmented with
an analogy component. In [Carbonnell 83b], he proposes a model essentially the
same as the Basic APS model of Figure 1-1 except that the plan construction
phase is omitted - the base solution is taken as the plan for the target. He gives
nor
no definition of, \ algorithm for finding^ analogies. His main concern seems to
be with the plan application stage. He proposes various operators which may be
applied to a faulty plan in the hope of transforming it into a valid target solution.
Examples of these are 'insert an operator application at a particular point in
the plan' and 'swap a consecutive pair of operator applications in the plan'.
However, he gives no details as to how these solution transformation operators
are to be controlled; this must be a serious problem, since the branching rate at
the solution transformation level is very much greater than that at the original
state space level. He does not even give any concrete examples of the proposed
behaviour of his system. He seems to refer in places to an implemented system;
however he gives no technical details of how the system works.
In [Carbonnell 83a], Carbonnell proposes a new model for reasoning by anal¬
ogy within an automated problem solver, for which he coins the phrase deriva¬
tional analogy. This is different from the Basic APS model and his previous
model in the following respect: instead of looking for analogies between the
problem representations alone, analogies are sought between initial segments of
problem-solving activity between the target and the base; that is, the target prob¬
lem is attacked by the problem solver (presumably with some general-purpose
search technique); the entire trace of the problem solver's search at any stage is
retained, including all failed branches and intermediate states; matching takes
place between this structure and corresponding initial traces for candidate base
problems; once an adequate match is found, the later stages of the process pro¬
ceed in a similar way to Carbonnell's earlier model.
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The motivation behind this model seems to be that an initial segment of
problem-solving activity contains more information about the form of a potential
solution than the problem does alone. This is certainly an attractive idea. But,
once again, Carbonnell gives no examples or technical details with which his
model can be tested. In particular he does not address the following issues
which would arise in an implementation of his model:
• How can the enormous quantity of information needed for matching be
stored and accessed efficiently? This applies both to the trace of the at¬
tempt at a target solution and particularly to the corresponding traces for
all possible candidate base solutions which must be retained.
• How can such large structures, once retrieved, be matched in reasonable
time? Note that there are bound to be many irrelevant differences between
the target and base traces, arising, for example, from extra operators on
one side which apply during the search but lead to dead ends.
• Why should an initial trace of a search be a good indication of the form of
a successful solution? We only need to resort to analogy because we have a
search problem; this means, by definition, that we cannot be confident that
a particular partially developed search path will ever lead to a solution.
Thus using such a search path to chose candidate base solutions seems
problematic.
Carbonnell criticises analogy systems which base their decision of which base
problem to pursue entirely on the comparison between problem representations.
His criticism certainly carries some weight. However, Basic APS systems do not
necessarily have this property, despite the initial appearance that they do: the
development of an analogical plan can be frequently reassessed during plan ap¬
plication; if the plan is doing well it can be developed further; if not, or if there
is a higher-rated alternative plan, the current plan can be suspended in favour
of the other. Thus the process of choosing the right base problem can extend
into the application phase, and thus be sensitive io more than just the original
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problems. In Chapter 7, we consider the design of such systems in more detail.
We now turn to the attempts at analogy between mathematics problems.
Brown
Brown [Brown 77] considers how to exploit analogies in a slightly different way
from the Basic APS model. He considers analogies between theories or domains
rather than isolated pairs of problems. Given an analogy between theories and a
target problem in one of the theories, a corresponding base problem in the other
theory is constructed using the analogy. This process replaces the matching stage
of the Basic APS model. Otherwise, Brown's model is the same as Basic APS.
Despite the differences, the issues that arise in Brown's model are the same
as those in Basic APS, with which we will be concerned for most of this thesis -
matching, plan construction and validation. [Brown 77] contains some interest¬
ing ideas, which we will refer to later in the thesis. He is certainly aware that
analogy matching involves permuting and omitting arguments where necessary.
However, it is clear that he is not describing an implemented system - his account
has many gaps and assumptions in it. Thus it has not been as valuable to the
project described in this thesis as has the work of Munyer and Kling described
below.
Kling
Kling [Kling 71] reports an analogical reasoning system for use with an existing
resolution theorem proving system. It is, as far as the present author is aware,
the earliest attempt to automate the use of analogies to solve problems. Kling
was the first to introduce the paradigm for reasoning by analogy which we have
called Basic APS into AI. Kling was mainly concerned with the analogies that
exist between different branches of abstract algebra, particularly group theory
Chapter 1. Introduction 15
and ring theory. The fact that these analogies are not perfect isomorphisms
has forced Kling to take a more flexible notion of analogy match than many
subsequent authors have done. We defer discussion of this notion, and Kling's
matching algorithm, until Chapter 3.
It is perhaps misleading to describe the later stages of Kling's system as the
construction and application of analogical plans: Kling uses an analogy to find
analogues for the axioms which were used in the base proof; the axiom base of
the theorem prover is then restricted to these analogues, and the theorem prover
attempts to prove the target by its normal uniform search procedure. Thus
the order of application of the axioms and any intermediate steps generated in
the base proof are discarded. In AI, the term plan is usually taken to mean a
structured entity which represents an intention to proceed in a particular way,
including some notion of order. We need to generalise this definition to include
Kling's candidate analogue axiom sets as plans: they represent an intention to
proceed in a particular way, namely to attempt a proof of the target using only
the analogous axioms, but without any specification of order. We will consider
Kling's application routines in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Munyer
Munyer [Munyer 81] describes a system for reasoning by analogy. Munyer's
system also fits into the Basic APS structure. Munyer, like Kling, is concerned
with analogies between problems in mathematics. This has led him also to
adopt a flexible view of an analogy match, and to face a correspondingly difficult
analogy matching problem. Again, we postpone more detailed discussion of this
until the next chapter.
Munyer describes two analogy application systems, the implicit planning
method and the explicit planning method (the latter was not implemented).
In both of these, the base solution is used to construct a plan for the solution
of the target. These plans are constructed out of the intermediate steps which
were generated in the base solution; the order in which they occur in the base
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solution is also used in the plans; the axioms (or operators, in Munyer's termi¬
nology) which were applied in the base solution are ignored. It is interesting
that Munyer's and Kling's analogical plans make use of disjoint sets of informa¬
tion from the base solutions. We will discuss Munyer's application procedures
in more detail in later chapters.
The work of Kling and Munyer (and to a lesser extent Brown) has been of
great assistance to the project described in this thesis; much of what follows is
an analysis of their programs, and many of the ideas developed in later chapters
have been suggested by the shortcomings which emerge. That their work has
been so relevant is surely related to the fact that they consider analogies be¬
tween problems in mathematics, and how to exploit them effectively. This has
lead them to approach the difficulties inherent in these "naturally occurring"
analogies.
1.4 Scope and Structure of Thesis
1.4.1 Scope
It has already been explained that this thesis concentrates on Basic APS. We
note here some other aspects and restrictions of the project described in the
thesis.
Mathematics as a source of analogies
We will be almost entirely concerned with analogies between problems in math¬
ematics. Mathematics is a good domain for studying analogical problem solving
for: a number of reasons. Firstly, mathematics is accepted as providing a rich
source of analogies, ranging from close and obvious to subtle and obscure. There¬
fore, we can build systems to deal initially with simple analogies, and then extend
them to cope with more difficult examples. Secondly, there are well-developed
formalisms and conventions for expressing mathematics problems formally, which
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include precise definitions of what constitutes a solution to a problem. This
means that we have a success criterion for the use of an analogy, namely whether
or not it leads to a solution to the target problem. Since the formalisation of
mathematics is accepted, we do not need to invent a formalism and represen¬
tational conventions before we can work with analogies. This removes the need
to tackle representation issues at the outset, and, perhaps more importantly,
prevents us from representing our problems in an idealised and simplified way,
in order to allow an over-simplified notion of analogy to be used.
Resolution in first-order logic
We use first-order logic in which to express theories, problems and solutions.
The automated problem solving system which underlies the analogical reasoning
system which we develop is a resolution theorem prover [Chang & Lee 73].
Both these choices were made on grounds of convenience, and the analogical
techniques which we develop are not closely tied to either choice. That is, it
would be straightforward to adapt the techniques for use in a different family
of first-order theorem provers, such as natural deduction; it would also be quite
straightforward to adapt the techniques for use in a different logical formalism,
such as higher-order logic.
The notion of solution, or proof, which we use is that of the basic resolution
proof (see Chapters 5 and 6). This comes fairly directly from the notion defined
in logic textbooks — a sequence of formulae, each member of which is either
an axiom or follows from formulae earlier in the list by logical inference. Thus
we consider proofs to be 'flat' entities, not annotated or structured in any way.
This is just the form in which proofs are produced by conventional theorem
provers. Some automated reasoning systems, such as planning systems, may
produce solutions which are structured according to the way in which they were
constructed; for example, a solution may give information about the plans which
were used to find it. Clearly, such annotated solutions can be flattened into the
basic form. We discuss in Chapter 7 how such annotations may be used in the
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application of analogies; however no annotations are used by the implemented
systems described in this thesis.
Difficulty of analogies
Just as mathematics problems vary enormously in difficulty, there is a wide
range of analogies from very simple to subtle and difficult. The approach taken
in this thesis is that an automated analogy system should be able to handle easy
analogies before it can handle difficult ones. A system which can make use of a
seemingly difficult analogy, but is unable to handle much simpler ones is suspect.
There appears to be no system reported in the literature which can handle even
very close analogies of the type that arise between mathematics problems. This
fact is not always evident from the claims made by researchers for their systems,
but will become clear as we analyse the relevant systems in more detail.
The procedures implemented and described in this thesis were aimed first of
all at close analogies, and then augmented so as to deal with successively more
difficult cases. It is always important that the effective behaviour on the easier
examples is maintained.
The extent of the development of the techniques has been limited within the
project described in this thesis; the analogies which are exploited by the systems
described here are all straightforward for a person. We consider in detail how our
systems will need to be further improved to cope with more ambitious analogies
in Chapter 7.
It is important to distinguish the difficulty of an analogy between a pair of
problems and the difficulty of the problems themselves. The difficulty of an anal¬
ogy refers to the process of finding and exploiting the analogy; the difficulty of
the problems refers to solving them from scratch, without the use of an analogy.
While the analogies considered in this thesis are straightforward, some of the
problems are quite hard, both for people and for a resolution theorem proving
system. In fact, some of the closest analogies we will look at, between problems
in Boolean algebra, involve some of-the hardest problems which we consider.
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An analogy system can fail to make use of an analogy (recognised by its user)
in one of two ways: firstly, it may fail to notice the analogy at all, a failure at
the matching stage; secondly, it may notice and construct the analogy in the
matching stage, but be unable to validate the analogical plan which results. The
latter stages of the analogy process, the application of analogical plans, has been
least developed in this project. Many analogies which are constructed by the
matching stage do not lead to successful solutions. Thus the further work chapter
(Chapter 7) concentrates on the further development of plan application.
Filtering base problems
An important issue which we do not consider in this thesis is the retrieval of
candidate base problems from a potentially large base of stored problems and
solutions. It is accepted by many authors that the analogy matching procedures
which construct analogies are too expensive to be applied exhaustively through¬
out such a knowledge base. Some kind of filtering mechanism would be needed
to cut down the possible base problems to a 'short-list' which could be passed to
the full analogy matching procedures for further analysis. Unfortunately, there
are no solutions to this problem in the literature, so it remains an area for future
work.
Post-generalisation
Another potentially useful component of an analogical reasoning system would
be an ability to generalise pairs of problems (and their solutions) which led
to successful analogical solutions; i.e. to abstract out the similarities between
the problems and solutions which had been exploited, while discarding the dif¬
ferences. This would amount to a post-processing step on analogical solutions.
This is another area which is not addressed by this thesis. It is clearly necessary





The thesis is mainly structured around the component processes of the Basic
APS model. Successive chapters deal with analogy matching (Chapters 3 and
4), plan construction (Chapter 5) and plan validation (Chapters 6 and 7).
In Chapter 2, we discuss analogical problem solving as a form of machine
learning, and how it relates to existing machine learning techniques. It is impor¬
tant that we consider other forms of machine learning for, while analogy works
in a different way, the overall goals are often the same. Chapter 2 is also an
appropriate place to discuss some of the work done on analogy in philosophy
and psychology, and its relevance to the goals of this thesis.
1.5 Conclusion
We have introduced the problem of analogical reasoning within the context of
automated problem solving, introduced the terminology used in this thesis, and
given some examples to illustrate the nature of simple analogies between math¬
ematics problems, which we would hope an analogy system could exploit. We
have also discussed some limitations in the scope of the thesis, in particular some
aspects of reasoning by analogy which we do not address.
We have also briefly reviewed some previous work related to the thesis, but
have left the most interesting accounts to be analysed in more detail in later
chapters.
The source code for all of the programs developed in this thesis is
in [ZOiOL* 2%J.
Chapter 2
Analogy in the Context of Human
and Machine Learning
The main purpose of this chapter is to put analogical reasoning
in the context of alternative machine learning techniques, and to
understand the trade-offs between them. To this end, we start by
reviewing some work in the philosophy of science which considered
the issue in the human case.
2.1 Introduction
i
Analogical reasoning, in the sense introduced in the previous chapter, is a form
of machine learning — a successful analogical reasoning system will improve
its performance over time by learning from examples which it has experienced.
There are other forms of machine learning which have the same goal, but which
attempt to achieve it in different ways. Broadly, these are generalisation tech¬
niques. Thus, just as we should take account of existing work in analogical
reasoning, we should also take account of that in the other areas. In this chapter
we compare analogical reasoning with other forms of machine learning.
In making this comparison, some work which has been done in philosophy
and psychology on the relationship between argument from analogy and argu¬
ment from generalisations will be useful. Therefore, we first discuss this work.
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While discussing this work, we take the opportunity to give a brief review of psy¬
chological accounts of analogy. This review is not part of the main development
of the current thesis, as it turns out that psychologists' theories do not provide
much computational insight into the problems we are concerned with.
Then we will turn to machine problem solving, and will try to understand
the relationship and trade-offs between analogy and other machine learning tech¬
niques, using the corresponding human situation as an analogy.
2.2 Philosophers'/Psychologists' Accounts
Analogy has been a recognised tool in human investigation for thousands of
years. Aristotle proposed a theory of analogy. However, in this discussion, we
will go back no further then Hesse's theory [Hesse 63], published in 1963. We
truncate the investigation so recently for two reasons: firstly, the analysis of older
theories of analogy, particularly medieval and ancient ones, while fascinating in
itself, becomes embroiled in discussion of the semantics of the terms which were
used; such discussions are best carried out by linguists. Secondly, Hesse herself
has studied the older theories in some detail; for the purposes of this thesis, we
may assume that Hesse's theory has been informed by any insights to be had
from the older theories.
Hesse was interested in analogy as a tool in scientific investigation, a use for
analogy closely related to our own. We next look briefly at two accounts proposed
by psychologists, those of Rumelhart and Abrahamson [Rumelhart & Abrahamson 73]
and Sternberg [Sternberg 77], which are concerned with analogy problems such
as occur in IQ tests. We then consider two more recent psychological accounts,
those of Gentner [Gentner 82]; and Gick and Holyoak [Gick & Holyoak 80], which
are concerned with the use of analogy to solve problems; both of these have some
relevance to this thesis.
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2.3 Hesse's Theory
Hesse's theory of analogy [Hesse 63] is concerned with the use of analogical mod¬
els to make predictions in science. When a scientist is investigating some new
and unfamiliar system (the target system), with only a few properties of the
system known to him, he may use an analogy with a more familiar system (the
base system) in order to predict new properties of the unfamiliar system; these
predictions can then be tested by experiment.
Famous examples of scientific models, quoted by Hesse, are Newton's particle
theory of light and Rutherford's solar system model of the atom.
Typically, the base domain is well enough understood that its basic mecha¬
nisms are known; that is, there is a successful theory which predicts the observed
properties. The model is used to assert properties of the target because corre¬
sponding properties are known to be true of the base.
Hesse analyses the situation in the following way: the model is initially pro¬
posed on the basis of recognisable similarities between observable properties of
the base and target systems; say the base has properties
which are recognisably similar to known properties of the target
This part is known as the positive analogy. There are also properties of each
domain known not to hold in the other; say
{^1 >-• • • > -^n}
in the base, and
in the target. This part is known as the negative analogy. There are moreover
properties of the base of which it is not known whether corresponding properties
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hold in the target (remember that the target is sparsely understood). This part
is known as the neutral analogy. The terms positive, negative and neutral
analogy are due to Hesse.
Say that property R is in the neutral analogy. The use of the analogy is to
assert that R' holds in the target. But there will be many properties which are
presently in the neutral analogy but will be false in the target. How is it that the
properties to assert and investigate are chosen from the neutral analogy? The
fact that the base domain is well understood means that there will be causal
relations known between the properties of the base. The properties from the
neutral analogy which are chosen to form hypotheses for the target are those
which are causally connected with properties from the positive analogy.
Perhaps a direct causal connection between the positive analogy and R is
known. This would amount to the knowledge of (or belief in) a general law
Bx & ... & Br —► R.
Such a law could (and should) be used to infer R' in the target by direct inference,
without using the analogy at all. But (Hesse claims) such general laws are not
often known; what is known is that
Bl & ... & Br & A, & ... & An —► R,
but precisely which factors are responsible for R in the base cannot be deter¬
mined. For example, the motion of elastic balls may be taken as a model for the
propagation of sound in air; the fact that balls rebound off hard surfaces may be
correlated with (i.e. is causally connected to) their basic properties, using, say,
Newtonian mechanics; but
"... we cannot empirically separate the characteristics which are in
common between the throwing of a ball and the uttering of a sound,
and those which are different, in order to infer a general causal rela¬
tion applicable also to sound: "throwing is correlated with rebound,"
in such a way that it is independent of the occurrence of the other
characters of the ball." ([Hesse 63]) — _
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Thus the echoing of sound could be predicted (or explained) by analogy to
the bouncing of balls, but not using a general theory, given the existing state of
understanding.
So Hesse's argument is that while arguing by general law is preferable to ar¬
guing by analogy when it applies, the latter is applicable in many more situations
than the former. According to Hesse, analogies tend to be "pre-theoretic", with
respect to the target domain anyway; a successful analogy will lead to a deeper
understanding of the target domain and hence, perhaps, to a causal theory of
the target which will replace the analogy. Thus analogical models can be seen
as complementary to general theories.
Hesse is rather vague about what constitutes the "recognisable similarity"
on which her theory is based. Notice that her theory requires not only that we
should be able to recognise the similarity between analogous properties A and
A', but also that, given a property R in the neutral analogy, we can assert the
analogous property R' in the target - i.e. we need to be able to construct the
analogue of a property.
2.4 Psychological Theories of Simple Analogies
Simple analogies are problems of the form
A : B :: C : X
(which reads "A is to B as C is to X"), where A, B and C are given and X
is to be determined, usually chosen from a small set of alternatives. This form
of problem is common in intelligence tests. Psychologists became interested
in providing models for the solution of such problems apparently because they
believed this would help them understand the nature of intelligence. With simple
analogies, the problem is recognising the analogy— we are not using the analogy
to solve another problem.
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Rumelhart and Abrahamson [Rumelhart & Abrahamson 73] give a model for
the solution of simple analogies. In this model, the terms are represented as
points in a multi-dimensional space, the dimensions being properties relevant to
the terms in question, such as size, ferocity etc. for animals.
A : B :: C : X if B~A=X~C.
That is, the analogy relation holds if the differences in the pre-defined dimensions
are the same on each side. Thus, the analogy is defined purely in terms of intrinsic
properties of the entities in question rather than external relationships between
them. So a simple analogy such as
DOG : CAT :: CAT : MOUSE
where the common relationship is a tendency for one term to chase the other,
could not be represented adequately in this model. Similarly, scientific analogies,
such as those studied by Hesse, typically involve systems of external relation¬
ships between entities. So the representational system chosen by Rumelhart and
Abrahamson is inadequate for most interesting analogies. Perhaps the fact that
the simple analogies are not used for anything, and thus that there is no objec¬
tive criterion for their success, led Rumelhart and Abrahamson to propose such
a restricted model. Also spatial models were fashionable in psychology at that
time.
Sternberg [Sternberg 77] gives another model for the solution of simple analo¬
gies; in this model, terms are represented by some (unspecified) semantic mem¬
ory, a semantic network for instance. An analogy is represented by the same
relation occurring between different objects. This definition for analogy is too
restrictive for the analogies which we are seeking in problem solving, in which
relations on one side may match with different relations on the other. How¬
ever, Sternberg's representation language can at least express a wider range of
relationships between objects than Rumelhart and Abrahamson's. Again, not
surprisingly, a model of simple analogies does not shed much light on the use of
analogy in problem solving.
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2.5 More recent psychological accounts
More recently, psychologists have moved on from simple analogies to consider
the role of analogy in problem solving.
As mentioned above, Hesse's theory does not define the notion of similar¬
ity on which it is based. Gentner [Gentner 82] presents a theory of analogy, the
structure/mapping theory, which attempts to define a notion of similarity (or
analogy) between physical systems. This theory can therefore be seen as an ex¬
tension of Hesse's. The notion of similarity which Gentner uses is similar to that
used by Sternberg and mentioned above, except that it is more fully and clearly
defined. Gentner uses a kind of semantic network to represent physical systems.
An analogy between two such networks is defined to be a mapping between the
objects of the networks so that the same relations hold between corresponding
objects. This definition is too restrictive for the purposes of problem-solving
by analogy, as pointed out above. Gentner also considers unary relations to be
irrelevant to analogies, and so does not try to find analogues for them 1 ; she
justifies this by saying that unary relations usually refer to superficial proper¬
ties of the objects (such as the yellowness of the sun), which are therefore not
part of the causal structure of the base domain, and so will never be helpful in
making predictions in the target. In automatic problem solving, however, unary
relations (represented by unary predicates) seem to be as useful in looking for
analogies as any other kind. In the following example, the only relations present
are unary2:
even(x) A even(y) —► even(x * y)
odd(x) A odd(y) —» odd(x *y)
1Brown [Brown 77] takes exactly the opposite view, namely that unary relations
should form the cornerstones of analogical matches.
2We discuss the application of this analogy in Chapter 7.
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These two factors (the insistence on identical non-unary relations, and the ig¬
noring of unary relations) together make Gentner's definition of analogy too re¬
strictive for the purposes of this thesis. Gentner's structure mappings are clearly
very much dependent on the particular way in which the systems in question are
represented; a complicated, real-world system such as the solar system could be
represented in many different ways; Gentner has chosen the one that fits the
best with her representation of the atom, i.e. she has, perhaps subconsciously,
anticipated the intended analogy in forming her representations of the physical
systems.
Furthermore, Gentner's theory is not computational, i.e. she does not suggest
mechanisms for the construction of her structure mappings.
The work of Gick and Holyoak [Gick & Holyoak 80] addresses the issue of the
level of representation of the base and target systems which Gentner avoided.
They show how people represent the systems in such a way as to maximise
the similarity between them (their notion of similarity, given representations, is
very similar to Gentner's structure mapping). They liken this ability to change
representation to a theory of text comprehension, in which a story can be de¬
scribed in many different ways, each being a summary of the story at some
level of generality. While explaining the problem clearly, they do not suggest
any computational mechanisms for either constructing the representations, or
for matching them once constructed.
2.6 Summary
Hesse's theory of the use of analogy to make predictions in science is interesting
and useful for the purposes of this thesis because it considers the applicability
of prediction by analogy relative to argument from general laws or theories.
This issue will be seen, later in this chapter, to arise again in the context of -
automated problem solving systems. Subsequent psychological theories have
tended to ignore this issue, and to treat analogy as an isolated phenomenon.
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Both Gentner and Gick & Holyoak raise interesting and relevant issues in analogy
- of the notion of similarity, and the representation of the analogues - but neither
account provides computational answers.
2.7 Machine Learning Systems
We now discuss analogy in the context of automatic problem solving - the sub¬
ject of this thesis. As explained in the previous chapter, the goal of APS is to
enable a problem solving system to improve its performance by exploiting its past
experience in solving similar problems. Thus APS is a form of machine learning.
There are other machine learning techniques which have the same overall goal,
although their means of achieving it is different from APS. In assessing the power
and applicability of APS, therefore, we should compare it with other machine
learning systems. In this section, we compare APS to three existing machine
learning systems, LEX [Mitchell 78], LEX2 [Utgoff 83] and LP [Silver 85]. The
three systems are chosen as representative of different kinds of machine learn¬
ing — LEX embodies an inductive form of learning, LEX2 uses an analytical,
explanation-based technique, and LP is an example of learning by meta-level
analysis.
All three are spontaneous generalisation systems; that is, given an example
or examples of problem solving behaviour, they form a generalisation of both
the problem and (aspects of) the solution. Faced with a new problem, they look
for a generalisation which subsumes it (strict subsumption); when one is found,
they attempt to instantiate the generalised solution to solve the given problem.
In contrast, APS makes no spontaneous generalisation, but attempts to match
old problems with new ones by flexible matching. These different approaches to
exploiting past experience are illustrated schematically in Figure 2-1. In each
case, there is a notion of the potential generality of the process - that is, across
what sort of variation in problems can old experience be exploited.- As well as the
potential generality across problems, there is the issue of the potential variation
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Figure 2—1: Analogy and Generalisation
in the form of the solutions. These two issues are crucial to the assessment of the
generality (in terms of applicability) of the techniques. We compare the existing
systems to the hypothetical Basic APS system with particular regard to these
issues.
Firstly, we give a brief description of the existing systems.
2.7.1 LEX
LEX [Mitchell 78] used a technique called version spaces to learn heuristics
for the application of particular rules in a symbolic integration system. The
generalisation is based on the taking of least upper bounds in a fixed, user-
supplied type-hierarchy for the domain. Positive instances for a particular
operator are problems whose shortest solutions begin with an application of
the operator. Given two positive instances, a generalisation is formed, which
subsumes both, by replacing subterms at which they differ by the least upper
bound of the differing function symbols in the hierarchy.
2.7.2 LEX2
LEX2 [Utgoff 83] works in the same domain as LEX, symbolic integration. It uses
a technique called goal regression to find the most general form of a problem
which can be solved by a particular sequence of operators. Its generalisations
Chapter 2. Analogy in the Context ofHuman and Machine Learning 31
stay within the object language — that is the language in which the examples
and operators are expressed.
2.7.3 LP
LP [Silver 85] learns schemata for the solution of equations from single examples
presented by the user. It first characterises the original equation, and the user's
solution in terms of a sophisticated description language, quite separate from
the object language — this language is termed the meta-language, since it
describes object level terms. LP then uses a technique called precondition
analysis to construct a schema by performing a simple kind of goal regression
in the description language. LP's schemata are expressed in the meta-language.
2.7.4 LEX vs APS
A LEX generalisation has the same top-level structure as the problems which
gave rise to it; it differs from the problems in that instances of particular functions
have been replaced by typed function variables. The part of the original problems
which has not been generalised (the greater part in most cases) must match the
new problem exactly. More complicated types of matches, such as
(? + y) t x = y
\\\ III I
x = 0 V (x * y)/x — y,
where there is an extra condition on one side, are not allowed. Matches in an
APS system may also permute arguments and omit function symbols. Thus the
range of problem generality in an APS system is potentially much greater than
that in LEX.
With respect to the solution generality, LEX only makes generalisations re¬
lating to the application of single operators; thus it cannot capture variations in
the solution which may correspond to variations in the problem. For example,
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LEX could potentially handle the following problem variation (within Boolean
algebra),
x A x = x
x V x — x
(assuming it knew the appropriate types), but could not represent the fact that
correspondingly different operators need to be applied in the solution of the
problems.
Thus, in both respects, APS offers greater generality than LEX, and would
thus be applicable in many more situations. Referring to Hesse's theory described
above, we can think of LEX as forming general laws inductively from instances
which it has observed. That is, it abstracts out certain of the properties of the
instances (in Hesse's terminology), and forms general laws (or rather beliefs)
involving those that remain. However, its single method of generalising through
a type hierarchy means that it can only abstract out certain sorts of property (the
identity of certain functions). If a potential generalisation involves abstracting
out other sorts of property, such as the order of arguments, LEX will not be able
to capture it.
Furthermore, even within its range of variation, the reliability of LEX gen¬
eralisations is questionable. As Hesse points out, arguing by general laws (or
beliefs) involves claiming a causal link between the form of problem (expressed
by the type hierarchy) and the form of solution (in this case, which operator was
applied first). In the case of LEX, this link is not based on any theory of the
problem solving process, as it is in, say, LP (see below), but is represented by
a domain-level belief that the type hierarchy gives good dimensions for general¬
isation. While this may be true for some sets of problems, it is unlikely to be
true throughout a non-trivial domain, and, in any case, strongly depends on the
user supplying a good hierarchy. Thus, the causal links will not be strong enough
to support reliable generalisations. The effect of this would be that LEX would
make serious over-generalisations after extended experience. — _
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In summary, APS offers greater scope for variation in both problem and
solution, and thus will be more widely applicable than LEX's inductive general¬
isation, as predicted by Hesse's theory. Furthermore, it is questionable whether
LEX's inductive technique is powerful enough to support valid generalisation.
2.7.5 LEX2 vs APS
LEX2 uses a form of explanation-based generalisation. That is, its gener¬
alisation from a solution to a problem is obtained by answering (at some level)
the question "why did this solution work?" LEX2 is very cautious - its answer
is simply that it worked because the sequence of operators applied was seen to
solve the problem (an answer which would be considered bloody-minded of a
human). Its generalisation technique (goal regression) looks for the most general
problem which could have been solved by the same sequence of operators. Thus,
its generalisations are very strong (theorems, in fact), but the range of problem
and solution variation is limited: new problems must match perfectly with old
ones, except for subterms which have been generalised to variables, and new
solutions must be identical to old ones. Thus APS will be more widely applica¬
ble than LEX2. This is not to say that LEX2 is not a useful system; as Hesse
points out, arguing by generalisation, where applicable, is preferable to arguing
by analogy. Generally speaking, in a given non-trivial domain, there will be a
trade-off between the strength and the generality of the generalisations: LEX2's
are cautious - that is, not very general, but very strong.
2.7.6 APS vs LP
LP's generalisation technique, like LEX2's, is a form of explanation-based gen¬
eralisation. The difference is that LP's answer to the question "why did this
solution work?" is much less cautious and is based on sophisticated domain
knowledge; it gives its answer, not in terms of the particular operators which
were applied, but in terms of the effect which they had on the terms to which
they were applied, expressed in a meta-level description language. Thus the gen-
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eralisations of which LP is capable are much greater than those of LEX2; on the
other hand, the generalisations are not as reliable, and schema application may
fail.
The potential variation in problem obtainable by LP's meta-level technique
goes beyond simple syntactic similarity; this is because LP's schemata are ex¬
pressed in terms of the description language, and will be applied to new problems
which satisfy a particular description. But, the descriptors in question, which
may say, for example, that the equation must contain a pair of identical sub-
terms, do not characterise the syntactic form of equations to which they apply.
That is, we cannot write down the most general equation which satisfies a par¬
ticular meta-level description. So the range of variation is much greater on the
problems. Similarly, the solutions can vary considerably as well: the operators
applied in the new situation do not have to be the same as the old ones, but can
be any from a class of operators capable of producing similar meta-level effects.
LP can also insert extra operators in the application of its schemas.
While the problem variation in APS is wider than that in LEX and LEX1,
it is still syntactically based, and thus cannot express the leaps of generalisation
available to LP. Similar remarks are true of the solution variation. Note that it
is still possible, in theory, for APS to exploit variation which LP cannot: if the
syntactic match between problems does not preserve the meta-level descriptors,
LP would not regard the new problem as an instance of the schema derived
from the old. Furthermore, an LP schema is only applicable within the domain
(equation solving) in which it was formed; APS can potentially work across
domains - indeed this is perhaps the most interesting application for analogy.
The success of LP's schemas is clearly dependent on the accuracy of the meta¬
language - that is, on the extent to which the (meta-level) form of a problem
determines the (meta-level) form of the solution. In LP's domain of equation-
solving, the meta-language seems extremely appropriate: it represents a theory
of how to solve equations, which enables large generalisations to be made.
In the terms of Hesse's theory, there is a theory which underlies and explains
the observed _(meta-level) properties independently of the other characteristics
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of the equations. This makes LP's generalisation, when it applies, preferable to
APS. As Hesse shows, models or analogies are useful when general theories are
not available. Thus, in domains which are not as well understood as equation-
solving, APS will become more attractive since LP's techniques will not work.
2.8 Summary
The above analysis shows that APS has a role to play in an advanced learning
and reasoning system. The only generalisation system we have discussed which
can produce greater variation in both problem and solution, LP, relies on so¬
phisticated domain knowledge. Where such knowledge is lacking, such as when
a new domain is being explored, APS could provide a means of exploiting past




On the left hand side, in the absence of sufficient domain-specific knowledge,
analogy will be the preferred technique for learning from past experience; on the
right hand side, in the presence of sophisticated domain knowledge, generalisa¬
tion techniques such as LP's precondition analysis will be preferred.
The question naturally arises of whether we could have a learning system
in the middle of the spectrum; that is to say, one which combines a certain
amount of spontaneous generalisation with a certain amount of flexible, analog¬
ical matching. If the meta-language for the domain was not fully developed,
analogical techniques could supplement analytical techniques in the following
ways:
• If the meta-language was not as general as it could be, i.e. there was.more
scope for generalisation in the domain than it knew, flexible matching could
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be used between schemas and new problems; this would have the effect of
"stretching" the schemas a bit further. The question would then arise of
whether the results of the attempted applications could be used to increase
the power of the meta-language so that it could express the greater gener¬
alisation. If this could be done, we would have a powerful system, capable
of directing its generalisation language by experience; analogical reasoning
would be a step towards reasoning by generalising, just as reasoning from
models is a step towards the construction of theories in science. However,
this seems to be an extremely difficult thing to do.
• If the meta-language was over-general, and was producing schemas which
failed much of the time, analogical matching between the object-level prob¬
lem statements could be used to select the most promising of a number of
schemas which matched at the meta-level. The results of this could per¬
haps be used to refine the meta-language, although this again seems to be
very difficult.
Chapter 3
Analysis of Existing Analogy
Matchers
This chapter is about analogy matching, i.e. finding analogies.
We argue that analogy matching algorithms must include heuristic
beliefs about promising matches, implicitly or explicitly. The match¬
ing algorithms ofMunyer [Munyer 81] and Kling [Kling 71] are anal¬
ysed; the analysis is done on the basis of Prolog reconstructions of
the algorithms and their performance. We abstract the heuristics
which are used in the algorithms and discuss their validity. We are
able to explain the shortcomings of the algorithms, which are made
clear by the reconstructions, in terms of the indexible way in which
they use their heuristics.
3.1 Introduction— Motivation for Reconstruc¬
tions
There seems to be no general, formal rule which tells us what constitutes a good
analogy match. It is in the nature of analogy that it is partly empirical— we only
know for sure whether a particular match is good or not after the application
procedure-has used it in trying to solve the target problem. Hesse's theory of
37
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analogy, discussed in the last chapter, helps us to understand this: analogy (as
opposed to generalisation) is useful when the causality in a domain is not well
understood; that is, when we cannot say, in general terms, why the solution to
the base worked; so, according to Hesse, we turn to analogy precisely when we
are not sure whether we can apply our old experience to a new situation.
Therefore analogy matching algorithms use heuristic criteria to guide them
in searching for good analogies. The heuristics that a particular matcher uses
determine its idea (or rather its designer's) of what constitutes a promising
analogy.
But the descriptions given in the literature of existing matchers do not make
it at all clear what heuristics they are using — the authors generally do not say
what heuristics their matchers are using, where they are using them, or why
they are using them. There has been little discussion of the assumptions which
matchers make. This makes it very hard to compare the existing matchers as
to their performance — how much they achieve relative to the information they
are given (see the discussion about semantic types below) — and hard also to
extend and improve them.
The matchers of Kling and Munyer have been reconstructed (both in Prolog)
in order to analyse their performance and underlying assumptions. The rationale
behind such rational reconstructions of previous work is as follows: firstly, the
discipline of having to transform the sometimes ambiguous descriptions of the
algorithms given by their authors into computer programs forces one to examine
the algorithms much more closely than one might do otherwise; secondly, having
a working version of an algorithm makes it easy to test it on different examples
from those around which it was designed, and thus to assess its generality.
The matchers of Kling and Munyer were chosen for reconstruction as they
are the only complete algorithms reported in the literature which attempt to
handle the sort of problem variation which occurs between analogous, problems
in mathematics. Such variations include function and relation mismatches,
where, say, a relation on one side is matched with a different relation on the
other; inconsistent matches, where a symbol on one side is matched with more
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than one on the other; unmatched subterms, where a subterm of one of
the problem representations is not matched; structural mismatches, where
individual symbols, rather than complete subterms, are left unmatched.
Brown [Brown 77] makes some suggestions about how to construct analogies
between theories, for example between two-dimensional and three-dimensional
geometry; Brown's ideas do not apply directly to the construction of individ¬
ual analogies between pairs of problems. Furthermore, his techniques are only
vaguely specified, and do not really constitute a single algorithm.
3.2 Descriptions of algorithms and reconstruc¬
tions
3.2.1 Munyer
The matching algorithm reported in [Munyer 81] takes two logical terms as input
and outputs an analogy match between them. We have already introduced the
notion of an analogy match (in Chapter 1); we now define it more precisely: an
analogy match is a set of positional associations between symbols in the
logical terms; ie consists of elements of the form
((symboli, positiorii), (symbol,position))
where symbol\ has positioni (the usual sequence of argument positions) in termi
and likewise for symbol, position2 and term2. The two symbols in their respec¬
tive positions are regarded as being analogues in the analogy represented by the
match. For example, given the terms
f(a,9(b)) and f(g(c),a) ,
Munyer's algorithm would return the match
{((/, 0); (/, 0)), ((<*, [1]), (a, [2])),
((fir, [2]), (g, [1])), ((6, [2,1}), (c, [1,1]))}
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which can be graphically represented as:
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/( a, 9( b ))
/( g( c ), a)
Following Munyer, we have called the terms input to the system logical
terms. They are well-formed in the sense of being representable as trees in the
usual way (so that each symbol has a unique position in a term and heads a
unique subterm) but are not necessarily first-order, since variables can have ar¬
guments (i.e. there can be variable functions and predicates). Munyer's matcher
makes no distinction between predicates and functions. If logical formulae axe
to be matched, the logical connectives in them are treated as predicate/function
symbols just like any normal predicates or functions in the formulae. So the
matcher operates with an unrestricted and rather uniform syntax. The only in¬
formation about the symbols that the matcher uses is whether or not functions
or predicates are commutative.
The algorithm
Munyer's matcher works in three stages, constructing intermediate matches from
the first two. They are: grounding, deleting and adding. The matching strategy
may be briefly described as follows: in the first stage, an initial match of a ■priori
plausible associations is constructed; in the second stage, this match is whittled
down to a subset of associations which fit together well; in the third stage, holes
are filled in the whittled down match.
Grounding In this stage, an initial map is created in which
• Any pair of identical symbols, one from each term, are associated.
• Any variable in either term is associated with all symbols in the other term.
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Deleting This stage takes as input the output of the previous stage, ie two
terms and an initial map between them, and deletes some (or all or none) of the
associations in the initial match. The choice of which maps to delete is made on
the basis of how well each map supports the maps which 'directly dominate' it
in the existing match. To explain what 'directly dominate' means, note that the
associations in a match can be partially ordered in the following way: for symbols
a and 6 in a term, define a > b if b occurs in the (unique) subterm headed by
a; for associations (oq,*^) and (61,62), (<21,02) dominates (61,62) if ai > 61 and
02 > 62; the relation of domination puts a partial order on the associations in a
match. Now we can define the relation of direct domination as follows: (01,02)
directly dominates (61,62) (in a match M) if (01,02) dominates (61, 62) and
there is no (01,02) in M, dominated by (01,02), which dominates (61,62).
The procedure is first to mark certain associations as being exempt from
deletion, and then to delete those which have not been exempted and which
share a node1 with another association.
To be exempt from deletion, a match must give support to an association
which directly dominates it. The notion of support is defined so that one asso¬
ciation supports another if together they tend to preserve the structure of the
terms being matched. For example, in the match
the (x,c) and (d, d) maps are directly dominated by the (g,g) map and both give
it support. The (x,d) map, however, which is also directly dominated by (g,g),
does not give it support.
xMunyer uses the term node to refer to an occurrence of a symbol at a position in a
term.
/( a, g{ x, d ))
/( g( c, d ), a)
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Support is a relative concept; that is, mapl supports map2 if there is no
map3 competing with mapl which supports map2 better. The definition of
'competes' is important : in the above example (x,c) competes with (x,d) at x,
(x,d) competes with (d,d) at d, whereas (a:,c) and (d, d) do not compete at all
(all this with respect to the directly dominating map (g,g)).
The formal definition is that two maps compete on the left (w.r.t a map which
directly dominates them both) if their left nodes occur in the same argument
position of the left node of the dominating map. (Similarly for competition on
the right).
A map supports a directly dominating map on the left if it has minimal left
penalty among all the maps with which it competes on the left. Munyer defines
• the left penalty of a map (/2,^2) w.r.t a directly dominating map (/i,rx) as the
sum
C.P. + P.P.
where C.P., the containment penalty, is the number of unmapped symbols above
/2 and below Zx in the tree structure of the left term, and P.P., the permutation
penalty, is 1 if (^2, w2) permutes arguments of (Zi,rx) and neither Zx or rx is
commutative and 0 otherwise. If the minimum is not unique, all maps achieving
it are deemed to give support.
In the above example, (x,c) and (x,d) compete on the left w.r.t. (g,g); both
have C.P. — 0, (x,c) has P.P. = 0 and (x,d) has P.P. = 1, so (x,c) supports
(g,g) on the left and (x,d) doesn't.
The notion of supporting on the right is defined analogously using the notion
of competing on the right.
Finally, Munyer defines a map to be exempt from deletion if it gives another
map either left support or right support.
After the marking stage has been completed, those maps which have not -
been marked and which share a node with another association are removed
from the match. This removal stage (but not the marking stage) is iterated,
Chapter 3. Analysis of Existing Analogy Matchers 43
as an association which was removed may have been the only one which another
association supported and so the latter should be removed also.
The motivation behind this complicated procedure seems to be that we should
retain a set of associations which preserve the structure of the terms (this is
behind the notion of direct dominance), and remove any alternative sets (this is
behind the notion of competition).
Adding This stage tabes as input the result of the deleting stage and adds an
association between any pair of nodes in the two terms which are both unmapped
in the existing match but whose parent nodes are mapped to each other.
Also, if the head symbols of the two terms are both unmapped an association
between them is added.
This step is not iterated.
Heuristics
What axe the analogy heuristics which are being used in this algorithm? That
is to say, what does Munyer believe about analogies that led him to design the
algorithm in the way which he did?
In the grounding stage, all possible identical associations are put in the initial
match: thus Munyer must believe that identical associations make good ana¬
logues, and matches containing high proportions of identical associations make
good analogies. Let us call this belief the identical symbols heuristic.
In the deleting stage, the initial match is whittled down to a subset of the
original; this is done so that the associations in the subset tend to support each
other well, in the sense of respecting the structure of the terms which are being
matched. Thus, Munyer must, in addition, believe that matches which respect
the structure of the terms make promising analogies. Let us call this belief the
partial homomorphism heuristic (a homomorphism, in algebra, is amapping
which respects, in a formal sense/the structure of the entities which it relates).
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In the adding phase, associations axe added to the match which fit in well,
again in a structural sense, with those left after deletion. So this stage also
makes use of the partial homomorphism heuristic.
Reconstruction
The reconstruction of Munyer's algorithm in Prolog proved to be fairly straight¬
forward, although the details of the deleting stage are complicated and make the
program larger than might be expected. The reconstruction has not been par¬
ticularly concerned with efficiency, which could no doubt be improved, but the
algorithm seems to be unavoidably expensive (we analyse this further below).
Performance and modifications
Among the examples of analogy matches which Munyer claims his matcher finds
are the following four2:
1. /( x ) 2. /(a, g(a)) 3. /(a,/(6,c)) 4. f(g(a,h(a)),g(b,h(b)))
f(d(a)) b), c) /( x(a), x(b) )
(Note the second order function variable, x, in the fourth example). Munyer
does not go into why these matches are suitable analogies, but lists them as the
types of matches which he thinks a matcher should be able to construct. The
first example represents a first order unification : Munyer views analogy as "a
cousin of unification" and thus the matcher should unify two terms when this is
possible. The second example represents a second order mismatch, the similarity
being that both terms are functions of a . The third example represents analogy
modulo associativity, and the fourth a second order unification.
2These examples are chosen from [Munyer 81] in order to illustrate the problems with
his original algorithm —=^they are not a random sample. .
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Initially, these examples were considered not so much for their intrinsic in¬
terest (they axe not examples from real problems, and Munyer's explanations
for them seem doubtful) as for whether the reconstruction of the algorithm con¬
structed the intended matches. The matches produced by the reconstruction on
the same examples are as follows:
1. /( x ) 2. /(a, g(a)) 3. /(o,/(6,c)) 4. f(g(a,h(a)),g(b,h(b)))
(These matches were subsequently confirmed going through the algorithm by
hand). These results are different from those that Munyer claims for his algo¬
rithm. We now analyse why the matcher does not get the intended answers, and
propose modifications to it so that it does.
Number 3 — improvement A. Analysis of the third example suggested
that it is wrong to count only unmapped intermediate nodes in computing the
containment penalty — this is why the internal (/, /) map is deleted in favour
of the (a, a) and (c, c) maps. If this restriction was dropped, (/, /) would have
equal left penalty with (c, c) and equal right penalty with (a, a) and would thus
be exempted.
This change was made to the program, and the new version was tested on
Munyer's examples. The only change in result was in the third example above,
for which the desired match was found. Since the performance wasn't worse
on any of the examples, we will call this an improvement to the algorithm —
improvement A. - .
Numbers 1. and 4. . — improvement B Note that the first example
should produce a first-order unification. But Munyer gives a sketch of a proof
that his algorithm is complete for first order unifiable terms i.e. that it finds the
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most general unifier (m.g.u.) between such terms. This 'proof' must be wrong
somewhere since the first example above had first order unifiable terms. The idea
of the proof is that, given two unifiable terms, after the grounding stage some of
the associations are 'correct', that is they are part of the valid unification, and
some are not. The correct maps will have penalty 0. Munyer claims that any
maximal incorrect map will have non-zero penalty and so will be deleted.
This claim is false both for the original algorithm and for the improvement
A version. However, it turns out that the claim is made true if, in addition
to improvement A, the condition for exemption from deletion, in the deleting
stage of the algorithm, is strengthened in the following way: a map is exempt
if it supports another map both on the left and on the right, as opposed to the
previous condition which only required either one or the other.
This further change was made to the program, and the new version was
tested on Munyer's examples. Again the only changes were improvements. The
new version got the 'right' answers on the first and fourth of the examples given
above. We therefore call the second change improvement B. Improvement B
without improvement A reverted to the 'wrong' answer on the third example.
Number 2. — improvement C But, even with both improvements, the al¬
gorithm is not first order complete: incorrect associations are sure to be deleted,
but correct ones are not sure to be retained. All four versions of the program
(generated by including or omitting improvements A and B independently) pro¬
duce the following match between the terms a(a(a(6))) and a(a(a(6))):
a( a( a( b )))
a( a( a( b )))
Note the missing ((a, [1]), (a, [1])) map. So the algorithm is not complete even for
identical first order terms. There is an easy way to stop the correct maps being
deleted: exempt any map from deletion which is maximal in the match w.r.t.
the partial dominance relation. ( An association (ai,~frf) partially dominates
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another (a2,b2) if either (ai,6i) dominates (02,62) or oq = a2 and 61 > 62 or
b\ — 62 and a,i > 02.)
It would too lenient to exempt all maximal maps under dominance, since
this would exempt incorrect maps as well. This is why partial dominance is
needed. With this change made to the program, it was tested again on Munyer's
examples. It got the right answers on all of those listed above. The one remaining
example from [Munyer 81] on which the new algorithm did not get the answer
that Munyer claimed is the example with which Munyer illustrates his algorithm!
We call this change improvement C.
It may be that Munyer had in fact incorporated the three improvements into
his algorithm, but forgot to update his written description of it. Otherwise, it
seems odd that he should quote examples that his matcher could not carry out.
Assessment of the algorithm
The first thing which is notable about Munyer's algorithm, or at least the recon¬
struction of it, is it's enormous computational cost. For example, in constructing
the match
the program took 40 seconds of c.p.u. time (interpreted Quintus Prolog on a
Sun3 workstation); and on the match
took 185 seconds. While the reconstruction of the algorithm has not been par¬
ticularly concerned with efficiency, the high cost seems to be an inherent feature
of the structure of the algorithm, in particular the treatment of variables. In
even(x) & even(x) ——► even(x * y)
odd(x) & odd(y) —> odd(x * y)
(27 associations!)
Chapter 3. Analysis of Existing Analogy Matchers 48
the grounding stage, associations axe placed between a variable and all symbols
in the other term, on the basis that no a priori restriction can be placed on the
possible bindings for a variable. In the above examples, there were 67 and 146
associations respectively after the grounding stage. In general, the number of
maps at this stage would be of the order of the square of the length of the terms.
The deleting stage then has to perform fairly complex computations on this
set of associations, and this is where most of the c.p.u. time is used. The
complexity of the deleting stage is of the order of the square of the size of the
match produced by the grounding stage. The adding stage is linear in the size
of the intermediate match. Therefore, the whole algorithm is n4 in the size of
the original terms. Unlike many "worst case" analyses, this is also a typical
case analysis, as the algorithm does not exploit features of particular terms to
cut down its computation. Munyer's justification for his bottom-up approach
to matching (as opposed to the top-down approach of unification algorithms) is
that, since an analogy match may disrupt the structure of the terms, no top-down
restrictions should be placed on associations. This philosophy contrasts with
that of Kling [Kling 71], who uses the notion of semantic type to constrain the
possible mappings between variables (see below). Kling's approach is to enforce
type correspondence if possible, but to allow a small amount of deviation in order
to find interesting analogies; in any case, in Kling's matches, variables are only
mapped to other variables. Munyer has no type restrictions, and furthermore
allows the binding of variables in his matches. This enables him to find a much
wider range of analogies, in theory anyway, but he pays for this generality in
c.p.u. time.
Having observed the inherent complexity of Munyer's approach, there axe
ways in which the algorithm could be guided which would not violate the ap¬
proach:
• consistency: no attention is paid, during matching, to the consistency of
the match, particularly the variable bindings which it entails. Matches with
inconsistent variable bindings are rejected at a later stage of the analogy
process (see [Munyer 81])._ But the complexity would be reduced if only
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consistent sets of variable bindings were considered in the first place. This
would involve the development of several possible matches between a pair
of terms which Munyer, for some reason, seems to want to avoid. The
(relative) consistency of the predicate and variable mappings could be used
to prune unpromising matches.
• syntactic types: Munyer's matcher blurs some syntactic distinctions which
analogies tend to respect, for example the special status of the propositional
connectives, and the distinction between predicates and functions: in all
the analogies considered in this thesis, propositional connectives are only
mapped to other logical connectives, predicates are only mapped to other
predicates, and functions to other functions. One way of exploiting these
syntactic type distinctions would be to construct only those associations
which respect the syntactic types during grounding, and put in those which
don't, if at all, during adding. These proposals introduce more typing into
the representation, but only at a very general, domain-independent level.
The issue was raised above of the construction of more than one match be¬
tween a pair of terms, which Munyer's algorithm cannot do. The following
intermediate match after the grounding stage illustrates the usefulness of such a
facility:
There are two main competing 'chains' of supporting associations, one drawn
as dotted lines, and one as continuous lines. Munyer's original algorithm would
delete both chains iteratively from the left, finishing the deleting stage with
a null match. The version with improvement C would retain the continuous
chain, because it connects the head function symbols, delete the dotted one,
and thus come up with the first order unification. But there really seems to
be a disjunction here — either of the chains represents a plausible match which
a( a( a( b )))
a( a( x))
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could be investigated further. The present criterion for deciding between them
is unsatisfactory as it does not relate to the structure of the various possibilities.
It seems sensible to split the match up into the disjuncts, at this stage, and
investigate them separately.
Analysis in terms of heuristics
In the previous section, we saw how Munyer's matcher could be improved in
certain ways, without departing from the overall, bottom-up approach which
Munyer takes. However, there is a serious problem with Munyer's algorithm
which will not be solved by any of the remedies which have been suggested.
The problem can be understood in terms of the way in which the matcher uses
its analogy heuristics: the identical symbols heuristic and the partial ho-
momorpliism heuristic. The matcher relies entirely on the identical symbols
heuristic to propose initial associations (apart from variable bindings). Non-
identical associations, which are not variable bindings, can only be added by the
adding stage. The effect of this is that the matcher is unable to construct useful
matches which involve a significant number of non-identical associations. The
two examples given above to illustrate the computational cost of the algorithm
also illustrate this defect. There are strong matches between the problem pairs,
which Munyer's algorithm misses — this is because they involve'significant non-
identical associations. In the second example, the identical symbols heuristic is
positively misleading, since the terms do contain common function symbols, but
these are not associated in the strong match.
Generally, the identical symbols heuristic can only be considered as a fairly
weak heuristic (see section 3.3.1 for further discussion of this, and of other heuris¬
tics). The partial homomorphism heuristic is stronger, however (see section
3.3.1). But no amount of clever computation at the deleting stage, which is
based on the latter heuristic, can rectify the errors in the initial match con¬
structed by the grounding stage, which is based on the former. Most interesting
analogies will contain a significant number of non-identical associations; thus the
heavy reliance of Munyer's matcher on the identical symbols heuristic will re-
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strict the generality of the matcher, preventing it from finding many interesting
and easy analogies.
Summary
Munyer's algorithm, even with the improvements which have been made to it,
does not provide an adequate analogy matcher, even for simple analogies. The
broad diagnosis of the problem with the algorithm is that it relies too heavily
on a weak heuristic, the identical symbols heuristic. Quite apart from this, the
algorithm is extremely expensive computationally, which makes the prospects
for it scaling up to larger examples remote.
3.2.2 Kling
Kling's algorithm for matching up pairs of problem descriptions is called INI¬
TIAL MAP, and is part of his analogy system ZORBA. INITIAL MAP accepts
as input two theorem descriptions, each of one of the forms
H1LH2&...&Pn -+ C!&C2&...&Cm or CxhC2h ...&Cm,
where each of the H's and C's is of the form
P{xi, . . . , 3^r))
P being a predicate and the x's variables. The variables are implicitly universally
quantified. Thus there are no functions or constants. Note that this is a more
restricted syntax than that accepted by Munyer's matcher. Kling claims that
this subset of predicate calculus is suitable for mathematics. This seems an
odd thing to say, as normal mathematics has as many constants and functions
in it as anything _ else. It is true that a much wider class of sentences can be
transformed into semantically equivalent sentences of the above form (skolemize
the existential variables; if P is a (unary) predicate,"1 f a function symbol and
terms, replace P(/(ta,..., tn)) by f\t\,..., x) —> P(x), where x is
a new variable and f' is the functional relation associated with f (similarly for
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n-ary functions); iterate the last step until there are no functions or constants
(0-ary functions) left). What comes out of this procedure is a very unnatural
looking sentence, and, importantly for analogy matching, the functionality of
the new predicates is not represented in the syntax. Note also that, unless the
functionality of the predicates is stated explicitly in the form of axioms, the
theory which results from this transformation is weaker than the original — in
particular it is decidable.
However, the theorems of abstract algebra on which Kling bases his matcher
do fit naturally into this form.
INITIAL MAP also has access to semantic templates for each of the pred¬
icates in the sentences to be matched. For example, the predicate group has
semantic template
structure(set, operation).
The intended meaning of this (although Kling does not explain it) seems to be
that a group is a structure consisting of a set and an operation.
INITIAL MAP outputs an analogy match between the sentences, which
consists principally of an association between the predicates in the sentences,
and, as a by-product, an association between the variables. In Kling's system
ZORBA, this match is then passed to the EXTENDER module, which applies
the match to the axioms used in the proof of one of the theorems in order to find
analogous axioms, extending the match in the process. The latter stages will be
analysed further in Chapter 5.
The algorithm
The matching strategy of INITIAL MAP ( I-M ) is as follows: assume the
hypotheses of one theorem match those of the other, and similarly for the con¬
clusions (so the match breaks up into two sub-matches); do one of these first,
and then the other, using the intermediate match obtained from the first to help
the second; use the semantic templates to constrain the association of atoms
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between the theorems, and use the existing predicate and variable associations
to choose where there is ambiguity in the semantic templates.
Kling doesn't say in what order the two sub-matches are attempted. In the
reconstruction described here, whichever of the conclusions and the hypotheses
contains fewest atoms is attempted first, on the basis that it is usually easier to
match smaller structures.
So, if the theorems to be matched are
A1kA2k...kAn -> BlfzB2k...kBm
and Ci&C2&...&Cr -* DlbD2&...kDs
and m + s < n + r, the module SETMATCH is called first on the conclusions,
then the hypotheses.
SETMATCH breaks up into two submodules, SINGLEMATCH and MUL-
TIMATCH, where SINGLEMATCH is first called to pair up the atoms in the
sets which have unique semantic templates, and then MULTIMATCH is called
to pair up the rest using the partial match generated by SINGLEMATCH to
guide it.
When either SINGLEMATCH or MULTIMATCH decides to associate a pair
of atoms, a procedure called ATOMMATCH is called to extract predicate and
variable correspondences from the atoms, which are added to the evolving match.
If the atoms have identical semantic templates, the associations are just those
which preserve argument order. But Kling also wants to be able to find analogies
in which, for example, groups are associated with rings— that is, group(Set, Op)
is associated with ring(Set 1, Opl, 0p2) — and these predicates do not have the
same semantic templates. Their templates are structure(set, operation) and
structure^set, operation, operation) respectively. Kling's solution to this prob¬
lem is as follows: he allows a variable in one of the atoms to be associated with a
consecutive sequence of variables in the other as long as (a) all the types involved
axe the same and (b) the correspondences preserve argument order. In this case,
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he would get
group <-> ring, Set <-> Set 1 and [Op] *-> [Opl,Op2].
If conditions (a) and (b) cannot be satisfied, ATOMMATCH fails.
The job of SINGLEMATCH and MULTIMATCH, then, is to decide on pairs
of atoms to pass to ATOMMATCH. SINGLEMATCH uses the following criteria
in its decision:
1. If there is only one unpaired atom left on each side, associate them by
default.
2. Associate pairs of atoms having the same semantic template.
3. Associate pairs of atoms whose predicate symbols are associated in the
existing match.
4. Associate pairs of atoms whose predicate symbols have the same type,
where this gives a unique association.
1 is checked after any association is made. Otherwise 2, 3 and 4 are checked in
that order.
If SINGLEMATCH cannot pair up all the atoms with unique semantic tem¬
plates on each side, it fails. If it can, the partial match produced is passed on to
MULTIMATCH, which considers the atoms on each side which have the same
semantic templates as others. First, the atoms are grouped into their semantic
blocks; then blocks are paired up using the following criteria in the same way
that SINGLEMATCH used its criteria:
1. If there is only one unpaired block on each side, associate them by default.
2. Associate pairs of blocks which contain atoms whose predicate symbols are
associated by the existing match. .
3. Associate pairs of blocks whose atoms have predicates with the same se¬
mantic type.
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When a pair of blocks is associated by the above criteria, the submodule MUL-
TIMATCH1 is called to pair up the atoms within the blocks. MULTIMATCH1
has a single criterion for doing this, based on the existing variable associations:
if there is a pair of variables associated by the existing match, each of which
occurs in only one atom in the appropriate block, then pair up the two atoms.
This completes the description of INITIAL_MAP.
Heuristics
What are the analogy heuristics which are used in Kling's algorithm? The most
obvious guidance is given to the matcher by the semantic templates; associations
are made which preserve the semantic type of predicates whenever possible. Thus
Kling must believe that matches which tend to preserve semantic type make
promising analogies. Let us call this the semantic type heuristic.
As well as the semantic types of predicates (for example, structure and
relsructure3), the templates give types for the argument positions to the pred¬
icates (for example, set and operation). These argument types are used in the
procedure ATOMMATCH, which insists that variable associations preserve the
argument types. We call this the argument type heuristic. These types seem
to be of a different kind to the semantic types of the predicates (although Kling
does not discuss the meaning of either); the argument types could well be unary
predicates from the object language, or the types within a typed logic, whereas
the semantic types denote heuristic sets of predicates from the object language.
This is why the two heuristics are distinguished here.
Thirdly, the partial homomorphism heuristic, used by Munyer, is also
used by Kling; the overall top-down structure of the algorithm ensures that the
symbol associations made in a match preserve the syntactic structure of the
terms being matched; furthermore, the default rules in SINGLEMATCH and
3relstructure seems intended to denote a substructure.
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MULTIMATCH are also based on the belief that analogy matches ought to be
structure-preserving — the association between atoms made by default fills a
structural hole in the associations which have already been made. The default
rules in INITIAL MAP are similar in spirit to Munyer's adding stage.
SINGLEMATCH, MULTIMATCH and MULTIMATCH 1 all contain criteria
for pairing up atoms, or blocks of atoms, on the basis of existing associations
in the intermediate match; pairings are made so that the associations are likely
to be repeated — that is, an attempt is made to keep the match as consistent
as possible. Thus, Kling must believe that consistent matches make promising
analogies. Let us call this the consistent translation heuristic.
Lastly, note that INITIAL MAP never considers associating symbols unless
they have the same syntactic type; i.e. propositional connectives are only
ever associated with propositional connectives, and similarly for predicates and
variables (unlike Munyer's algorithm, INITIAL MAP makes no attempt to bind
variables in matching). This is not done by explicit criteria, but is built into the
structure of the algorithm; let us call this the syntactic type heuristic. Given
the restricted syntax which the matcher accepts, we can think of this heuristic as
being implied by the partial homomorphism heuristic (or vice-versa); however,
in more general situations, the two would be separate, which is why they are
listed separately here.
Reconstruction
The reconstruction of INITIAL_MAP in Prolog turned out to be straightforward
— considerably easier than Munyer's algorithm.
Performance and modifications
The reconstruction was first tested on the examples from abstract algebra that
Kling gives in {Kling 71]. The performance was satisfactory on most of these.
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SETMATCH is first called on the conclusions, and SINGLEMATCH immedi¬
ately defaults to ATOMMATCH, since there is only one atom in each conclu¬
sion. The semantic templates of the conclusions are not identical, but they do
match in the weak sense outlined above, giving the first four elements of the
match. SETMATCH is then called on the hypotheses, with the partial match
being passed along. The atoms in the hypotheses which have unique semantic
templates,
{propernormal(m, g, *), factorstructure(x, 5,m)}
from theorem 1, and
{properideal(n, r, *, rf), factorstructure(y, r, n)}
from theorem 2, are passed to SINGLEMATCH.
Condition 2 from SINGLEMATCH _pairs up the factorstructure atoms and
passes them to ATOMMATCH which adds two more associations to the analogy.
Then the default condition in SINGLEMATCH pairs up the remaining two atoms
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and passes them to ATOMMATCH which adds one more association to the
match.




{ring(r, *, +), simplering(y, *, +)}.
These are paired up by the default condition, and are passed to MULTIMATCH1
to pair up the atoms within the partitions. The existing g <-* r variable associa¬
tion is used to pair up one atom from each partition, and the x «-> y association
to pair up the remaining atoms, giving the final match.
While the program performed as desired on Kling's algebra examples, the
heavy use of the semantic templates was worrying. All of Kling's theorem pairs
come from essentially the same global analogy between group theory and ring
theory. It seemed that it was Kling's knowledge of this global analogy which led
him to choose the particular semantic templates which he did for the examples.
Thus it is no surprise and no great achievement that the algorithm finds the
correct matches in these cases. This issue is discussed further below.
After going through Kling's algebra examples, the reconstruction was tried
on some new examples. One of these was the following pair 4:
—(x + y) = —x -| y and l/(x . y) = \/x . 1/y
4Note that the second equation is not true if interpreted within the real numbers;
we have omitted the conditions which would make it true in order to make it as easy as
possible for the matcher. In any case, the equation is true of the non-zero reals
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where new functional predicates are introduced to replace the functions. Very
general types were chosen — 'relfn' for all the functional predicates and 'rel' for
equal/2. This is a very easy analogy, involving 1-1 associations of atoms, predi¬
cates and variables; however, the matcher was unable to find the correspondence.
On investigation, it can be seen that the problem comes when MULTIMATCH
is called on the hypotheses. Condition 3 (see above) does not apply, since both
blocks in each partition have predicates of the same type, and thus MULTI-
MATCH fails. There seems to be no reason why MULTIMATCH should not
have the extra semantic template condition that SINGLEMATCH does (condi¬
tion 2); this would solve the present problem, and lead to the correct match. This
change was made to the program. Furthermore, performance is not impaired on
any of the previous examples. It seems odd that Kling should have omitted this
condition, since it seems a natural consequence of his matching strategy; but, as
mentioned above, Kling admits that the matcher was designed around two of the
algebra examples, so it may be just that the extra condition was not necessary
for these.
Another example on which the matcher was tried was:
rational(p) & irrational(q) —> irrational(p + q)
rational(p) & irrational(q) & unequal(p, 0) —* irrational(p. q).
This is one of the examples considered in Chapter 1, except that irrational is
used instead of not(rational) and unequal instead of not(equal), since the matcher
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Sz times(p, q, r)
—> irrational(r).
General semantic templates were again used. The matcher fails on this example,
since it requires a 1-1 association of atoms in order to succeed. The failure
occurs in SINGLEMATCH on the hypotheses; the plus atoms are associated
by the second condition, leaving the unequal condition on the right hand side
and nothing on the left hand side, which causes failure. But sometimes (as in
this example) it seems right to leave an atom unmatched — extra conditions
are common in analogies. A reasonable rule would be to allow SINGLEMATCH
to succeed if one set is empty and the other contains just one atom. With this
change implemented, the matcher goes on to find the right match in this example.
Again, performance on previous examples is not impaired. More liberally, we
could allow any number of unmatched atoms within SINGLEMATCH, but this
was not implemented.
Another example where the performance of the matcher was not as good as
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subgroupfjii, g, *) subring(s2, r, *, +)
j ring(r, *, +)
I commutativering(si,*, +)











The match is almost complete, but lacks the expected group n'nj association.
First, the conclusions are SETMATCHed; the intersection atoms are then SIN-
GLEMATCHed; MULTIMATCH pairs up the semantic blocks as shown, and
passes them to MULTIMATCH1; this is first applied to the three-atom blocks,
pairing up the abeliangroup and commutativering atoms using existing variable
associations, but the remaining atoms, group(g,*) and ring(r, *, +) cannot be
paired up by MULTIMATCH1 — this is the cause of the incompleteness in the
final match; MULTIMATCH is then called on the two element blocks and finishes
the matching.
There seem to be two possible solutions to this problem:
• MULTIMATCH 1 could be given a default condition, like those in SIN-
GLEMATCH and MULTIMATCH. The group and ring atoms would then
be ATOMMATCHed by default and the final match would be complete.
• The applications of MULTIMATCH1 to the various pairs of semantic
blocks could be interleaved in the following way: if MULTIMATCH1 can't
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pair up some of the atoms between two blocks, it should leave them un¬
matched temporarily, and work on another pair of blocks; having matched
as many atoms as it can within the new pair, it should return to the old pair
and try to use newly added variable associations to pair up more atoms.
In this example, when MULTIMATCH1 is applied to the second pair of
blocks, the g r association is added, which enables the group and ring
atoms from the first pair to be associated.
Both of the above changes will be applicable in situations where the other one
is not. So, although only one is needed for this example, it is reasonable to
propose both changes. Of the two, the second seems more reliable — a more
sophisticated application of the existing matching strategy. The problem with
having many defaults in the matcher is that it will tend to match pairs of short
sentences, almost entirely by default, which are not in fact very similar. The
matcher will not be able to discriminate so well. Having said that, Kling uses
defaults heavily anyway, and adding one to MULTIMATCH1 seems consistent
with his matching strategy. Again, it is probably just because Kling's target
examples didn't need it that he did not put in the default himself. As before,
these changes would not affect the matcher's performance on previous examples,
although they were not actually made to the reconstruction.
Further criticisms
The following are further criticisms of INITIAL MAP which are not based on
failure in any one example, but have arisen from scrutiny of the matching pro¬
cedure over previous examples:
• As explained above, ATOMMATCH only makes variable associations which
preserve argument order. While this is understandable if the predicates of
the atoms are the same, it is not otherwise — the relative order of argu¬
ments between two different predicates is the result of arbitrary decisions
made when the domain was formally represented, and should therefore
have no influence over analogy matching. Furthermore, if the predicates
Chapter 3. Analysis of Existing Analogy Matchers 63
are commutative in some of their arguments, the particular presentations
chosen for the atoms determine the possible variable correspondences that
ATOMMATCH can make; that is, no account is taken of the commutativity
which might allow ATOMMATCH to permute the order of the variables in
the atoms. In the examples given above, where functional predicates have
occurred, we have presented the atoms so that corresponding variables (in
the intended match) occur in the same argument positions; thus, we have
made it as easy as possible for the matcher. Had we not done this, the de¬
ficiencies of ATOMMATCH would have been compounded with the other
problems which were discussed.
• MULTIMATCH1 makes use of existing variable associations only, and in a
fairly simple way — this is all that was necessary for Kling's target algebra
examples. There seems to be no reason why it should not use existing
predicate associations as well, as SINGLEMATCH and MULTIMATCH
do. This would make it more powerful. The way in which MULTIMATCH 1
uses the variable associations could also be strengthened so that it can make
use of multiple associations, like * <-> [*,+], as well as single associations.
• Conversely to the previous point, there seems to be no reason why SIN¬
GLEMATCH and MULTIMATCH should not use existing variable asso¬
ciations, as well as predicate associations, to pair up atoms .and blocks of
atoms.
A more serious problem with the matcher is shown up by the following ex-
yjx + 1 + a = b plus(x,l,y) & root(y,z) & plus(z,a,w) —► equal(w,b)
In the first sentence, all the atoms have unique semantic templates, whereas in
- the second the two plus atoms are in a semantic block together. Thus, SIN¬
GLEMATCH pairs up the two root atoms and the two equal atoms, and leaves
ample:
Equation In Kling's syntax
yfx + a = b root(x,z) & plus(z,a,y) —» equally, b)
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the plus atom in the top sentence un-matched. Then MULTIMATCH is called
between a single block on one side and nothing on the other, and so fails.
It is the basic SINGLEMATCH/MULTIMATCH distinction which is at fault
here: where there is an atom which ought to be unmatched, its semantic tem¬
plate may coincide with that of another which ought to be matched by SIN-
GLEMATCH, which will prevent the latter from ever being considered by SIN-
GLEMATCH. It seems likely that this situation will occur often in non-trivial
analogies, and thus that the matching strategy of INITIAL MAP will have to be
changed to cope.
Assessment
Given the user-specified semantic templates, INITIAL MAP performs quite well
on the algebra examples around which Kling designed it. Its top-down matching
strategy, and the heavy guidance it receives from the semantic templates, make
INITIAL MAP efficient — much quicker than Munyer's algorithm.
However, as indicated above, the heavy and inflexible reliance on semantic
templates is worrying:
• The expectation that matches will preserve type is built in to the overall
structure of the matcher, in particular the SINGLEMATCH/MULTIMATCH
distinction. As explained above, this rigid structure restricts the generality
of the matcher, causing it to fail on fairly easy examples, even when the
intended match would preserve types. In order to avoid this problem, the
main procedures of the algorithm would have to be rewritten.
• It is a consequence of the design of the algorithm that almost all of the pred¬
icate associations which are made will preserve semantic type; it is possible
for non-type preserving associations to be added by the default rules, but
nob significantly many. But we can think of the types as (partially) encod- -
ing potential analogies; for example, the type structures shown in Figure
3-1 suggest an analogy which includes the associations group <-* ring and
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structure relstructure
group ring subgroup subring
Figure 3—1: Algebraic type structures
subgroup subring. So INITIAL MAP is unable to extend significantly
the analogies which axe encoded in its type structure. Thus it is doubtful
whether the matcher can be said to discover analogies at all — its use of
types seems to involve a circular argument. As explained above, on the
algebra examples, the matcher repeatedly reconstructs parts of the same
global analogy between group theory and ring theory, which is the analogy
suggested by the semantic templates. The problems with the use of the
semantic types in matching are discussed further in section 3.3.1.
Analysis in terms of heuristics
From the point of view of the discovery of new analogies, the shortcomings of
Kling's matcher can, like Munyer's, be understood in terms of the way in which it
uses its analogy heuristics. The matcher relies on the semantic type heuristic
to propose initial associations between atoms, and only uses the other heuristics
to add new associations on the basis of the existing ones. Thus, just as Munyer's
matcher is unable to break free of its reliance on the identical symbols heuristic,
Kling's is unable to break free of the semantic type heuristic.
But some analogies will preserve a given set of types, some will respect them
(in the sense of inducing a consistent mapping between types in the base and
target), and others will do neither. We would like a matcher to be able to use
the type information in a flexible way, along with other criteria for analogy, so
that matches which respect types may be preferred, but those which don't will
__not be ruled out.
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Summary
Kling's matcher has turned out to be inadequate for many of the simple analogies
which we would hope that a matcher could find. Perhaps this is not surprising,
since the matcher was designed around just a few algebra examples, for which it
was provided with much of the information about the intended analogies.
We have seen that there are various straightforward alterations which can be
made to the algorithm to improve its performance while not affecting its over¬
all strategy. However, it has also become clear that, in order to improve the
algorithm much further, its reliance on the semantic type heuristic, including
the SINGLEMATCH/MULTIMATCH distinction, which is the basis of the al¬
gorithm, would have to be dropped. This would entail a complete redesign of
the matcher. The distinction, and hence the matching strategy, is based on the
rigid use of types and 1-1 associations between atoms; where these cannot be
guaranteed, the matcher will be inadequate.
3.3 Summary of reconstructions
3.3.1 Heuristics used and justifications
Figure 3-2 lists the heuristics which have been found to underlie the matchers
of Kling and Munyer, and which matchers use each of them.
We next consider what justification there is for making use of each of these
heuristics.
Partial homomorphism Firstly, note that almost all computational or quasi-
computational accounts of analogy axe based around a notion of structural
matching, which is what the partial homomorphism heuristic recommends. For
example, in her structure-mapping theory, considered in Chapter 2, Centner
introduces the notion of the systematicity of a structure-mapping; this is the














Figure 3—2: Heuristics used
extent to which matched objects are mutually constrained by identical relations.
Apart from the strange restriction to identical relations, Gentner does not con¬
sider the looser forms of structural correspondence which arise in mathematics,
and which both Munyer and Kling are concerned with. Both these restrictions of
the structure-mapping theory seem related to the fact that Gentner designed the
representations of the physical domains herself, and thus was able, by anticipat¬
ing the analogy, to finesse away many of the matching problems. Interestingly,
the partial homomorphism heuristic is the only one shared by both Kling's and
Munyer's matchers.
But why is it a good idea to look for matches which respect the structure
of the terms being matched? Although most authors have considered structural
matching crucial to analogy, there has been very little discussion of its justifi¬
cation. However, within automated problem solving, we can understand why
structural matching is important. The goal of analogy is to use the base proof
to guide the search for a target proof." The base proof consists of a sequence
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starting with the problem and ending with a recognised goal state (the empty-
clause, for instance). The applicability of an axiom to a step is determined by
unification, a strict structural matching procedure. The hope in analogy is that
we will be able to make corresponding steps in the target. In the target too,
we will need structural matches between axioms and intermediate steps. If we
can find a structurally similar problem to the target problem, we can reasonably
hope that, if we can also find structurally similar axioms to those used in the
base, there will be a good chance of being able to make corresponding steps
in the target — that is, that the corresponding clauses will unify and produce
corresponding inferences. If this is so throughout the proof, the application pro¬
cedure (see Chapter 6) will have no difficulty in solving the target problem by
analogy to the base problem. Of course, many things can go wrong: we may
not be able to find similar axioms to apply in the target, or, even if we can, the
corresponding steps may not go through because of the loose structural matches
(see Chapter 7 for a discussion of how the application procedure can get into dif¬
ficulties). But a structural match between problems is still an important factor.
To put it another way, if we do not have a structural match between problems,
it is almost certain that the application of the analogy will be difficult.
Therefore, we consider the partial homomorphism heuristic to be strong. It is
important that our notion of structural similarity be flexible, in .order to encom¬
pass the sorts of structural matches between even closely analogous problems
which occur in mathematics.
Consistent translation heuristic Again, the notion of consistency of the
translation implied by an analogy match is taken to be important in almost all
accounts of analogy, but, again, without much attempt at justification. Many ac¬
counts, such as Gentner's [Gentner 82] and Winston's [Winston 80] require that
the mapping be strictly consistent. But others, such as that of Gick and Holyoak
[Gick & Holyoak 80], accept that many analogies contain some inconsistencies,
and that to insist on strict consistency would considerably restrict generality. In
Chapter 1, we saw that simple problem matches such as




involve inconsistencies. Kling's matches can have inconsistent predicate map¬
pings, via the default rules in SINGLEMATCH and MULTIMATCH, although
this happens rarely in practice5. Munyer's matcher pays no explicit attention to
consistency, although its reliance on the identical symbols heuristic means that
inconsistencies can only be introduced at the adding stage.
So why should we prefer consistent matches at all? Again, by considering
automated problem solving, we can understand why we would like matches to
be as consistent as possible. In the discussion on the importance of structural
similarity in predicting inferences to make on the target problem, we omitted
another important feature of unification: it is not only a strict structural match,
but also a strict match on the identities of predicates, functions and constants.
Since, in most interesting analogies, there will be non-identical associations,
there is a danger that target inferences will fail to go through, not because of
structural mismatches, but because of symbol mismatches. But, if the mapping
is consistent, we will have greater confidence that this will not happen — if there
is a consistent translation of symbols between base and target, where symbols
were the same in the base, they will be the same in the target. Although we
would like a strictly consistent match for this reason, restricting a matcher to
such matches would restrict its generality. More realistically, we would like our
match to have as few inconsistencies as possible, but we may have to put up
with some.
So we consider the consistent translation heuristic to be strong, but we must
be flexible about its application.
5In fact, inconsistent predicate mappings are rejected by Kling's system ZORBA,
since the application stage of the system cannot cope with them
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Syntactic type heuristic It is implicit in all existing computational accounts
of analogy that syntactic types will be respected by analogy matches — predi¬
cates are never associated with functions, and propositional connectives are only
ever associated with each other. Perhaps even this should not be treated as an
absolute criterion — it would be quite possible for a predicate on one side to
be associated with a function on the other. But in practice, it seems a reliable
heuristic. The application of an analogy which did not respect syntactic types
would be difficult.
We can therefore consider this to be a strong heuristic.
Argument type heuristic Kling insists that matches preserve the types of
the arguments of predicates. Whether or not this is a good heuristic depends on
the particular types which are used; with Kling's algebra predicates, the main
argument types axe set and operation. We would certainly feel more confident
in being able to apply an analogy which matched sets with sets and operations
with operations, since the axiomatisations are likely to involve checks on these
types. Thus, in this case, we could consider the argument type heuristic to be
quite strong. However, in some other case, argument types may not be a good
clue to analogy at all. Thus, the strength of the heuristic is variable. Brown
[Brown 77] uses just this notion of type in his matching procedures; however,
Brown's matches do not necessarily preserve the types, indicating the variability
of the heuristic.
Identical symbols heuristic This heuristic is used heavily in Munyer's matcher,
as explained above, but not at all in Kling's. Some accounts of analogy, such as
those of Gentner [Gentner 82] and Sternberg [Sternberg 77] have insisted that all
associations between predicates (though not constants) be identical. Munyer's
matcher does allow non-identical associations to be added at the adding stage,
although^ because of the structure of the algorithm, this has limited effect.
While it is clear that most interesting analogies involve a significant propor¬
tion of non-identical associations (some authors define analogy as necessarily
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involving differences in the surface representations), the heuristic nevertheless
has some value: we should not forget that the aim of an analogy system is to
solve the target problem; it should use the most similar problem which it can
find as base. Other things being equal, the presence of identical associations can
only be a good thing; it will increase our confidence that we can find structurally
similar axioms to apply in the target (the same axioms, with luck).
But, bearing in mind that many examples involve genuine translations, we
can only consider the identical symbols heuristic to be relatively weak.
Semantic type heuristic The discussion of this heuristic has been left until
last because it is the most problematical to assess. The reason is that it is the
only one that requires extra information to be provided to the analogy matcher,
apart from the problem statements, and other information available in the object
language, such as argument types. Thus we need to assess not only whether the
preservation of semantic type is a useful property for an analogy match, but
where the type information comes from and what information it represents.
The term "semantic type" is taken in AI to refer to groups of symbols from the
object language which are believed to be related to each other in some (usually
unspecified) way. Often, the semantic types are organised into a hierarchy,
determined by the subset relations between the groups. In automated problem
solving, type hierarchies have been extensively used in the field of inductive
generalisation [Mitchell 78], discussed in the previous chapter. It is generally
recognised that semantic types are heuristic devices, rather than conforming to a
formal definition; but little attention has been paid to the origin of the hierarchy,
although some work has been done on modifying the hierarchy over the course
of problem solving experience [Utgoff 83].
So it is initially unclear what sort of information is being provided to an
analogy matcher in the guise of semantic types. However, by returning to the
automated problem solving argument expounded above, we can identify the con¬
ditions under which a set of semantic types would be useful in guiding a matcher;
i.e. conditions on the types which would make the semantic type heuristic suc-
1. TLz -rUe y-e/vn "se^cna-hc- Sidfiy
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cessful. It is clear in the argument that, in order to apply an analogy easily
and successfully, the analogy system needs a structural correspondence not only
between the problem statements, but also between the axioms which were used
in the base proof and other axioms from the axiom base; it is under these con¬
ditions that we can reasonably expect to make a corresponding inference in the
target to one which was made in the base. The partial homomorphism and con¬
sistent translation heuristics tell us nothing about how likely it is that we will
be able to find analogues for the axioms; the identical symbols heuristic does (if
the symbols are the same, we can reasonably guess that the same axioms will
apply), although it only handles the case where most of the symbols are mapped
to themselves. In more interesting cases, such as Kling's algebra examples, where
most of the associations are non-identical, the heuristics above tell us nothing
about potential analogues for the axioms. For example, given the solution of the
equation a + root(x) = x as target problem6, we would not be able to distinguish
between the following two potential matches with base equations:
That is, in terms of structural correspondence, consistency and the identity or
difference of matched symbols, the two matches above are identical; we call
this inability to distinguish between potential matches the multiple matches
problem. Intuitively, however, the first of the two seems more promising; this
is because the functions + and — are thought to be more closely related than are
+ and log. This feeling is born out by the fact that the first two can be solved
in very similar ways (move the a to the right hand side, square to remove the
rooti and solve the resulting quadratic in x), whereas this simple strategy does
not apply to the logarithmic equation. This is the sort of guidance we would
root(x) + a = x a + root(x) = x
root(x) — a = x log(a,root(x)) = x
is written as root to make the syntactic structure clear.
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hope to get from the semantic type heuristic; the first match is chosen because
it preserves the type of arithmetic operators, whereas the second does not.
From the point of view of the analogy system, what makes the first match
above fruitful is the presence of analogues for the axioms used in the solution of
the base equation; in particular, the identity (x + y) — y = x was applied to move
the a to the right hand side, in the base; the target proof proceeds analogously
in the presence of an analogous identity (x — y) + y = x.
In general, we claim
The extent to which semantic types are useful in analogy match¬
ing is the extent to which symbols of the same type have analogous
axioms/theorems associated with them.
To put it another way,
The extent to which semantic types are useful in analogy match¬
ing is the extent to which they encode potential analogies within or
between domains.
This analysis introduces a dilemma: if the types do not encode analogies, they
will not be useful in analogy matching; if they do, their use in analogy matching
apparently is based on a circular argument, i.e. the matcher is being told, albeit
in disguised form, about the analogies which it is supposed to discover for itself.
However, we can avoid the circularity by one or both of the following means:
• The semantic types should be used flexibly by the matcher, so that it is
able to extend and/or override the type information, if other of the analogy
heuristics suggest that this is a good thing to do.
• The types could be learnt automatically in some way. Since, as we have
seen, useful types encode analogies, the types could represent a succinct
summary of the knowledge which the analogy system has gained about
analogies within the domain in question/This would provide a means for
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the analogy system to improve its ability to reason analogically within the
domain over the course of its experience. This issue is taken up again in
Chapter 7.
But types could perhaps be derived in some other way as well; while not
relating directly to potential analogies, they might nevertheless provide
clues to the matcher.
The first alternative really ought to be chosen whether or not the second is
pursued: if learnt semantic types are used inflexibly, they will never be extended
or overridden, which will prevent any further learning from taking place.
Kling's matcher does neither of these things: the types are provided by the
user, and they are used inflexibly. Thus the suspicion that Kling's use of seman¬
tic types (in his algebra examples, anyway) amounts to a circular argument is
confirmed.
In conclusion, the semantic type heuristic can provide useful guidance to an
analogy matcher, without involving a circular argument. But it can only be
considered as a fairly weak heuristic compared to the partial homomorphism
heuristic and the consistent translation heuristic, from the point of view of the
discovery of new analogies. From the point of view of finding a successful analogy,
whether a new one or not, the usefulness of the heuristic depends on the reliability
of the types. The techniques proposed in Chapter 7 suggest ways of assessing
the strength of semantic types; this information could be fed back to the analogy
matcher, which would weight the heuristic accordingly.
3.3.2 Conclusion
As the arguments presented above show, all of the heuristics which have been
found to underly the analogy matchers of Kling and Munyer have validity, and
can provide useful guidance to a matcher. The problem with the particular
algorithms which we have considered, then, is not the heuristics, which they use,
but the way in which they use them. Each matcher relies far too heavily on —
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the weak heuristic which it uses, the identical symbols heuristic, in the case of
Munyer, and the semantic type heuristic, in the case of Kling; these are used as
the source of initial, plausible associations. The stronger heuristics are only used
conditionally — to propose or retain an association on the basis of an existing
association. This strategy for the use of the heuristics restricts the generality of
the matchers considerably — they axe only able to find matches which conform
closely to the weak heuristics.
Quite apart from this, we have seen that the existing matchers are not partic¬
ularly successful at finding even matches which do conform to the weak heuris¬
tics. Their performance has been improved somewhat by the alterations that
have been described. But Munyer's algorithm appears unavoidably expensive,
and Kling's is too strongly based around the enforcement of types even for some
matches which do preserve types, but which involve unmatched atoms.
Chapter 4
An Improved Analogy Matcher
In this chapter we describe a new approach to analogy matching,
and a particular matcher which exemplifies it. The approach can be
considered to be a generalisation, in several important respects, of
Kling's algorithm. We first motivate the approach and the algorithm
by reference to the shortcomings of existing algorithms, as described
in the last chapter. The features of the algorithm are introduced
gradually, each being motivated as it is introduced. A brief summary
of the algorithm is given in section 4.3. The performance of the
new matcher is then illustrated on some examples, and compared to
Munyer's and Kling's algorithms. Finally, we consider the limitations
of the approach to analogy matching taken by all of the matchers
considered so far, including the new one — namely matching between
the problem statements almost in isolation.
4.1 Introduction
In the last chapter we analysed the shortcomings of the matching algorithms
of Munyer and Kling, particularly with respect to their strategy for applying:
their analogy heuristics. The overall conclusion was that neither of the algo¬
rithms provides a robust and useful analogy matcher. The broad diagnosis of
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their problems is that they rely too heavily and inflexibly on weak heuristics, the
identical symbols heuristic in Munyer, and the semantic type heuristic in
Kling. Thus, while certain modifications have been suggested to the algorithms
which improve their performance to some extent, the analysis in terms of heuris¬
tics suggests that a more fundamental redesign is necessary, in order to produce
a matching algorithm which can be a useful part of an analogy system.
The broad diagnosis of the problem, too much reliance on weak heuristics,
suggests a cure: namely, to use the heuristics, particularly the weak ones, more
flexibly, allowing each to be overridden if others suggest that this would lead to a
promising match. Furthermore, it is clear from the previous chapter firstly that
different people have different ideas about the analogy heuristics that should be
used, and secondly that definitive answers as to the relative strengths of the
heuristics are hard to come by. Thus as well as making more flexible use of
the heuristics, it is desirable to be flexible about which heuristics to use, and
what relative significance to give them. The latter two features tend to follow
from the former, since, if the heuristics are being used flexibly, this suggests that
the design of the matcher is not biased towards particular weak heuristics, and
therefore is relatively easy to modify by either changing the heuristics which are
used, or changing the relative significance of existing heuristics.
So we have the following requirements for an improved matcher:
• The matcher should use its heuristics flexibly, rather than being biased in
design towards any single weak heuristic.
• It should be easy to modify or extend the matcher, on the basis of changing
beliefs about the heuristics; this may include tailoring the matcher-to a
particular domain, by the addition of domain-specific heuristics.
• The matcher should accept any terms from the language of the problem
solver on which the analogy system is based: Kling's restriction to a subset
of first order logic, containing no functions or constants, would be a severe
restriction on a practical analogy system.
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In the next section, we introduce the design features of the new matcher
gradually, explaining the motivation for each. Then, in section 4.3, we give an
algorithmic summary of the matcher.
4.2 Design of the matcher
4.2.1 Dual use of heuristics
Each analogy matcher involves a notion of the space of a priori possible matches
between terms. The analogy heuristics have two main uses:
(a) To guide the matcher towards promising matches — i.e. to prune the search
in the space of possible matches.
(b) To assess the strength, or promise, of completed matches between terms.
The algorithms discussed so far have been wholly concerned with (a). Mun-
yer has a separate algorithm for computing the strength of completed analogy
matches (see below); Kling does no assessment.
It would be possible to take the following brute force approach to analogy
matching: generate all possible matches between a pair of terms, assessing each
and returning the best one or few; i.e. search the space of possible matches
exhaustively, only using the heuristics in (b). Winston [Winston 80] employs this
approach, although he admits that it would be inadequate for larger examples
than those which he has considered so far.
In order to assess whether Winston's approach would be feasible for the sort
of analogies we have in mind, we should consider the size of the space of possible
matches associated with such analogies. We can attempt to estimate the size of
the space between the following formulae from Boolean algebra:
x fl (y U z) = (x fl y) U (x fl z)
x U (y fl z) — (x U y) D (x U z)
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A match is an association between symbols in the two formulae; i.e. a subset of
the cartesian product of the sets of symbol occurrences in the formulae. Each
formula contains 13 symbols, so the cartesian product contains 13 • 13 = 169
elements, and thus has 2169 subsets. To use the brute force approach, we would
clearly need to put restrictions on the type of associations acceptable as analogy
matches. What restrictions are reasonable?
Winston restricts to 1-1 (i.e. consistent) associations of objects in his rep¬
resentation system; but we have seen that consistency can only be used as a
relative criterion without restricting the generality of the matcher. Thus, we
cannot make this restriction. We have likewise seen that we cannot restrict to
identity pairings between predicates and functions.
It would be reasonable to restrict to associations which respect syntactic type;
in this case, this restriction would bring the space down to 2^2) • 2^122) = 2145
(the single predicate = could only be mapped to itself). We could also restrict
to matches which respect the structure of the terms in the following weak sense:
This notion of preservation of structure leaves room for much structural defor¬
mation in a match, such as the following matches
There are degrees of greater structural preservation within this class of matches.
Munyer's algorithm can, in theory, construct matches which do not satisfy this
restriction. But he gives no real examples of such matches — all of his mathemat¬
ical examples do satisfy the condition. We regard this as a reasonable restriction
for an analogy matcher working within a problem solving system; the matching
approach described in the next section only produces matches of this form. But
it is hard to estimate the reduction in -the space of matches produced by this
restriction. We can give a worst case analysis for terms of size n (i.e. n symbol
for local maps (ai,6i) and (<22,62)) if > 0-2 then b\ > 62-
even(x) —> x = 2 • f(x) (x + y) — x — y
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occurrences): for given n, two flat terms of size n produce the maximal number
of matches, since there is minimal term structure to restrict possibilities; the
number is
So the number of matches is, in the worst case, worse than factorial in the size
of the terms. A program which enumerated the possible matches produced 12
possible matches between f(a) and <7(6), 88 between x U y and x fl y, and ran
out of space when called on the terms x fl (y U z) and xU(yfl z). Thus, while
we cannot estimate the size of the space of matches between the original terms
analytically, it is clear that it will be far too big to be searched exhaustively
— apart from enumerating the possibilities, the brute force approach would
have to assess each according to the criteria, which in itself requires significant
computation (see below).
So we can conclude that guidance through the space of possible matches is
necessary; i.e. that the heuristics need to be used in (a) as well as (b).
4.2.2 Design criteria
One part of Kling's matcher which seems quite promising is his pairing up of the
arguments to logical conjunction, which are always atoms in his restricted syntax.
Although he relies too heavily on semantic templates to suggest the pairings,
which contributes to the overall inflexibility of his matcher, the associativity
and commutativity of conjunction are implicit in the process, so that there are
no preconceptions as to which atoms are paired with which — the pairings
are determined by analysing the atoms using heuristics. By contrast, Kling's
procedure ATOMMATCH, for extracting variable associations from a pair of
atoms which have been associated, is based on arbitrary preservation of argument
order, which is totally unsatisfactory.
The matcher developed in the current section makes the following generali¬
sation of the promising part of Kling's algorithm: a flexible, heuristic analysis
of possible argument (or subterm) pairings should be done at every stage of
+ 2 • n.
1 k " / rftiafitMp fist /TUcuttluij
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matching, whether at the propositional or functional level. This generalisation
will enable the matcher to work with an unrestricted syntax. The analysis is
done with pairing criteria, which are based on the analogy heuristics. The
criteria are coordinated flexibly to produce subterm pairings. For example, if
the following terms are to be matched, the matcher might make the argument
pairings shown:
In general, a given set of argument or subterm pairings will lead to a correspond¬
ing set of matching subproblems. If, for the moment, we represent a matching
subproblem as a pair (Ti,T2) of subterms to be matched, the argument pairings
shown above cause the matching problem
( /(/OiA),Ci), g(c2,g(b2,a2)) )
to be replaced by the two subproblems
( /(«lA), g(b2,a2) ) and ( Ci, c2)
So we are led to a problem refinement view of analogy matching: the initial
problem is to match the two terms or formulae which are given; as matching
proceeds, subproblems, to match pairs of subterms of the original terms, are
produced, and recursively refined. Subproblems are solved without producing
more subproblems when one of the subterms in question is a constant or a
variable, or when no pairings are suggested by the refinement procedure. Thus,
instead of Kling's one-pass matching procedures, the whole matching process
needs to be recursive, calling the same procedure on subterms which have been
associated.
As matching proceeds, symbolic associations will be made (between the head
function/predicate symbols (hfs's) of subterms which are associated); these as¬
sociations will be added to an evolving mapping, which will in turn be used to
/(/(°i, bi), Ci)
g(c2,g(b2,a2))
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make new refinements. In the example above, the association1
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(/,J,[(1,2),(2,1)])
would be added to the mapping when the argument pairings are made.
Notice that this approach to matching will only produce matches which sat¬
isfy the structural preservation constraint discussed above. This constraint thus
represents an assumption behind the approach to matching which is developed
in this section. The partial homomorphism heuristic is therefore built into
the structure of the algorithm. However, as noted above, the restriction still
allows considerable scope for structural deformations, which encompassess the
types of structural mismatch which have been suggested by example.
Two more observations need to be made before the structure of the matcher
can be described.
Firstly, it is important to realise that, in contrast to unification algorithms,
it cannot be predicted, in advance, on which of the subproblems progress can
next be made. Thus a fixed flow of control (for example top-down left-to-right),
in which each matching subproblem is either successfully refined or the whole
match fails, is not suitable for a heuristic analogy matcher2. This suggests that
the matching subproblems should be organised as an agenda; if no refinement is
suggested for a subproblem, it should be moved to the end of the agenda, and the
next subproblem analysed. Matching should only terminate when no progress
can be made on any of the subproblems on the agenda. When a subproblem
is successfully refined, the sub-subproblems which are produced are added to
1Associations which have been written previously as / <-> g are in this chapter written
(f,g,P), in order to show the argument pairings explicitly as the list P. P contains elements
of the form (i j) meaning that the ith argument of f is paired with the jth argument of
g- ;
2Kling's matcher was criticised in the previous chapter for its inflexible co-ordination
of the procedure MULTIMATCH1 within MULTIMATCH.
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the front of the agenda. Since the existing mapping is used by the refinement
procedure, we may (and often will) find that a matching subproblem which had
been analysed without success previously, will be returned to with an extended
mapping and will be refined successfully. This is the benefit of the agenda-based
refinement.
The agenda of matching subproblems in a partial match are conjunctive
subproblems — that is, they represent parts of a single match, and we hope to
be able to solve them all together with a common mapping. We call this kind
of agenda an and-agenda, to contrast it with the alternative type (or-agenda)
which will be introduced below.
The second observation is that the heuristic analysis of a subproblem from
the agenda may suggest more than one way of refining the subproblem, i.e.
more than one set of subterm pairings. Each such set can then be investigated
separately. Therefore, whenever this happens, the entire agenda should be split
into a set of new agendas, each arising from one set of pairings. For example, on
the following problem
f(x,f(y,z)) = y), z)
g(x,g(y,z)) = g(g(x,y),z)
the matcher might decide to make the two sets of argument pairings [(1,1),(2,2)]
and [(1,2),(2,1)]; the partial match would be split into two, containing the new
sets of subproblems
{(/(z,/(y,2)), g(x,g(y,z))), ( y), z), g(g(x,y), z)) }
and
{ ( f(y, z)), g(g(x, y), z) ), ( f(f(x, y), z), g(x, g(y, z)) )}
respectively. Thus, the current state of matching between a pair of terms in¬
volves, in general, a set of partial matches, each represented as an and-agenda
together with an evolving mapping. In the current example, the mappings as¬
sociated with the offspring partial matches" would be produced by adding the





respectively to the previous mapping.
As we shall see, each partial match can be assessed as to its promise, via
its mapping. Since we are looking for strong matches, we develop the most
promising of the partial matches first. After the strongest has been developed a
certain amount, we re-assess its mapping, compare it with the rest, and develop
the (possibly) new strongest partial match. Thus the set of partial matches
between terms is handled as an agenda as well; this agenda is an or-agenda,
since we only need a single match between the terms in order to progress to the
later stages of the analogy process; the partial matches on the top-level or-agenda
do not share any information.
Thus, the overall structure of the matcher will be an or-agenda, which con¬
sists of partial matches between the terms, each of which itself consists of an
and-agenda of pairs of subterms still left to be matched coupled with an evolv¬
ing mapping
While this structure may seem rather complex at first sight, it has been
derived from some simple and natural properties that an analogy matcher should
have. We emphasise this basic simplicity as an attractive feature of the approach
to matching which we are taking. In the next two sections we add detail to the
structure: in section 4.2.3, we describe the procedures involved in refining a
partial match; in section 4.2.4, we describe how matching is coordinated between
partial matches — i.e. how the top-level or-agenda is developed.
4.2.3 The development of a partial match
In this section we describe how a given partial match is developed — that is,
how one or more of the matching subproblems which make up the partial match
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is refined, and how offspring partial matches are constructed from a refinement.
Specifically, we describe
• The heuristic criteria which are used to propose argument or subterm pair¬
ings,
• How the application of these criteria is co-ordinated over a partial match,
and how their suggestions are evaluated to decide on which pairings to
make,
• How offspring partial matches are constructed once the pairings are decided
It is an important feature of the new matcher that the heuristic criteria are
separate from the procedures that make use of them. This separation facilitates
modification of the matcher, by introducing new criteria (possibly based on new
heuristics), adjusting the relative importance of existing criteria, or altering the
strategy for coordinating the criteria.
Pairing criteria
In Kling's matching algorithm, all the pairing criteria used by SINGLEMATCH,
MULTIMATCH and MULTIMATCH1 are argument pairing criteria; that is,
given an association of compound terms, it is assumed that the immediate sub-
terms of the terms will match, as in the following example:
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Here, the two terms have been associated, but instead of the arguments being
paired in some way, the whole of one of the terms is matched with a subterm
of the other. We would like a flexible matcher to be able to find such matches.
This is why the pairing criteria are not solely argument pairing criteria, but may
be used to indicate other sorts of subterm pairings.
The pairing criteria perform tests on the two terms involved in a matching
subproblem; the results of the tests can be thought of as suggestions for pair¬
ings of subterms, usually argument pairings; however, the job of assessing the
information and deciding on which pairings to make, if any, is left to the control
procedures — depending on the results of its test, a particular criterion may be
used to suggest pairings of arguments, or the pairing of the whole of one term
with a subterm of the other.
We list the criteria which are used in the current matcher below, together with
examples of their use. We then discuss each, and say which analogy heuristic it
is based on. All but one of the criteria are completely specified; one however,
criterion 3, is only partially specified, and will be described in detail in the
remarks which follow.
Pairing Criteria
Given a matching subproblem, consisting of a pair of
terms to be matched, and the existing mapping:
1. Suggest pairs of arguments to the terms which have head function symbols
(h.f.s.'s) which are associated in the existing mapping.
For example, if the existing mapping contained the association (U,n,P),
this criterion would suggest the pairing (2,2) on the following subproblem3
3We are using the convention that the upper formula in a diagram corresponds to the
left element in associations, and the lower corresponds to the right. Pairing suggestions
areillustrated with dashediines, in this section, to distinguish them from actual pairings.
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x' U (y' n z')
2. If the hfs's of the terms are associated in the existing mapping, suggest the
previous axgument pairings. If either of the hfs's in question is commuta¬
tive, return all possible argument pairings.
For example, suppose the existing mapping contains the association
(/, 9, [(2,1), (1,2)1)
Then the pairings
{(1,2),(2,1)}





3. Suggest pairs of arguments to the terms in the match which have similar
syntactic structure, as long as almost all of the arguments can be paired
in this way.
This criterion is further specified and discussed below, where an example
is given.
4. Suggest pairs of non-head symbols in the arguments of the terms which
axe associated by the existing mapping.
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2 • g{x) + 1
Note that the complete subterm positions at which the symbols occur are
retained in the pairing suggestion; this is so that the criterion can be used
to suggest pairings other than argument pairings.
5. Suggest pairs of arguments of the terms which have the same hfs.
The suggestions {(1,1),(2,2),(2,3)} would be made by this criterion on the
subproblem
A(rational(x), ^rationally))
/ / ^I / s
! '
A(rational(x),-rationally),->x — 0)
6. If the terms have the same hfs (and the same arities), which is not known to
be commutative, suggest argument pairings which respect argument order
(i.e. the pairings {(1,1), (2,2)... (n,n)}); if they have the'same hfs which
is known to be commutative, suggest all argument pairings.






4The current mapping is referred to as a throughout this chapter. The expression
term in the argument pairing slot of an association indicates that the symbols have no
arguments paired — i.e. the association is terminal in the match. This will usually be
because at least one of the symbols in question is atomic, and thus has no arguments.
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this criterion would suggest the pairings {(1,1),(2,2)}.
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Remarks on the pairing criteria:
1. This criterion is based on the consistent translation heuristic; argu¬
ment pairings are suggested which, if made, would maintain the consistency
of the existing mapping. If pairings suggested by this criterion are over¬
ruled, the mapping is very likely to become inconsistent. Thus, we regard
this as a strong criterion. Kling uses similar criteria in SINGLEMATCH
and MULTIMATCH.
2. Again this is based on the consistent translation heuristic; an associa¬
tion of predicates or functions which is repeated in a match with different
argument pairings is regarded as a (mild) form of inconsistency. If either of
the symbols in question is commutative, the particular pairings used before
are not relevant, so all possible pairings are suggested; it would be possi¬
ble to make no suggestions in this case, and this was done with an earlier
version of the criterion, but this had the effect of discriminating against
commutative functions; so it was replaced with the present version.
3. This criterion is based on the partial homomorphism heuristic: pair¬
ings are suggested which would allow a close structural match, not paying
attention to other factors such as consistency. This criterion was added
to the matcher after the others had been implemented. Originally, the
partial homomorphism heuristic was only used in the overall structure of
the matcher, as explained above. The performance of the original matcher
was found to be poor on simple examples such as the following one
/(/(ai,6i),ci) = /(ai, /(&i, c0)
milium
g(g(a2,b2),c2) = g(a2,g(b2,c2))
where there is a close structural correspondence and consistent mapping,
but few initial clues, such as the identity of symbols, to get the match
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started. Thus an explicit criterion, based on the partial homomorphism
heuristic, was suggested, which could be used to propose new pairings.
So far, we have only specified the intention of the criterion, to look for
structural similarity between arguments of the terms. The following other
considerations motivated the design of the syntactic structure criterion:
• If arguments can be unambiguously paired by analysing their syntac¬
tic structure to a certain level, there is no point in analysing them
any further, at that stage. For example, in matching x ft 1 = x and
x U 0 = x, analysis at level 1 (ie just arities) indicates the pairings
(1,1) and (2,2), so there is no need for the criterion to go further.
• Unless almost all of the arguments of the terms can be paired off
on the basis of syntactic structure, no pairing suggestions should be
made at all. This is because, even between terms with little overall
syntactic similarity, there are likely (by coincidence) to be some pairs
of arguments with the same structure; this should not be regarded as
evidence for their pairing.




Syntactic structure criterion Sort the arguments of each of
the terms into blocks of equal arity; then pair up the arity blocks
on one side with those of the same arity on the other; on the
example we would get5
5i.e. both the arguments of the first term have arity 1 as do all those of the second
term.






For each pairing of blocks, if each block contains just one argu¬
ment mark these as paired (this does not apply in the present
case); if the blocks contain more than one argument, attempt to
pair up the arguments within the blocks on the basis of the ari-
ties of their arguments; with each argument in a block associate
the bag of the arities of its arguments, and mark as paired each
pair of arguments within the given blocks with the same bag of
arities. In this case, we get





If, by the above procedure, all of the arguments to the terms
can be paired up (perhaps ambiguously), except for at most one
argument on one side, then return the pairings as suggestions. If
not, return no suggestions. In the present case, there is just one
unpaired argument, so the pairings {(1,1),(2,2)} are returned.
This criterion only looks to depth two; if there are sets of arguments which
have the same structure at this level, but which could be differentiated at
a deeper level, the pairings are still made.
The above is just one way of implementing a syntactic structure criterion,
and is not meant to be taken as the definitive version. Experience with
the matcher without it has indicated the need for some syntactic structure
criterion.
4. This criterion is based on the consistent translation heuristic, and is
a weaker form of criterion 1. It is weaken because the symbols which axe
associated by the existing analogy may not be in corresponding positions
in the arguments, and thus we are not so sure that the argument pairings
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which are suggested would lead to preservation of the consistency of the
mapping. This criterion is designed to be a cheap form of look-ahead.
Kling uses a similar pairing criterion as the basis of MULTIMATCH1.
This criterion may be used to suggest structural mismatches, such as that
shown above, as well as argument pairings.
5. This criterion is based on the identical symbols heuristic; we propose
argument pairings which will lead to identical associations being added to
the mapping. Just as the identical symbols heuristic was seen to be a weak
heuristic, this criterion is a weak criterion, compared to those discussed
above.
6. This is again based on the identical symbols heuristic, and thus is also a
weak criterion; "identical association" in the context of an analogy mapping
means having identical argument pairings as well. If the hfs is known to be
commutative, there should obviously be no inclination towards identical
pairings, and so all pairings are suggested. Kling uses a similar criterion,
as the basis of ATOMMATCH, but for all pairs of predicates, not just
identical pairs.
General remarks on criteria. Note that there is no criterion based on the
semantic type heuristic; as discussed in the previous chapter, there are problems
of circularity associated with the use of this heuristic. While the heuristic may be
used to give the matcher clues to analogies, it is important for the matcher to be
able to work without any type information. It would be easy to add a criterion,
similar to criterion 5, which would find arguments whose hfs's have the same (or
similar) type. The use of the semantic type heuristic, being weak, could also be
restricted to the assessment stage (b) of matching, to choose among the matches
produced by stage (a); this use for the heuristic is also suggested by the fact
that the types would, in general, be organised in a hierarchy, and the semantic
judgement between a pair of symbols would be a degree of semantic closeness,
rather than an all or nothing judgement. We discuss further how criteria based
on the semantic type heuristic could be added to the matcher in Chapter 7.
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The coordination of the criteria in making pairings
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We now describe how the pairing criteria are co-ordinated across a partial match
to make a refinement. Recall that a partial match is an and-agenda of matching
subproblems, together with a mapping. We need to decide
1. Which subproblem to apply the criteria to.
2. Given pairing suggestions, how to derive the pairings which axe actually
made.
3. Given the pairings which are made, how to update the partial match to
produce offspring matches (including perhaps some complete matches).
At any stage, the answer to 1 is simple — choose the subproblem at the top of
the agenda; the order of the agenda is a consequence of the procedures described
below. The following procedure would be an obvious way of tackling 2:
Apply all of the criteria to the subproblem. Put all of the evidence
together to get a measure of strength (weighted according to the
strength of the criteria) for each suggested argument pairing. Find
consistent (1-1) subsets of the pairings which are relatively strong,
the strength of a subset being the sum of the strengths of its elements.
Return these strong subsets as the plausible argument pairings.
A control strategy such as this would have the following deficiencies:
• Some of the criteria are considerably stronger than others; if strong cri¬
teria suggest argument pairings unambiguously, there would be no point
in applying the weaker criteria, since, in this case, they would not affect
the overall judgement about pairings; doing so would be wasteful, partic¬
ularly considering that one of the weaker criteria, criterion 4, will involve
considerable computation. " —
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• If only weak criteria suggest pairings, or if the strong criteria are ambigu¬
ous, it may be wise to suspend the current subproblem, making no pairings
and moving it to the back of the and-agenda; stronger criteria may be ac¬
tive and unambiguous at another subproblem. The pairings suggested at
the other subproblem would be more reliable, and, once made, the associ¬
ations added to the mapping might lead to clearer pairing information at
the original subproblem. The simple control strategy does not allow this
flexibility.
• It would be sensible to delay splitting a partial match as long as possible;
i.e. to see if a single set of pairings is suggested at any subproblem, before
splitting the match. This would avoid the proliferation of weak partial
matches in the top level or-agenda. Again, the simple control strategy
would not be able to do this.
These factors suggest a control regime for match development under which
stronger criteria are considered first throughout the agenda before the weaker
criteria are considered anywhere. Furthermore, the weak criteria would be con¬
sidered at all subproblems before any splitting of the partial match was done.




3 (1, .., 6), splitting
Thus we deem criteria 1,2 and 3 to be stronger than the others; this judgement
is based on the strength (decided in Chapter 3) of the heuristics on which the
criteria are based; the only exception is criterion 4 which, although based on a
strong heuristic, the consistent translation heuristic, is put in at level 2; this is
because, as explained above, the criterion is based more loosely on the heuristic
.than is so with the other criteria.
To develop a match, we first attempt to make a refinement at level 1; if suc¬
cessful, the and-agenda and mapping are updated according to the new subterm
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pairings; if unsuccessful (i.e. no clear pairings can be made at any matching
subproblem at level 1), we attempt a refinement at level 2; similarly, if this is
successful, the agenda and mapping are updated; if not, an attempt is made to
refine at level 3.
Thus, there are two possible results to developing a partial match: (1) a
refinement is made at some level, and new matches are produced as a result; some
of these may be complete, having empty and-agendas, and some still partial;
each new partial match would then be available for further development (2)
no refinement is made, in which case matching terminates; any subproblems
remaining on the agenda are transferred to the mapping — i.e. we regard the
entire subterms as being associated as wholes.
Pairing evaluation We now describe how the pairing suggestions made, at a
level, are analysed to find clearly suggested pairings.
Level 1. First, some weakly suggested pairings are removed from the list
obtained from criteria 1 2 and 3 — those that share an argument position with
another pairing which is suggested by a larger set6 of criteria. Those pairings
which remain and are now unambiguous (i.e. do not share arguments with
others that remain), are returned as the clearly suggested pairings.
The rationale behind this procedure is as follows: the criteria which are being
used often suggest many different argument pairings; those which are less well
suggested than others with which they compete are removed to cut down the level
of 'crosstalk'. After this has been done, any which remain and do not compete
with any other which remain, may be taken to be reliable (clearly suggested)
pairings, and should thus be made. Note that the pairings made here may not
be complete, i.e. there may be arguments left in the terms which have not been
paired.
6By larger set, we mean strict superset.
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If terms in the subproblem each have all but one of the arguments paired,
the remaining two axe also paired. This is a default rule, similar to rules used
by both Kling and Munyer.
If there are no clearly suggested pairings, the subproblem is put at the back
of the agenda, the next is chosen, and the procedure is repeated. This con¬
tinues until either some clear pairings are found (a refinement is made), or all
subproblems have been analysed at level 1 (no refinement is made).
Level 2. The level 2 procedure is an extension of that at level 1; pairing
suggestions from criteria 4, 5 and 6 are added to any remaining from level 1
(multiple suggestions from criterion 4 are countedmultiply). The main procedure
is exactly that for level 1. To illustrate, suppose we had the following subproblem,
with pairings labelled with the sets of criteria suggesting them:
The two remaining pairings are both unambiguous and so would be returned as
the clearly suggested pairings.
In addition to the level 1 procedure just illustrated, suggestions made by
criterion 4 may be used to derive a structural mismatch pairing, i.e. a pairing
of one of the terms from the subproblem with a subterm of the other. A pair
of symbol positions returned by criterion 4 may be thought of as suggesting a
structural mismatch if the two symbols are at different depths in the terms; if the
positions are Pi and P2, |Pi| < |P2|, and P is the initial segment of P\ of length
oad(x') A odd(y')
The first stage removes the pairings (1,1) and (2,2), leaving
even(x) A even(y)
odd(x') A odd(y')
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|P2|— |Pi |, the pair of associated symbols suggest that the whole of the first term






If the variable x is associated with itself in the current mapping, criterion 4 will
return the pair of ads at positions Pi=[2,l] and P2=[l,2,l] respectively. Then
P=[l], so the pairing of the whole of the first term, 2 • /(x), with the subterm of
the second at position [1], 2-g(x), is indicated. The rule for suggesting structural
mismatches takes into account all the symbol pairs returned by criterion 4: a
mismatch is only suggested if all the pairs give the same position for P. In the
example above, x is the only symbol present which is in the existing mapping,
so the rule would fire, and suggest the structural mismatch pairing. The rule is
perhaps rather strict, as a potential mismatch may be ruled out by 'crosstalk'
between more than one occurrence of a matched symbol. A more flexible rule
could be devised if this problem turned up in practice.
The structural mismatch rule is an 'optional extra' in the matcher, which
gives it the ability to construct a wider range of matches.
Again, a refinement is initiated when new pairings are suggested by the eval¬
uation routine at some subproblem. Otherwise, the match passes to level 3.
Level 3. Level 3 involves no further calculation of criteria; the first subprob¬
lem (if any) which contains pairing information from levels 1 and 2 is taken from
the agenda; the suggested argument pairings are split up into maximally con¬
sistent subsets7. Only those subsets having maximal size are retained, each of
these producing a set of argument pairings. If there is no pairing information at
any subproblem in the agenda, no refinement is made.
7By consistent, we mean that each argument is paired with at most one argument
from the other term.
Chapter 4. An Improved Analogy Matcher
Updating the agenda and the mapping, given pairings
98
When the procedures just described result in pairings being made at a sub-
problem in a match, the pairings made are used to update the and-agenda and
mapping of the match. We describe these procedures now.
When more than one set of pairings is made, the updating procedures de¬
scribed below axe called on each such set in turn, to produce a corresponding set
of offspring matches.
The agenda. Given a set of pairings, the agenda is updated in the following
two ways:
• New subproblems may be added to the front of the agenda, corresponding
to the subterms which are paired. A new subproblem is added for each
new pairing of compound subterms. If one or both of the subterms in a pair
is atomic, the association between them is added directly to the mapping,
as described below, and no new subproblem is put on the agenda; this is
because there is no more matching to be done between these subterms.
• The subproblem at which the pairings were made may be removed from
the agenda. This happens if the pairings made are complete — that is,
one of the terms in the subproblem has all its arguments paired, or if there
is a structural mismatch. If the pairings are incomplete, it is retained, to
be analysed again at a later time, in the hope of being able to complete
the pairings; in this case, the pairing suggestions made for the subproblem
are retained for analysis at lower levels.
The mapping. If the subproblem giving rise to the pairings is having its first
argument pairings made, the association between the hfs's of the terms in the
subproblem is added to the mapping together with the argument pairings which
are being made. We could add the association as soon els the subproblem is
put on the agenda, rather than waiting for pairings to be made; we do not do
this for two reasons: firstly, the subproblem may lead to a structural mismatch,
which does not involve an association between the hfs's of the terms; secondly,
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the terms of the subproblem might not match syntactically at all, and would be
shifted directly to the mapping when matching terminates (i.e. they would be
considered part of the difference between the original terms in the analogy).
If the subproblem has already had some pairings made, and more are being
added, the association between the hfs's will already be in the mapping, and is
merely updated with the extra argument pairings.
In the case of a structural mismatch, the association between the entire terms
in the subproblem is added to the mapping, with no argument pairings. The
motivation for this is that, with structural mismatches such as
we want to consider 2 • g(x) -f 1 as a potential analogue for 2 • /(x); if we did not
add the association between the whole terms, we would only be able to consider
2 • g(x) as analogue for 2 • /(x).
The mapping is also extended whenever subterms are paired at least one of
which is atomic; the association is simply that between the subterms, with no
argument pairings (i.e. with term in the pairing slot).
Completed matches There are two situations under which an offspring match
is deemed to be complete:
• If the and-agenda is empty after it has been updated. This is the 'bet¬
ter' form of completion, as it means that the original formulae have been
completely matched.
• If no pairings are made at the previous stage, i.e. no further matching
is suggested between subterms which remain on the agenda. In this case,
if we are to regard the original formulae as analogous, we must regard
the remaining subterms as being associated as wholes, without further
even(x) —> x — 2 • /(x)
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decomposition of their association. The subproblems which remain on the
agenda axe therefore transferred to the mapping as associations.
4.2.4 Co-ordination ofmatching between different partial
matches
In the previous section, we looked in detail at how a given partial match is
refined, producing, in general, a set of new partial matches. We now describe
the top-level of the matching algorithm — how the development of the various
partial matches is co-ordinated. We have already explained (section 4.2.2) that
the various partial matches being developed are organised in an or-agenda. The
ordering of the agenda is based on an assessment of the promise of the matches
— the assessment procedure is described below.
Assuming the assessment procedure, the development of the or-agenda of
partial matches is straightforward: the top match (ie the most promising one)
is taken from the agenda; the match refinement procedure is called to make
a refinement to the match, producing a set of offspring matches. Each of the
offspring matches is then developed as far as possible at level 1. The resulting
matches, some complete and some still partial are assessed; the partial ones are
merged with the or-agenda (i.e. inserted in order of strength); the complete ones
are kept in a separate list; the set of matches (both complete and partial) is then
pruned by removing all matches with strength less than a dynamic threshold —
the threshold is calculated by subtracting a fixed number (0.125 in the current
version) from the strength of the strongest complete match.
The above procedure is repeated until the or-agenda becomes empty.
One aspect of the procedure requires further explanation — the further de¬
velopment of offspring matches at level 1, after the initial refinement has been
made. A single stage of development of a match may thus consist of more than
one refinement. The reason for 4his is that a refinement at level 1 can be thought
of as an inevitable consequence of the initial refinement, and involves no further
splitting of the match; it is thus sensible to perform all such refinements before
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re-assessing the match. This is not an important feature, but does limit the
amount of time spent processing the top-level agenda and in match assessment.
Match assessment The assessment of a match is done using its associated
mapping, and is based directly on the analogy heuristics. The mapping is as¬
sessed according to each heuristic separately, and the overall assessment is deter¬
mined from the individual assessments. More specifically, the mapping is rated
according to its degree of conformation with a heuristic on a scale of 0 to 1. The
overall assessment is a weighted average of these numbers; the weights deter¬
mine the relative significance given to the heuristics. The heuristics which are
incorporated into the current assessment procedure are the following:
1. Partial homomorphism: as explained earlier, a degree of structural preser¬
vation is ensured by the design of the matcher, but there is still scope for
significant variation within this — individual symbols or entire subterms
may be unmatched. The proportion of symbols which have been matched
to symbols which have been left unmatched is taken as a measure of the
structural closeness of the match.
2. Consistent translation: we assess the degree of consistency of a mapping,
by counting the number of inconsistencies as a proportion of the size of
the mapping, and scaling the answer so that it lies between 0 and 1. If /
is the length of the mapping, and n is the number of inconsistencies, the
assessment is
1
1 + 3 • (n/l)'
Inconsistencies such as {a *-> b, a <-> c}, where a, b and c are atomic and
distinct, in a mapping are easy to count. It is more difficult if compound
terms are involved in the associations, which, as explained above, can hap¬
pen. The general definition of an inconsistency which is used by the current
assessment procedure is as follows:
The distinct associations
Si <-» t and S2 <-+ v,
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where S?, t and v axe possibly compound terms, are regarded
as inconsistent (from left to right) if t and v are distinct and Sj
and S2 share at least one symbol. Inconsistency from right to
left is defined analogously.
This definition of an inconsistency, which subsumes the normal one for
atomic associations, is perhaps rather strict; we might find that some map¬
pings are penalised more than they intuitively ought to be, although this
problem has not yet arisen in practice with the current matcher.
When an association in the mapping involves unmatched arguments, these
are taken into account when counting inconsistencies: if a symbol occurs
in an unmatched term, and is also associated in the mapping, we regard
this as a mild form of inconsistency; half an inconsistency is added for each
such situation.
Before a mapping is checked for inconsistency, any associations in it which
arose from subterms at which there was a structural mismatch are removed;
for each such association, one inconsistency is counted. The reason for this
exception to the procedure is illustrated by the example of a structural
mismatch given above:
even(x) —> x = 2 • f(x)
I I / lllll/
odd(x) —» x = 2 • g(x) -f- 1
In the mapping, we would have the associations 2-f(x) <-» 2-g,(x)+ l, 2h2,
x x, / *-+ g and •<-»■; the first of these is the mismatch association which
would be removed before counting inconsistencies, and would contribute
one to the number of inconsistencies. This is correct intuitively, since there
is an inconsistency implied by this mapping, namely (from left to right) as
to what is the analogue of the term 2 • f(x) — it could be either 2 * g(x)
or 2 • g(x) + 1 — but only one. If the mismatch association were not
removed, it would lead to four inconsistencies in this case, which would be
excessive. The general problem with mismatch associations is thatT they
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tend to be inconsistent (in the sense defined above) with their own daughter
associations.
3. Identical symbols: the proportion of the associations in the mapping which
link identical symbols is computed as the extent to which the mapping
conforms to the identical symbols heuristic.
The overall assessment of a mapping is given by
a • PH + p • CT + 7 • IS,
where PH, CT and IS are the contributions from the partial homomorphism,
consistent translation and identical symbols heuristics respectively, and
a + (3 + 7=1.
In the current version, a — 0.5, (3 = 0.4 and 7 = 0.1. These numbers reflect the
relative significance attached to the corresponding heuristics.
Note that the semantic type heuristic is not used at the moment. This is
firstly because the multiple matches problem, referred to in the previous
chapter, has not arisen with the modest size of knowledge base which has been
used with the current matcher, and secondly because the matcher should be able
to work without the guidance of semantic types.
Examples of assessments of matches are given in section 4.4.
Comparison with Munyer's assessment
Munyer's direct assessment of completed matches is, like his matching algorithm,
based on the partial homomorphism and identical symbol heuristics. Oddly,
Munyer's procedure makes no penalty for unmatched symbols, and so would not
rate the structural mismatches we have been considering any less highly than a
structural isomorphism.
Another unsatisfactory aspect of Munyer's procedure is that he penalises
^associations which permute the argument positions-of their parent associations,
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even if the parent functions are distinct. As explained above with reference to
Kling's procedure ATOMMATCH, there is no rational basis for this.
4.3 Summary of new matcher
We have now completed the description of the matcher. Since we have chosen to
introduce the features gradually, with explanation and examples, the description
has been rather spread out. Therefore, we give here a concise summary of the
structure of the matcher.
Data structures
State of matching: a pair (C,0), where O is an or-agenda, whose nodes are
partial matches, ordered by their assessments, and C is a list of completed matches,
again ordered by their assessments.
Partial match: a quadruple (A,M,L,S), where A is an and-agenda of
matching subproblems (ordered by (1) recency of addition and (2) success/failure
of refinement); M is a mapping; L is a level (1, 2 or 3); S is the assessment of
the partial match.
Completed match: a pair (M,S), where M and S axe as above.
Matching subproblem: a quadruple (T1,T2,P,I), where T1 and T2 are the
subterms to be matched, P records argument pairings of Tl and T2 which have
already been made and I records any pairing information which has been passed
down from analysis of the node at higher levels.
Mapping: a list of pairs (F1,F2,P), where F1 and F2 are symbols from the
terms, and P gives pairings of the arguments to F1 and F2.
Initialisation
Initially, state of matching=(</>,{({(Tl,T2,<ft,<?!>)},<?i>,l,u)}), where Tl and T2 are
the entire terms to be matched; i.e. there is one partial match, which consists
of a single subproblem (the entire problem), empty mapping and no assessment;
Chapter 4. An Improved Analogy Matcher
the initial level is 1.
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Algorithm
Repeat main cycle until state of matching=(C,(ft); return the completed matches
C as the result of the procedure.
Main cycle (given state of matching, (C,0), returns new state of matching
(C',0')): remove top partial match, (A,M,L,S) from O; call the development routine,
producing sets of daughter matches (C", N"), C" complete and N" partial; assess
these (as described above), and merge them with (C, O), adding any completed
daughters to C and the rest to O; compute the strongest completed match, and
remove all matches (complete or partial) having strength more than a preset
threshold below the strongest; return new state of matching (C, O').
Development routine (given partial match, (A,M,L,S), returns new sets of
matches (C,N), where C are complete and N are partial): attempt to make a
refinement to the partial match, calling the refinement procedure at decreasing
levels starting at L, until either a refinement is made at some level or the levels
are exhausted; if a refinement is made, producing sets of new matches (C',N'),
C' complete and N' partial, call the refinement procedure at level 1 repeatedly
on each partial match from N', until either the match becomes complete or no
more progress can be made at level 1; return the resulting sets of complete and
partial matches as (C,N); if no refinement is made, move the nodes from A to
the mapping M and return ({(M', S)}, <f>) as (C, N), where M' is the extended
mapping; i.e. mark the match as complete.
Refinement procedure (given partial match (A,M,L,S), returns new sets of
matches (C,N), where C are complete and N are partial): attempt to make a
refinement to (A,M, L, S) by calling the subproblem analysis procedure repeat¬
edly on subproblems from A (from the top), until either new pairings are made
at some subproblem, or all subproblems from A have been tried; if new pair¬
ings are made at some subproblem, call the updating procedures (as described
above) on each set of new pairings, producing new sets of complete and par-
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tial matches (C, IV); if no new pairings are made at any subproblem, return
{(A',M,L,S)}), where A' is the agenda updated by any pairing information
at level L.
Subproblem analysis procedure (given matching subproblem (T1,T2,P, I),
mapping M and level L, returns a set of sets of new argument pairings S): call
the pairing criteria associated with L on those arguments of T1 and T2 not al¬
ready paired according to P; add pairing information obtained to that in I and
pass to the pairing evaluation procedure associated with L (as described above);
if new pairings are suggested, return these as 5"; if not, return <f).
4.3.1 Additional features
• If we want to match up a pair of terms and we already know some asso¬
ciations which we want to be in the mapping, we can start the matching
off with a non-empty mapping slot, containing the associations which we
want to appear in the match. This facility allows guidance to be given to
the matcher, and will prove useful in later stages of the analogy process
(see Chapter 5).
• If the propositional structures of the terms being matched are not the same,
they are both rewritten into conjunctive normal form (i.e. each term is
transformed into an equivalent one which is a conjunction of disjunctions of
literals), and matching proceeds on the normal forms. The idea behind this
is that a potential analogy may be obscured by superficial differences in the
propositional presentation of formulae; if both formulae are normal-formed,
such differences will be removed. Other kinds of superficial differences
between formulae are considered "in section 4.7.
• When the matcher produces multiple matches between a;pair of terms,
some of them may be trivial variants of each other: for example, the fol¬
lowing two matches
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x fl y x D y
III
x \J y illy
differ only in their association of variables and the argument pairings to
the association ft <-> U. But the variable associations are equivalent up to
renaming of variables (i.e. are a-variants of each other), and the functions
fl and U are known to be commutative, and so the argument pairings are
irrelevant. Thus, only one of the matches needs to be retained.
Generally, two matches are considered variants of each other if (1) their
variable associations are a-equivalent and (2) their non-variable associa¬
tions are identical modulo commutativity. After two terms are matched,
the set of matches which has been produced is analysed, and any variants
axe removed.
• The top-level or-agenda allows partial matches between a problem and
a number of other problems to be considered alongside each other. The
initial agenda contains a node for each of the alternative base problems.
As matching proceeds, the promising matches with the promising base
problems will tend to rise to the top of the agenda; the rest will fall to
the bottom, and may well be cut off by the threshold. Thus it will not be
necessary to match each candidate base problem to completion in order to
find the best.
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4.4 Performance
We illustrate the performance of the new matcher on some examples:
Example 1
Formulae to be matched8:
rational(x) A ->rationally) ► ->rational(x + y)
rational^x) A -rationally) A -<x = 0 —> -irational(x ■ y)
The matcher starts with a single node, containing the whole formulae. The
level 1 criteria are first checked; none of these makes any suggestions, so the
match goes to level 2. Of the level 2 criteria, both 5 and 6 suggest the argument
pairings (1,1) and (2,2). These suggestions are undisputed, so the argument
pairings are made; two new nodes are added, containing the hypotheses and the
conclusions respectively, and the original node is deleted, having had complete
pairings made; the association ( >, >-,[(1,1),(2,2)]) is added to the mapping,
and the match returns to level 1.
The hypotheses node is analysed first at level 1; criterion 3 suggests the
pairings [(1,1),(2,2)], which are undisputed and therefore made; two new nodes
are added to the agenda, and the hypotheses node is deleted, as one side has
8The hypothesis of the second formula is written with A as an infix operator for the
sake or readability; the term presented to the matcher is actually
A(rational(x)i-irational(y),-ix = 0)
This convention will repeated elsewhere.
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had all its arguments paired; the association (A,A,[(l,l),(2,2),(u,p(3,~i:r = 0))])
is added to the mapping9, and the match stays at level 1.
The new node (rational(x),rational(x)) is analysed next: criterion 3 sug¬
gests the undisputed pairing [(1,1)], which is made; the node is deleted, and
associations (rational,rational,[(1,1)]) and (x,x,term) are added to the map¬
ping, the latter arising automatically from an atomic node. In a similar way, the
hypotheses ~>rational(y) and ->rational(y) are paired up using criteria 1, 2 and
3, and adding the associations (-1,-1,[(1,1)]) and (y,y,term) to the mapping.
On the conclusions, still at level 1, refinement proceeds via criteria 1 and 3.
On the node (x + y,a:*y), criterion 1 suggests [(1,1),(2,2)], on the basis of the ex¬
isting variable associations, and criterion 3 suggests [(1,1),(1,2),(2,1),(2,2)]: the
more weakly suggested pairings, (1,2) and (2,1) are removed, and the remaining
ones are made, which completes the matching.
Thus, the following single match is found:
rational(x) A ->rationaUy) —» -*rational(x + y)
///// \\\%
rational(x) A ->rational(y) A ~<x = 0 * ->rational(x ■ y)
Assessment: 0.850
Example 2
Formulae to be matched:
yfx + a = b
y/x -f 1 + a = b
9When the argument pairing list contains a pair of the form (u,p(I,T)); this means
that the Ith argument of the right symbol, T, was unmatched; similarly, the notation
(p(I,T),u) refers to the left symbol having an unmatched argument.
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This example was used, in the last chapter, to illustrate the inflexibility of Kling's
matcher.
Firstly, at level 1, the initial node has pairings [(1,1),(2,2)] made by criterion
3, adding the association (=,=,[(1,1),(2,2)]). The (2,2) pairing yields an atomic
association (b,b,term), which is added to the mapping. The node arising from
the (1,1) pairing has pairings [(1,1),(2,2)] made by criterion 3 again, adding the
association (+,+,[(1,1),(2,2)]) to the mapping. The (2,2) pairing yields another
atomic association (a,a,term). The other new node, (root(x),root(x + 1)), leads
to no suggestions at level 1. Therefore, since it is the only node left, the match
goes to level 2; the same node is analysed by the level 2 criteria, of which crite¬
rion 6 suggests the pairing (1,1), which is made, yielding an atomic association
(x,x+l,term), which completes the matching.
Thus, the following single match is produced:
On the two examples considered so far, most of the matching takes place at
level 1, with criterion 3 doing most of the work. This is because there is a close
structural correspondence in each case. However, with criterion 3 removed from
the matcher, the same matches would have been produced. In this case, most
of the matching would be done at level 2, with applications of criteria 5 and 6
replacing those of criterion 3.
In the next two examples, the structural correspondence is not so close.
Example 3
The formulae to be matched are:
y/x + a = b
y/x + 1 + a — b
Assessment: 0.795
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even(x) —> x = 2 ■ f(x)
odd(x) —> x — 2 • g(x) + 1
On the initial node, criterion 3 suggests the pairings [(1,1),(2,2)], which are
made. On the node arising from the hypotheses, the same criterion suggests
the pairing (1,1), which yields an atomic association (x,x,term). On the node
arising from the conclusions, criterion 1 suggests (1,1) and criterion 3 suggests
[(1,1),(2,2)]. The pairings [(1,1),(2,2)] are therefore made, yielding an atomic
association and a new node (2 • f(x), 2 • g(x) + 1).
The new node yields no suggestions at level 1, so the match goes to level 2.
Here, criterion 4 suggests the argument pairing (2,1); on evaluation of the pair¬
ing suggestions, the structural mismatch rule fires, as explained in section 4.2.3.
Thus the match is split into two: the first new match results from the argu¬
ment pairings [(1,2),(2,1)] (the (1,2) pairing is added by the default rule); the
second new match results from the structural mismatch. These two matches are
developed separately, and lead to the two matches shown below:
The assessments which are produced for the matches indicate that the first
match is the preferred one10.
10Although the assessments seem very close together, the difference between the first
and the second is quite significant; experience with the matcher has shown that, as a
consequence of the way assessments are calculated, reasonable matches start at around
even(x) —► x = 2 • f(x) even(x) —> x = 2 • f(x)
odd(x) —► x — 2 • g{x) + 1 odd(x) —► x — 2 • g(x) + 1
0.815 0.796
0.6.














This is one of Kling's algebra examples. As explained in the previous chap¬
ter, Kling's matcher leans heavily on the semantic templates to match up these
formulae.
The matching with the new matcher proceeds as follows: no pairings are
suggested for the initial node at level 1, so the matcher goes to level 2. Criterion
5 suggests the pairing (1,1), and criterion 6 the pairings [(1,1),(2,2)]. Thus, these
pairings are made, and the matcher returns to level 1.
No progress is made on either of the two new nodes at level 1 (on the
conclusion node, criterion 3 suggests all possible pairings, but there are no
undisputed ones), so the matcher goes back to level 2. On the hypotheses,
criterion 5 suggests the pairing (3,3), and criterion 6 suggests all possible pair¬
ings, since conjunction is commutative (symmetric); the assessment procedure
removes the more weakly suggested pairings that compete with (3,3); of the
remainder, (3,3) is the only undisputed pairing and is therefore made. The hy¬
pothesis node is retained on the agenda, since it has not had complete pairings
made. The match goes to level 1, but, again, no progress is made there, so
it returns to level 2. Criterion 6 suggests the pairings [(1,1),(2,2),(3,3)] at the
node (/actorstructure(x,g,m), factorstructure(y,r,n))] these suggestions are
assessed along with those remaining at the node from criterion 3, which had
suggested all possible pairings; the pairings [(1,1),(2,2)^(3,3)], being the more
strongly suggested, are made, and lead to atomic associations, (x,y), (g,r) and
(m,n), which are added to the mapping. The match returns to level 1, where the
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conclusion node (maximalgroup(m, g, *), maximalring(n, r, **, ++)) has pair¬
ings [(1,1),(2,2)] made by criterion 1 (criterion 3 again suggests all possible pair¬
ings). No further progress is made at level 1.
At level 2, the hypothesis node is analysed again: criterion 6
again suggests all possible pairings. Criterion 4 suggests the pairings
[(1,1),(1,2),(2,1),(2,2),(2,2),(4,4)], on the basis of the existing variable associ¬
ations (note that (2,2) is suggested twice by criterion 4). After weakly suggested
pairings have been removed, the pairings [(1,1),(2,2),(3,3)] remain, and, being
mutually consistent, are made (the structural mismatch rule does not fire).
The new node, (simplegroup(x, *), simplering(y, **, -f+)) is analysed
at level 1, and the pairing (1,1) is made on the basis of cri¬
terion 1 (criterion 3 again suggests all possible pairings); similarly,
the other new nodes, (propernormal(m, g, *),properideal(n, r, **, ++)) and
(group(g, *), ring(r, **, ++)) are refined at level 1 by criterion 1; no further
progress is made at level 1.
At level 2 the five remaining nodes, are re-analysed, but there are no clearly
indicated pairings. The match therefore goes to level 3; the match is split up on
the basis of the node (group(g, *),ring(r, **, ++)): the pairing (1,1) has already
been made; the remaining possible pairings, (2,2) and (2,3), are both suggested
by criterion 3; each of these pairings leads to a new match.
Each of these new matches is developed further. In each case, the matching
is completed at level 1 by criterion 1. Therefore, two matches are constructed,
which are shown below.
A( grp(g, *), pnorm(m, g, *), fstx(x,g,m),sgrp(x,*)) —► mgrp(m,g,*)
A( rg(r,**, ++ ), pidl(n, r, **, ++ ), fstx(y,r, n), srg(y, **, ++ )) —> mrg(n,r, **,++ ))
Assessment: 0.935
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Affifrp(g,*), pnorm(m,g,*), fstx(x,g,m),sgrp(x,*)) —> mgrp(m,g,*)
A( rg(r, **, ++), pidl(n, r, **, ++), fstx(y, r, n), sry(y, **, -f+) ) —> mrg(n, r, **, ++))
Assessment: 0.935
The only difference between the two matches which are produced is that,
in one, the group operator is associated with the ring addition, whereas, in the
other, it is associated with the ring multiplication. The matcher cannot distin¬
guish between these possibilities and gives them the same assessment (0.935).
It is interesting that this example does not actually need the semantic tem¬
plates in order to be matched. On other of Kling's algebra examples, the matcher
produces more than two consistent matches; in some of these, set variables are
matched with operator variables. Kling avoids these by insisting, in ATOM-
MATCH, that argument pairing respects argument types. The argument type
heuristic is not used in the present matcher; it could be added as one of the
pairing criteria to prune the matches which do not preserve the argument types;
alternatively, it could just be added to the assessment phase, so that the type-
respecting matches are preferred.
I
4.5 Assessment of new matcher
We claim that, in terms of performance, the current matcher is a considerable
improvement over those of Munyer and Kling. The flexible use which the current
matcher makes of the analogy heuristics enables it to find a wider range of
matches than either Munyer's or Kling's. We summarize important aspects
of the greater flexibility below; Appendix A contains a collection of examples,
together with the performance of the three matchers on them.
As explained in the previous chapter, Munyer's matcher is unable;to construct
matches which involve significant proportions of non-identical associations, such





Because of the arbitrary nature of its procedure ATOMMATCH, Kling's matcher
is unable to construct matches which involve any permutation of arguments, such
as the following one from Boolean algebra, constructed by the current matcher:
x < x V y
x A y < x
Kling's matcher arbitrarily enforces preservation of (relative) argument position.
If the functions (predicates in Kling's syntax) are commutative, this restriction
means that Kling's matcher will only consider one possibility for pairing them
up; this makes the performance of the matcher very sensitive to minor changes in
presentation, such as which way round the arguments to a commutative function
are written. The current matcher takes commutativity into account, and thus is
not affected by these minor presentation changes.
We have seen that Kling's matcher can be modified to make it able to
construct matches involving unmatched conditions and arguments, but only
if the extra conditions have unique semantic templates. Otherwise, the SIN- -
GLEMATCH/MULTIMATCH distinction, which is the basis of the algorithm,
is violated. This arbitrary restriction is removed in the current matcher.
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even(x) A even(y) —► even(x • y)
odd(x) A odd(y) —► odd(x ■ y)
x fl (y U z) = (x fl y) U (x n z)
x U (y Pi z) — (x U y) fl (x U z)
(x + y) - x = y
x = 0 V (x*y)/x = y
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The current matcher can be thought of as a generalisation of Kling's: it shares
the basic top-down approach to matching. It is a generalisation in that it ac¬
cepts an unrestricted syntax, removes arbitrary restrictions of Kling's matcher as
explained above and makes more flexible use of the analogy heuristics. Further¬
more, the agenda-based refinement architecture of the current matcher makes it
more persistent, and therefore powerful, in matching than Kling's matcher.
The current matcher is able to construct essentially the same matches, to¬
gether with others in some cases, as Kling's on the abstract algebra examples,
without making any use of the semantic templates on which Kling's matcher
relies. The other matches which the current matcher produces are usually just
as strong, from a purely syntactic point of view, as the intended matches, but
some variable associations do not preserve the argument types of their contain¬
ing predicates. As has been argued above, the use of these templates represents
a circular argument, as they encode most of the information about the global
analogy between group theory and ring theory. We also argued, however, that
there is no reason why an analogy matcher should not make use of global analo¬
gies which it knows, in the guise of semantic types or perhaps some more explicit
representation, in order to construct' matches between individual problems, as
long as no pretence is made that the matcher is discovering the analogy. If the
presenty matcher was guided by semantic templates (that is, predicate types
and/or argument types) the unintended matches would be blocked, or at least
be given lower strength.
Naturalness and flexibility
A complete description of the matcher is certainly complicated. However, the
matcher is based around some simple requirements
• The central procedure of matching is a recursive pairing analysis, based on
analogy heuristics.
• The matcher should be flexible with respect to the heuristics.
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The structure of the matcher follows directly from these requirements: the or-
agenda of partial matches, the and-agenda of matching subproblems and their
development, the separate pairing criteria. On this basis, we claim that the
matcher embodies a natural approach to analogy matching.
The lower level procedures, such as the evaluation of pairing suggestions, the
particular pairing criteria used and the assessment procedure, are not based so
directly on the initial motivation. The choices made for these procedures make
the current matcher one of a class of matchers of similar structure; other members
of the class are obtained by varying the lower level procedures. For example, new
criteria can be added, based on new heuristics; similarly, the pairing evaluation
and match assessment procedures can be easily changed to produce alternative
matchers— the next section discusses some directions for change. We regard this
flexibility, particularly with respect to the analogy heuristics, as an important
advantage of the current matcher over previous ones; as we found in the previous
chapter, Munyer's and Kling's algorithms were strongly biased, in their structure,
towards weak heuristics; this limited their development.
4.6 Areas for improvement
First-order unifiability We saw in the previous chapter that Munyer's algo¬
rithm can be modified so that it becomes complete for first order unifiable
terms, i.e. finds a match that represents the most general unifier between
such terms. The current matcher is not complete in this way. For example,




These two terms are unifiable, with common instance f(h(c),g(b)). The
current matcher does not find the unifier. While a unification with a pre¬
vious problem is no guarantee of being able to solve the given problem
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analogously, it might well help, and is certainly relevant information. One
way of getting round this problem would be to extend the syntactic struc¬
ture criterion (criterion 3) so that it took account of variables, and the
possibility of their being bound in a match; this would, however, consid¬
erably reduce the discriminating power of the criterion. Another would
simply be to have a unification check separate from the analogy matching
algorithm. The latter suggestion has the drawback that matches which
were 'nearly' unifications would be unlikely to be found.11
Completeness A more ambitious aim than that just discussed would be to
have a matcher which conforms to a more general completeness criterion
for analogy matches (rather than for the subclass of first-order unifica¬
tions). That is, we would have a precise definition for what constitutes
an acceptable match, and would be able to prove that the matcher would
be able to construct any match of that type. For example, the definition
of acceptability could be based on the match assessment procedure — a
match would be acceptable if and only if it had assessment greater than a
fixed number. Bundy [Bundy 87] has argued for the desirability of such a
criterion.
The current matcher clearly fails to satisfy any completeness criterion
which includes first-order unifiability. With criterion 3 extended, the matcher
would have a better chance of conforming to a completeness criterion. An
exhaustive matcher, which constructed and checked all possible matches
between a pair of formulae would naturally satisfy a completeness crite¬
rion. The problem would be to find a balance between thoroughness and
reasonable efficiency; a matcher, such as the current one, based around
the application of opportunistic pairing criteria, will tend not to satisfy
uniform completeness criteria.
11Note that Munyer's matcher is also unlikely to find near unifications if they involve
function mismatches.
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Pairing evaluation The evaluation of pairing suggestions, the pruning ofweakly
suggested pairings and the rule for suggesting structural mismatches are
all quite simple in the current matcher. The methodology for development
of the matcher has been to make the procedures only as sophisticated as
necessary to perform as desired on the examples being considered.
The present rule for pruning weakly suggested pairings is simply to remove
those competing with others which are suggested by a strict superset of
criteria. This may lead to good matches being missed because necessary
argument pairings were not made early on in the matching process. While
there will always be a danger of this in a matcher which uses heuristic
criteria to prune the analogy search space, the danger would perhaps be
lessened if the pruning rule was made more flexible; in particular, it could
be made responsive to the strengths of different criteria, rather than just
their identity; it could then prune pairings which were significantly weaker
than others.
Similarly, the rule for assessment of pairing suggestions could be made more
flexible; for example, pairings might only be made at level 1 if there was
good overall pairing information, rather than, say, just one criterion firing
between one pair of arguments; in cases such as the latter, the refinement
would be delayed until level 2.
The rule for suggesting structural mismatches is quite fussy at the moment:
if there is 'crosstalk' in the suggestions from criterion 4, the rule may well
not fire in cases of potential mismatches.
However the present simple procedures have proved effective in producing
a matcher of greater power and generality than previous ones; this fact in¬
dicates the strength gained from the agenda-based refinement architecture,
and the generality gained from flexible application of the heuristics.
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4.7 Limitations of matching on given problem
statements alone
All the matchers which we have discussed construct matches between problem
statements as presented to them; they find structural correspondences between
the given problem statements without much regard to the 'meanings' of the
symbols, or the context in which the problems arise. In fact, all of the matchers
do take some account of the properties of the symbols in matching: Kling's
uses semantic templates, which represent global analogies; Munyer's matcher
and the current matcher both take account of the commutativity or otherwise of
symbols in matching. Furthermore, the current matcher can, if necessary, change
the propositional form of formulae in trying to match them up. Nevertheless,
the view of analogy embodied in the matchers relates basically to the problem
statements in isolation. In this section, we consider some limitations of this
approach to analogy in mathematical problem solving.
The philosophy of analogy matching on the syntactic structure of the for¬
mulae representing problems is based on the hope that the analogies between
problems will be apparent in their syntax, or at least that there will be sufficient
clues in the syntax for the solution of the base problem to be of use in solving
the target problem. There are two main limitations to this philosophy:
• Superficial difference problem. Analogies between problems are often ob¬
scured, from the syntactic point of view, by superficial differences in their
representations; by superficial, we do not mean that they are necessarily
trivial, but merely that the differences are not crucial to the form of the
solutions.
• Multiple matches problem. There may be an analogy between two prob¬
lems which is clear in the syntax, but there may be many other equally
good syntactic matches with the target problem, and no syntactic way of
distinguishing between them. ' __
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Multiple matches problem. This problem was referred to in the previous
chapter, in discussion of the justification of the semantic type heuristic; it was
argued that this heuristic can be used to alleviate the problem; for example, it
would be used to prefer the first of the following two matches to the second, on




When searching for an analogue in a large knowledge base of solved problems,
this problem could occur often.
Another, perhaps complementary, solution to the multiple matches problem
would be just to try to apply all of the syntactically promising matches, in some
interleaved manner, and discard those that did not turn out to be useful.
Thus, this limitation of problem-based analogy matching does not seem to
present severe difficulties.
Superficial difference problem. The superficial difference problem is more
challenging. Some superficial differences, such as the argument order of com¬
mutative functions and the propositional form of the formulae, really are trivial,
and are already coped with adequately by the current matcher. However, others,
such as the following example from elementary number theory, are more difficult:
odd(x) y odd(x2)
odd(x) A odd(y) —> odd(x ■ y)
Intuitively, these are analogous problems; in fact, one is a special case of the
other. Furthermore, we could reasonably expect the solution to one to be of use
in trying to solve the other. However, there is no close syntactic correspondence
between the formulae which would enable a syntactic matcher to treat them as
analogous. However, by applying the rules PAP y P and x2 = x ■ x to the
— x a + root(x) - x
ii Km
= x log(a,root(x)) — :
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first of the formulae, we can transform it into an equivalent formula which makes
the analogy clear in the syntax:
odd(x) A odd(x) —> odd{x • x)
odd(x) A odd(y) —> odd(x ■ y)
As to the usefulness of this match, it would clearly be easier if the first of
the original pair was the target problem, since the base solution could be used
without modification; it would be more difficult if the base problem was the
one which was rewritten, since the existing base proof might have to be altered
significantly before it could be used. However, in either case, the correspondence
between the problems is certainly relevant, and we would like an analogy matcher
to be able to find it.
In order to be able to notice the similarity, the matcher would clearly need
access to the rules with which the problems are made syntactically similar, in
this case P A P <—► P and x2 = x ■ x, and would need to be able to apply them
to one or both of the formulae. What is called for seems related to unification
modulo a theory in which terms are rewritten using equations from the theory,
if necessary, in order to allow unification to proceed. We would need analogy
modulo a theory. The difficulty with looking at the problem in this way is
that, unlike in the case of unification, we do not have a precise specification for
what we are looking for when we rewrite the terms. This would compound with
the search problem already inherent in the rewriting.
The superficial differences discussed so far, whether easy or difficult, are
solved by re-representing one or both of the formulae to be matched in order to
make the analogy clear. The re-representations are achieved by making infer¬
ences within the object language— propositional inferences, applications of com-
mutativity for certain functions, or, more generally, application of any axioms
from the theory. However, it is possible to make more radical re-representations
than these in order to remove superficial differences: the object level formu¬
lae may be described in a meta-language; object level formulae which are
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very different syntactically may nevertheless have similar meta-level descrip¬
tions. This kind of re-representation is used by the schema learning system LP;
as discussed in Chapter 2, LP makes use of a sophisticated meta-language to
describe the equation solving process. The same meta-level descriptors, such
as common .subterms, may apply to two equations which do not appear at all
similar syntactically. The schemas which LP constructs from worked examples,
which are expressed in the terms of the meta-language, will thus match with
equations very different syntactically from the equation solved in the worked
example.
The hope embodied in this use of the meta-language is that equations which
have similar meta-level descriptions can be solved in similar ways; that is, that
the differences in the object level equations are superficial. It was argued in
Chapter 2 that this allows greater leaps of generalisation than would be possible
by object-level manipulations alone. In the case of LP, the meta-level matching
between schemas and new equations is strict — the equations must satisfy the
preconditions of the schema. This strict use of schemas assumes that the fixed
meta-language generalises the worked examples as far as possible. This depends
on the meta-language being very well developed for the domain in question. In
an advanced learning and reasoning system, we might well find that a meta¬
language had developed partially for a domain, i.e. that it expressed certain
generalisations within the domain, but not others. In this situation, we would
want to allow flexible matching at the meta-level as well, in order to extend
schemas to new situations not envisaged in the existing meta-language. Thus,
we could use the existing analogy matching algorithms, but lift them to the
meta-level. The matching process would then be making use of the analysis of
the domain represented by the meta-language to remove 'superficial' differences
between old and new problems.
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4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have developed a new analogy matching algorithm. The new
matcher makes flexible use of the heuristics which it embodies. There is only one
heuristic implicit in the structure of the algorithm, the partial homomorphism
heuristic, which is a strong heuristic; moreover, there is considerable scope for
structural variation in the algorithm.
The matcher is also easily modifiable in the ways called for in section 4.1:
the procedures for applying the heuristic criteria are separate from the criteria
themselves; new heuristic criteria can be added easily (the late addition of cri¬
terion 3 exemplifies this), and the relative significance of existing criteria can
be altered (criteria can be switched between levels 1 and 2, and the weightings
given by the assessment procedure can be altered).
The matcher also accepts an unrestricted syntax, as called for in section 4.1.
The performance of the new matcher has been seen to be a considerable im¬
provement on that of the existing matchers: we have seen, by general argument,
that the new matcher produces a wider class of common matches; this has fur¬
ther been illustrated on particular examples, and is illustrated on many more in
Appendix A.
We therefore have some confidence that the current matcher can be a useful
component of an analogy system. Subsequent chapters, in which the matcher is
repeatedly called on in such a system, will add to this confidence.
We have also indicated ways in which the procedures for co-ordinating the
criteria may need to be made more flexible, for more difficult examples of analogy.
Lastly, we have considered some of the limitations to the problem-based
approach to analogy taken by all the matchers we have considered. We have seen
that the apprehension of an analogy often crucially involves re-representations
of one or both of the problems. While we have not suggested any computational
solutions to the problems of re-representation, we have argued that a structural
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match is still involved on the transformed problems. Thus the techniques for
structural matching will still be a necessary part of a more sophisticated analogy
system.
Chapter 5
How to Map a Proof Using an
Analogy
In this chapter we consider the next stage ofBasic APS, in which
a plan for the solution of the target problem is constructed from
the known base solution and the initial match between problems. In
particular, we describe how to construct analogues for steps made in
the base solution; and how to find analogues for axioms applied in
the base solution. Both processes are compared (in the latter case on
the basis of a reconstruction) with the corresponding components of
Kling's and Munyer's systems. We also discuss the mapping of the
inference positions from the base solution.
5.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters have been concerned with the finding of analogies via
analogy matching. In this chapter, we consider the next stage of the analogy
framework which was described in Chapter 1 — the construction of a plan for
the solution of the target problem, given a match with a base problem, and
the solution to the base problem. We can think of the plan construction phase
as being separate from the plan application phase, described in Chapter 6 —
given a match with a base problem we could construct a complete plan before
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trying to apply any of it. However, we will see that, in practice, it may be wise
to interleave the construction and application stages, constructing a part of the
plan, attempting to apply it, then constructing some more, and so on. Therefore,
in this chapter, we describe the procedures for constructing individual parts of
the plan, and leave the discussion of how the procedures are co-ordinated with
the application of the plan until Chapter 6.
As explained in Chapter 1, the analogy system which is described in this
thesis is based on a resolution problem solving system. Therefore, a base solution
will be a resolution proof of the base problem. Such a proof contains the following
three types of clauses:
• Axioms. These are axioms of the theory which are used in the proof.
• Goal clauses. These are the clauses which are produced by negating, normal-
forming and skolemising the conjecture which is being proved.
• Intermediate steps. These are clauses obtained by the resolution or paramodulation1
of previous clauses in the proof.
In addition, we will know the inference positions of the inferences which were
made in the base proof; i.e. the positions within their clauses of the literals
which were unified, in a binary resolution step, and the subterm position at
which an equality was applied, in a paramodulation step. In order to map the
base solution over into a plan for the solution of the target, we must be able to
map over each of the three types of clauses; we also consider how to map over
the inference positions, in order to predict how to make corresponding target
inferences to those which were made in the base.
While we are concerned here with a resolution system, the same types of
clauses and connection positions will arise in any automated problem solving
1Paramodulation [Bundy 83] is an inference rule which formalises substitution by
equality. " "
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system. The techniques described in this chapter will thus be applicable to
other kinds of problem solving system.
For the goal clauses, we use the structural correspondence from the match
between the problem statements to find analogous goal clauses from the target
problem. This process is straightforward, and will not be described further here.
For the intermediate steps, we want to construct their analogues as best we
can according to the current match; there is no a priori restriction on the form
of the analogues; i.e. we are solving problems of the form
A is to B as C is to X
where A and C are the problem statements2, B is an intermediate step in the
base solution, and X is the (unconstrained) unknown. Given the existing match
between A and C, we apply the match to B to get X. This application is done
by the analogue construction rule (ACR) described in section 3.
For the axioms, we have a similar problem to the one above, except that
X is constrained to be an axiom (or theorem) from the knowledge base. The
'free' application of the ACR is not guaranteed to result in an axiom, so we need
some way of finding the axiom, or axioms, which is closest to being the analogue
of B. This is done by the analogous operator identification routine (AOI),
described in section 4.
In section 2, we take care of a slight complication to the story, arising from
the refutation method of resolution systems: we describe how the initial mapping
needs to be negated and partitioned before it is used in mapping parts of the
base proof.
2More generally, A and C may stand for whatever has been matched so far to produce
the current mapping— this may include previous axioms and intermediate steps as well
as the original problem statements.
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5.2 Negating and partitioning the mapping
Refutation problem solving systems, such as resolution, prove that a conjecture
follows from some axioms by showing that, in the presence of the axioms, the
negation of the conjecture leads to a contradiction. The initial match between
problems is between the skolemised forms of the tin-negated conjectures; the
goal clauses, being skolemised forms of the negated base conjecture, will contain
skolem terms where the matched clause contains variables, and vice-versa. Thus,
the initial mapping will not apply directly to the goal clauses. The same is true
of the intermediate steps, which will contain skolem constants and variables
introduced by the goal clauses. However, the negated forms may be obtained
from the positive forms by a consistent replacement of variables and skolem
terms by skolem terms and variables respectively: for example, if the positive
form is
p(x0,y,z0(y)),
where xo is a skolem constant and zo(y) is a skolem function, arising from the
unskolemised conjecture
3x My 3z p(x,y,z),
then the negated form is
-.p(x,y0(x),z),
arising from the negated conjecture
Vx 3y Mz ->p(x,y,z).




By composing with the replacement substitutions for the base and target
conjectures, we transform the initial mapping between the positive forms into a
negated mapping between the negated forms, as shown below
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It it is the negated mapping which is used in mapping the goal clauses and
intermediate steps. For example, if the positive base and target conjectures
(from Boolean algebra) were
iUi = i and x D x = x
respectively3, the initial mapping between them was
{x x, Unfl,
and the negated forms were
~>a U a — a and ->b D b = b,
the replacement substitutions would be
and the negated mapping would be
{an J, U f|, =<-)■= }.
The part of the initial mapping which is transformed by the above procedure,
that involving variables and skolem terms, is relevant for mapping goal clauses
and intermediate steps, but not base axioms. Therefore, the negated mapping is
partitioned into two subsets, one containing associations free of skolem terms and
variables, and the other containing all other associations. In the above example,
we would have
3The meet and join functions of Boolean algebra are written fl and U respectively to
distinguish them from the logical connectives A and V.
{x ► a) and {x ► b},
{U <—> n, —}
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and
{a *-» b}.
An alternative to negating and partitioning the mapping would be to negate
and skolemize the problem statements before matching them. We do not do this
for two reasons: firstly, it is much easier for a user to interpret a match between
positive forms of the problem statements, since these directly express what is
being asserted; secondly, and more importantly, if an analogy is successful we
may wish to store the match for later use in guiding other analogy attempts
(Chapter 7 discusses this in detail); the match would be used in its positive
form; thus, we would have to invert the mapping at some stage anyway.
5.3 Analogue Construction Rule
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, the ACR is given the existing
match, and a clause from the base proof, and has to construct the (best guess
at the) analogue of the clause according to the mapping.
The basic idea behind the ACR is simple: view the existing match as a
mapping from base to target, and apply the mapping to the clause to get its
analogue. For example, supposing the match contained the associations4
(U,n,fcf), (n,U,fd), (<, <, [(1,2), (2,1)]), (=, =,id), (a, b, term) and (0,1, term),
and the clause from the base proof to be mapped was
aU(adO) = a.
4Recall that the third component of the associations give argument pairing infor¬
mation about the symbol pair; 'id' (short for identical) means that argument order is
preserved, 'term' (short for terminal) that there are no arguments to be paired, and
otherwise the pairing is given by a list of pairs (i j), meaning that argument i on the left
is paired with argument j on the right.
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Then the correct analogue would clearly be
6n (6U 1) = b.
If the base clause was
a < a U a,
then the analogue would be
b fl b < b
However, the following cases may arise, which the ACR will have to cope
with:
1. The base clause contains symbols which are not mapped in the existing
match. This will happen often, as proofs almost always contain symbols
which do not occur in the original problem statement.
2. The base clause contains a symbol which is mapped to more than one other
by the existing match (i.e. the match is inconsistent with respect to this
symbol).
The ACR described below treats these cases as follows:
1. The symbols are copied over to the target, with identical-pairings if they
are not atomic. The results are flagged as being default symbols, as this
fact is relevant for plan application. For example, with the mapping used
above, the analogue of the clause
a U a = 1
would be
b fl def(b) = def(l).
The unary function symbol def is special syntax introduced to flag symbols
which have been mapped by default; def(T), for some term T, indicated
that the head function symbol of T has been mapped by default. De¬
pending on how the plan application procedures treat the default symbols
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in a plan, their use may involve an application of the identical symbols
heuristic; in fact, the application procedures described in the next section
do not attach significance to the identity of the symbol which is mapped by
default, just to the fact that it is a default symbol, so the heuristic is not
used in this case; however, different application procedures might attach
significance to the identity of default symbols.
2. All analogues are constructed and are returned either as a list, or as a more
compact notation, if this is possible (see below). The list can be thought
of as a disjunction of possibilities, and the plan application procedures of
the next chapter treats it in this way. For example, if the mapping used
above in addition contained the association (a, c, term), the analogue of
a U (a D 0) = a
would be
[b,c] fl ([6,c] U 1) = [b,c\.
We next give the formal definition of the ACR which has the behaviour called
for above. The definition is by recursion on the structure of the term whose
analogue is being constructed. Firstly, some notation used in the definition: for
a term or symbol T and a match a, let
Ta = {V\(T,V,term) 6 a};
i.e. Ta is the set of terms to which T is directly mapped by a.
Analogue Construction Rule
Given a term T and a mapping a, ACR produces the
result of applying the mapping to the term, TP.
Base case. T is atomic: if Ta ^ <j> then Ta — Ta (if Ta contains just
one element, it is represented as the element, to improve readability);
if Ta = <f> then Ta == def{T).
Recursive case. T is not atomic, Ta = Ta\JaT, where aT is as defined
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below5 (again, if Ta contains just one element, it is represented as
the element): if
T = f(ai,a2,.. .an),
let a", a%,... a% be the results of the recursive calls to the ACR. There
are three subcases to the recursive case:
(a) If /„ = <f> then
„T = {<&/(/(«?, «?,...<))}■
(b) If fa contains just one element, g, where (f,g,Pj9) £ a, then
c*T 1) ' ®cr(2) 5 • • • ^<r(n) )})
where o is the argument mapping implied by Pju 6 If the previous
argument pairings of f and g, Pj„ leave an argument unmapped
on the left (represented as (p(i,t'),u) in Pfg, meaning that the ith
argument, was unmatched previously), then for any j such that a,j
unifies with t', a\* is flagged in aT in the form bdef(a°j) to signify the
fact that it may need to be omitted; in addition, if / is not known
to be commutative, bdef(af) is added as a final argument to aT (it
would otherwise be erased by the above definition); if argument i is
unmapped on the right (represented as (u,p(i,t')) in Pf3), then the
term t' is introduced in the ith argument position of aT; again, it is
introduced in the form bdef(t') to signify its special status. (These
complicated conditions involving bdef are explained in the remarks
below.)
5Ta is the direct analogue, if any, of T, and aT is the composite analogue, formed
from the analogues of the constituents of T.
6If the previous occurrences of the (ffg) association have consistent argument pair¬
ings, a is derived from these; if the previous occurrences are inconsistent, the first set of
pairings in Pfg is used for a.
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(c) If fa contains more than one element, say [</i, g2,...], the pairings
of f with each of the g's are checked to see if they are consistent; if
they are, then
ofU — {poss^ [<7i, <72 J • • •]} [a<r(l) 5 0-cr(2) >•••])}?
where a is the (consistent) argument mapping derived from the pf;s.
This is the compact notation referred to above (the meaning of poss
is explained in the remarks which follow). If the pairings are not
mutually consistent,
cfF { i • • • O'tji (n) )? 5^^2(2) > • • • ®<72 (n) )i })
i.e. just the set of the individual analogues. The same conditions on
unmatched arguments in (b) apply to this case as well.
Remarks
• For most composite terms, Ta = i.e. it is rare for composite terms to
have direct analogues in the mapping. Thus, usually Ta = aT. Where a
composite term does have direct analogues, these are considered to be al¬
ternatives to the composite analogues derived by recursion on the structure
of T, and so the union of the possibilities is taken.
• poss(L, Args), where L is a list of function or predicate symbols stands
for the list of terms constructable from symbols in L applied to Args; the
notation is more compact that the list of the possibilities, and makes the
analogue easier to interpret.
• The treatment of associations which include unmatched arguments is illus¬
trated by the following example: Suppose the terms
angle(a,b,c) and segmented, c)
have been matched together previously (say, within the problem state¬
ments), and have given rise to the association
(.angle, segment, [(1,1), (p(2,-b), u), (3,2)])
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in the existing match; if, later, we want to construct the analogue (from
left to right) of the term
angle(d, 6, e),
the ACR would produce
segmented, e, bdef(b)).
If we wanted to construct the analogue (from right to left) of
segment(x, z),
the ACR would produce
angle(x, bdef(b),z).
Terms headed by the unary bdef function symbol should be thought of as
optional. This means that they are deemed to unify with another term
if they unify (in the normal sense) either with or without the term inside
the bdef. The motivation behind the conditions involving bdef is that we
want to allow arguments to be erased or introduced again, where this has
happened before. However, it would be hard to be confident as to just when
arguments would be introduced or erased; the symbol bdef is introduced
and interpreted to allow flexibility — i.e. arguments may or may not be
unmatched again. For a non-commutative symbol, an argument position
which has been unmatched in the past is a candidate for being erased by
the ACR, so bdef is used for such arguments; for commutative symbols,
particular argument positions are of no significance, so another condition
is added which looks for arguments which unify with previously, erased
arguments, and flags these with bdef as candidates for erasure. Flagging
extra arguments with bdef merely increases the generality of the analogue
produced by the ACR, so the particular conditions under which bdef is
used are not critical. The true significance of bdef (and the other special
syntax introduced by the ACR) will only be clarified when the procedures
which make use of the analogue steps are described in the next chapter.
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• The ACR as defined above produces a structural correspondence between
a term, T, and its analogue Ta, as a side effect (each symbol is associated
with the symbol to which it is mapped). The structural correspondence is
used in mapping inference positions (see below).
• The exotic cases which make the definition complicated, such as what
to do if there is more than one prior pairing, and if arguments have been
unmapped previously, are necessary for the definition to be complete; how¬
ever, they do not, in practice, arise very often.
5.3.1 Comparison with Munyer's AIR
Munyer's analogy system contains a procedure which has the same purpose as
the ACR described in the previous section: to predict an analogous step in the
target to one which was made in the base. Munyer calls the procedure the
analogical inference rule. He uses the term 'inference rule' since he regards
the construction of an analogue as an approximate form of inference; however,
the use of the procedure corresponds to that of the ACR, since approximate
inferences need to be validated before they can be accepted.
Munyer's definition for his AIR is a complex case analysis; on investigation,
it turns out to contain numerous errors and inconsistencies in the cases, and
cannot be considered to be a coherent algorithm; the planning method which
makes use of the AIR was never implemented by Munyer, and perhaps the AIR
itself was never implemented. It is clear from the examples that Munyer gives
that he intends the AIR to do the same sorts of things as the ACR described
in the previous section. However, there are also overall differences which are
discussed below:
• Munyer's AIR uses no special syntax: to represent the results of unmatched
symbols and inconsistencies; for example, if a symbol is unmatched, it
will be copied over in the analogue, another application of the identical
symbols heuristic. This will undoubtedly lead to problems for the plan
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application procedure: whenever a symbol is introduced by a step of the
base proof, it will be assumed to be preserved by the analogy; whenever
this is not so, the plan will be flawed and will need to be corrected at some
stage; plan correction (see Chapter 7) is a difficult enterprise, involving
extra search. Thus it is sensible to avoid as many flaws in the plan as
possible; the ACR does this, for unmapped symbols, by flagging the result
using the special unary function de/; the application procedure is then
able to match the default symbol with any symbol in order to allow the
step to go through.
• Munyer's AIR makes use of what he calls inference links to communicate
the analogy between successive steps of the base proof; i.e. the analogue
for a symbol is determined by the analogue for a symbol from the previous
step to which it is (inference) linked. This contrasts with the approach
taken in this thesis, and by Kling, in which the analogy is conveyed by
an evolving global mapping. Munyer gives no account of the meaning of
the links — almost all of them, in his mathematical examples, are between
identical symbols and represent shared structure in the base proof. The
effect of the links seems to be to subdivide occurrences of a symbol in a
term according to the occurrences, if any, to which they are linked in the
previous term. The main potential benefit seems to be that inconsistencies
in the mapping can be avoided in this way. However, the value of this
is doubtful: while it avoids the introduction of disjunctions into the plan,
this will have the effect of causing the plan to be unnecessarily flawed if
there is a genuine inconsistency.
It would be easy to change the ACR to account for inference links, if this
was thought sensible: whenever there is a check of the form (f,g,P/g) G
a in the above definition, it would be replaced by a check of the form
linked(f, f) and (/',<7, Ppg) € a, where the symbols /, /' and g would
i be particular occurrences of the symbols concerned, and would thus include
the position of occurrence in a named clause. The main difficulty involved
with the introduction of inference links into the analogy system would be
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updating and propagating the links in the base proof: given this, their
incorporation into the ACR would be relatively straightforward.
5.4 Analogous Operator Identification
As explained above, the purpose of analogous operator identification (AOI) is to
find plausible analogues (from the axiom/theorem base) for axioms which were
used in the base proof, given a mapping derived from the problem statements. In
addition, as we shall see below, the AOI can produce an extension to the initial
mapping between problems. As noted above, the analogue of an axiom, A, with
respect to the existing mapping a, Aa, will not in general be in the knowledge
base. This is why a separate procedure is required for the AOI. Kling's analogy
system, ZORBA, forms unstructured plans for the solution of the target problem
which consist entirely of potential analogues for the axioms used in the base —
ZORBA makes no use of intermediate steps.
We first analyse Kling's procedure EXTENDER, for finding the analogues of
axioms. The analysis involves a reconstruction of EXTENDER, and assessment
of its performance on some examples. In the following sections we propose an
AOI which is an improvement on Kling's, and discuss its performance.
5.4.1 Kling's EXTENDER
We first give a brief description of Kling's algorithm:
Description
Given a mapping, a, and a set of axioms whose analogues are sought, first find
the subset, SOMEa, which consists of those axioms some (not all) of whose
symbols are mapped by a. For each A £ SOMEa, form a description "of
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A, descr(A). descr(A) is a list of the predicates 7 that occur in A, flagged by
the polarities of the positions in which they occur — pos if all occurrences are
positive, neg if they are all negative, and impcond if there are some of each.
Thus if A is
-isubgroup(h, g, *) V grouping, *)
then descr(A) is
\pos(group), neg(subgroup)].
Then map descr(A) to get descr(A)" (this type of mapping is obviously much
simpler than that described in the previous section). Express descr(A)a as
descr(A)a U Defs,
where Defs consists of that part of descr(A)a which was mapped by default, and
descr(A)a is that part which was positively mapped. Then return as possible
analogues for A those axioms B such that
(a) descr(B) D descr(A)a
and (b) |descr(B) fl Defs\ is maximal over all axioms satisfying (a). We can
think of (a) as a filter, and (b) as a metric which is applied to axioms which pass
through the filter. The filter (a) is an application of the consistent translation
heuristic— we look for axioms which contain symbols which are associated with
ones in the base axiom. The metric (b) is a direct application of the identical
symbols heuristic — analogous axioms are chosen which will lead to identical
associations being added to the analogy.
Given such a B, the existing mapping is extended in the following way: form
the sets
descr(B) \ descr(A)a and Defs = descr(A)a \ descr(A)a.
7Recall that Kling's clauses contain no functions or constants — in a less restricted
syntax, the descriptions would obviously include the other symbols (see below).
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For any pair of identical features (including the polarity signs) between these two
sets, add the corresponding predicate association to the mapping, and delete the
features from the sets. Out of the remainder, for any pair of features of the
same polarity, whose predicates are of the same (unique) semantic type, add the
predicate association to the existing mapping.
The procedure is repeated for each extended mapping, until the set SOMEa
is empty.
Reconstruction
The procedure described above was reconstructed in Prolog, and its performance
was analysed. The following difficulties with the routine became apparent:
1. It is likely that Kling's routine will fail to find analogues for certain of
the axioms used in the base proof. Any axiom that has all its predicates
mapped by the initial mapping will never be considered by the procedure.
This is presumably an oversight on Kling's part; the situation perhaps
never arose in the examples which he was considering. It is straightforward
to change the procedure so that it takes account of such axioms, and this
was done for the reconstruction.
2. Axioms whose descriptions contain only one feature, will tend to give rise to
many possible analogues, most of them obviously unsuitable. For example,
12 analogues were found for the axiom x = x, out of a base of just 19
axioms, including such unlikely candidates as x D (y U z) = (x fl y) U (x fl z).
There is clearly something wrong with the metric for this to happen. As
the axiom base expanded, this problem would become increasingly severe.
3. When an association is added to the mapping, no argument pairing infor¬
mation is included, because all such information is lost "in forming the
descriptions. For example, if the axioms in question were x < x U y
and i fly < x, the extended match ought to include the association
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(<, <, [(1,2), (2,1)]), but Kling's procedure would produce (<,<,id) by
default. This could be important at later stages of the Basic APS process8.
4. The extension procedure is heavily geared towards adding identical asso¬
ciations, both in the metric for choosing possible analogues, and in the
procedure for extending the mapping based on them. For example, if A is
-irat(x) V -irat(y) V rat(x — y),
and '— 'is not in the initial map, then the axiom B,
-irat(x) V -irat(y) V y = 0 V rat(x/y),
would not be considered as a possible analogue, since A itself has a higher
default match than B. But if the initial mapping contained the association
(+,-,id), then B would actually turn out to be the correct analogue for A.
It is interesting that EXTENDER relies heavily on the identical symbols
heuristic, while INITIAL_MAP (see Chapter 3-2) made no use of it at all,
relying on the semantic type heuristic instead. The overall problem with
both procedures is too much reliance on weak heuristics.
5. If A is




x U (y fl z) = (z U y) fl (a; U z),
then descr(A) — descr(B) = descr(A)a — [pos(=),pos(fl),pos(U)]; so
Kling's procedure, based on the abstracted descriptions, has no way of
8This point does not" apply to Kling's own system, since it only uses the identity of
analogous axioms, and not their structure; but it will apply to the application systems
described in chapter 6. " " _
Chapter 5. How to Map a Proof Using an Analogy 143
distinguishing between A and B as analogues for A. Yet, given the initial
mapping, it is clear that B is the analogue of A (in fact B = Aa, according
to the ACR defined in the last section).
Some of the problems listed above are caused by the particular filter and met¬
ric which Kling uses: 1 and 2 are clearly of this type; 4 is also partly, since the
filter could be changed so as not to bias towards identical associations. However,
some of the problems indicate limitations of the reliance on abstracted descrip¬
tions, which take no account of the structure of the axioms: it is the structure
which indicates argument pairings (3), which causes non-identical associations
to be added to the mapping (4), and which enables us to distinguish between
axioms which contain the same symbols (5).
Conclusions Kling's EXTENDER is clearly deficient in two respects: firstly,
his metric for chosing possible analogous axioms is unsatisfactory because it can
cause many obviously unsuitable analogues to be found, particularly for small
axioms, and leans too heavily on the identical symbols heuristic, causing the cor¬
rect analogue often to be missed; secondly EXTENDER is based on abstracted
descriptions of the clauses, and thus cannot take account of the structure of the
clauses, which is important for analogy.
5.4.2 An improved AOI
Value of structural match
Kling's EXTENDER routine seems to be based on the expectation that finding
analogues for axioms should be easier than the initial analogy matching; i.e. that
the knowledge of part of the analogy should make it easier to extend it further,
and that the extension can be done solely on the basis of the abstracted descrip¬
tions of the axioms. However, we have seen that structural correspondence is
relevant in deciding analogues for axioms. We summarise the reasons for this:
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• The notion of structural similarity (the partial homomorphism heuristic)
is crucial to the use of analogy in automated problem solving, as discussed
in Chapter 3-2. In order to make use of this strong heuristic effectively, we
need a structural match between base axioms and their potential analogues.
It is possible to get an idea of whether two axioms might possibly match
well together structurally by analysing their abstracted descriptions (see
below), but this is only a weak use of the heuristic.
• A structural match enables the existing mapping to be extended in a prin¬
cipled way, with non-identical argument pairings if indicated. The use
of the strong partial homomorphism heuristic would remove the need to
rely on the weak identical symbols heuristic to propose extensions to the
mapping.
• If we have a structural match between a pair of axioms, we can map over
the inference position, at which the base axiom was used in the base proof,
to the target axiom. For example, if we have the following match between
axioms from Boolean algebra
x = x U 0
1 fl x — x
and we know that the upper axiom was applied by paramodulation from
left to right in the base, we can predict that the lower one will be applied
by paramodulation from right to left in the target.
Value of flexible filter
Kling's use of a filter based on abstracted descriptions has been seen to be
both faulty in itself and limited in its discriminatory ability, being based on
abstracted descriptions; while the latter point is true for any matching based on
abstracted descriptions, a more flexible and less biased filter would nevertheless
be a valuable part of an AOI: since some of the symbols in a base axiom will
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probably already have been mapped, we can use their analogues to 'get a handle'
on potential analogous axioms; this will enable us to cut down the number
of candidates considerably out of the potentially very large knowledge base.
Structural matching, as called for above, is bound to be more expensive than
feature matching; without some way of pruning possible analogues, we would
find that the AOI was extremely expensive.
However, we need a more flexible filter than Kling's, which does not, for
example, allow inconsistencies to be introduced into the mapping; we would also
want to remove the heavy reliance on the identical symbols heuristic.
Two-stage AOI
We are therefore led to a two-stage AOI:
1. A flexible filter, based on abstracted descriptions, is first called between a
base axiom, and all clauses from the knowledge base; it returns a (short)
ordered list of candidate analogues for the base axiom.
2. The candidate list is used to form the initial state of the matching and-
agenda as described in Chapter 4; each partial match is started off with
the existing mapping in its mapping slot, instead of the empty mapping.
The analogy matching algorithm (described in chapter 4) is then called to
produce an ordered list of completed matches. The candidate analogues
involved in the matches, together with the matches themselves and their
assessments, are returned as the result of the AOI. Each candidate has an
associated extension to the mapping — those associations added in the
course of matching, which were not in the initial mapping.
Of the two stages,, the second is much more complex; however, the complexity
involved is that which has already been discussed in the design of the matching
algorithm, so there is not much more that needs to be said here. Note that the
facility of the matcher to be provided with guidance in the form of expected
associations is being made use of here; the existing mapping is put in the initial
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mapping slot; this makes the matching faster and more accurate than it would
be if the matching was done from scratch. It also has the virtue of guiding the
AOI towards axioms which involve mappings which are consistent with the ex¬
isting mapping; this is important, since we are looking for (relatively) consistent
mappings throughout the analogy process. But we also do not rule out the intro¬
duction of inconsistencies into the mapping, if this is suggested by other analogy
heuristics. The AOI inherits the flexibility of the matcher with respect to the
heuristics.
The filter stage is important, for the reasons given above, and we next con¬
sider its design.
A flexible filter. We first change the definition of the description function
so that repeated occurrences of symbols are repeated in the descriptions (thus
x U x = x no longer has the same description as x U (y U z) = (r U y) U z). We
then define a similarity function between descriptions which takes account of the
symbols which do not match as well as the ones which do.
Since we are dealing with an unrestricted syntax, the descriptions are defined
to be three lists, one each for predicates, functions and constants. So if A is
iU0 = i then
descr(A) = ( [=], [U], [0] ).
(Unlike Kling, we do not include polarities in the description, although it would
be simple to add them if it proved useful.) The similarity function d(Di,D2)
between two descriptions of this form is defined to be the sum of a similarity
function / between individual components across the three components. The
function / is defined below.
Suppose we have descriptions D\ and D2, and that D\ is a mapped descrip¬
tion; Di may thus contain default symbols, flagged by def, and optional symbols,
flagged by bdef. Let these be Defs and Bdefs respectively, and let
Maps — Di\(DefsU Bdefs)
be those symbols in Di which were positively mapped. Then
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1. f(D\,D2) should depend positively on di(Di,D2) — \D\ H D21; i.e. the
number of positively mapped symbols; note that default and optional sym¬
bols are excluded from this, since there are no defaults in D2\ this is an
application of the consistent translation heuristic — we prefer axioms
which may enable repeated associations.
2. f(Di,D2) should depend negatively on the number of symbols in the de¬
scriptions which do not match. There are two qualifications to this. Firstly,
default symbols should be excluded from the unmatched symbols, since
they may match, without inconsistency, with symbols in D2] furthermore,
for each default symbol, two should be subtracted from the unmatched
total, since the symbol with which a default might match should not be
penalised either. Secondly, optional arguments should not count as un¬
matched, since they are optional; furthermore, for each optional symbol in
Bdefs which matches with a symbol in D2, two should be subtracted from
the unmatched total, since we can then consider the optional symbol to be
included and to match with the other. These qualifications are designed
to view the match as optimistically as possible. When all this is included,
the expression obtained is
d2(Dx, D2) = \D\ U D21 — \D\ fl D2\ — 2 • \Defs\ — \Bdefs\ — |Bdefs' Pi D2\
where Bdefs' is Bdefs with the bdef tags stripped off.
This is also an application of the consistent translation heuristic, from
the negative point of view — d2 represents an estimate of the number of
inconsistencies which would be introduced by matching with a particular
axiom.
3. f(Di,D2) should depend negatively on the difference in size between the
descriptions. As above there is a qualification arising from Bdefs; since
symbols in Bdefs are optional, and we should be optimistic, we should
retain just as many optional symbols in order to minimise the difference in
sizes. Thus we define dz(D\, D2) as follows:
|Z>2|-|I>i| if Pi|<|D2|




This number represents a minimum on the number of unmapped symbols
in an analogy match between the clauses giving rise to the descriptions.
This is an application of the partial homomorphism heuristic: d3 gives
a lower bound on the number of unmatched symbols which would result
from matching with a particular axiom.
4. f(Dx,D2) also depends positively on
\Defs' (~l D2\
where Defs' is Defs with the def tags stripped out. That is, we reward
default symbols which match symbols in D2. This is an application of
the identical symbols heuristic — we marginally prefer matches which
promise identical associations.
All of the applications of analogy heuristics above are weak ones, even though
some of the heuristics are strong; this is because the quantities can only estimate
indirectly the prospects for a given heuristic being well satisfied by a match with
the axiom. The filter which has been implemented has
i, D2) = 3 • dx(Dx, D2) — d2(Dx, D2) — 3 • d3(Dx, D2) + d4(Dx, D2).
The weights attached to the four constituents reflect their relative importance.
The filter uses the similarity function just described together with a preset
threshold — it finds the maximal similarity between the mapped description and
the axioms in the knowledge base, and returns all axioms whose similarity with
the mapped description differs from the maximum by less than the threshold.
A small threshold will result in fewer axioms being returned, and thus in less
work for stage 2, but risks missing plausible analogues. A large threshold has
the reverse characteristics. 5 has proved a suitable threshold for the filter, and
is used in the examples that follow.
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We now illustrate the behaviour of the new AOI routine on some examples.
For both of the example problems considered below, the same knowledge base
was used, consisting of 59 axioms and theorems from real number theory and
Boolean algebra. The axioms/theorems for the two domains were mixed in order
to simulate a large knowledge base, where many different sorts of axioms and
theorems could be applied.
Example 1 Given the following initial match between problems
-irat(x) V rat(y) Vi = 0V -*rat(x ■ y)
we use the new AOI to find plausible analogues for the axioms used in the proof
of the upper clause:
A\: -irat(x) V -rat(y) V rat(x — y)
M2: (x + y)-x = y
For Ai, the filter returns the following candidates, with associated scores:
-irat(x) V raf(y) V ->rat(x + y)
Ap. -irat(x) V -irat(y) V rat(x — y) (10)
A3: -irat(x) V-irat(y) V y = 0 V rat(x/y) (9)
Ay. -<rat(x) V rat(y) V ~^rat(x + y) (9)
The matching stage produces three matches:
Axioms Strength Map extension
Ai Mi | 0.929 _ {— <—> —}
Ai A3 0.811 - {-<-+/}
Ai A3 0.811 {—<—► /}
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The difference between the two matches with A3 is that the association — <-* /
has arguments preserved in one and swapped in the other. In the context of the
solution of the target, A3 will turn out to be the correct analogue (see Chapter 6);
the match with A\ has greater strength than that with A3 because it is a better
structural match, and it has more identical symbols. However, the match with
A3 is still returned as a plausible analogue; Kling's EXTENDER returns A\ as
the only analogue for itself, and would thus be led into trouble on this example.
For A2, the filter returns the following 9 candidates:
■A5: x • y = y ■ x (5)
A&. x • y = x • y (5)
A7: ->x | y V y = x • h(x,y) (4)
A8: x2 = X • X (4)
Ag: II'S>OIIH (4)
A10: X • 1 = X (2)
An: x n x = 0 (1)
A2' {x + y) - x = y (1)
Given these candidates, the matching stage produces 3 matches-:
Axioms Strength Map extension
A2 A2 0.867 {-f- > +, — <—> —}
A2 Ag 0.833 {— > /}
A2 *-> A10 0.751 {(a: + y) — x <-> x ■ 1}
The first of the matches is marginally preferred because the inconsistency which
it entails (+ • previously, and + <-» — now) is outweighed by the unmapped
symbols in the other match. In the context of the target problem, the second
match will turn out to be correct (see Chapter 6). Kling's EXTENDER returns
11 possible analogues from the knowledge base, including the correct oner"
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Example 2 Given the following initial match between problems,
x U x — x
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x n x = x
we use the new AOI to find plausible analogues for the following axioms from
the proof of the upper clause (see Chapter 6 for the full base proof):
Bp. iU0 = x
B2: xflx^O
By. x — x
For Bi, the filter returns the following candidates, with associated scores:
Bp. x D 1 = x (6)
B2: xflx = 0 (3)
By. xflO^O (3)
By. x + 0 = x (2)
Bp. x U 0 = x (2)
The matching stage produces three matches:
Axioms Strength Map extension
Bi <->• B5 0.980 {0 *-* x, x 0}
Bx ^ B4 0.960 {0 1}
Bx <-» Bx 0.867 {0h0,UHU}
The second of these turns out to be correct in the context of the target proof. The
second is a unification modulo commutativity and a single function mismatch.
Kling's EXTENDER returns B2 and B5 as the possible analogues; it is unable
to find f?4, the correct analogue, because of its heavy reliance on the identical
symbols heuristic — the association with B4 introduces a new non-identical
association 0h1 into the mapping.
For B2, the filter returns the following 8 candidates, with associated scores:
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By. x n x = 0 (6)
By x U x = 1 (4)
By x2 = X ■ X (3)
Be: x + 0 = x (2)
By (x + y)-x = y (2)
Bw~. x C\ y = y n x (2)
Bp. x U 0 = x (2)
Bp x n 1 — x (2)
The matching stage produces two matches:
Axioms Strength Map extension
_E?2 0.967 {n U, — > —, 0 *—> 1}
,z?2 t?2 0.880 {n > n, — <—> —, o ► 0}
The first of these will turn out to be correct; the second involves an inconsistency
as to the analogue of fl from right to left. Kling's EXTENDER returns as
the only analogue for itself, and thus would, once again, be led into trouble. The
cause of the problem is again the reliance on the identical symbols heuristic.
For R3, the filter returns just one candidate, B3 itself, which leads to a
single match. Note that this was the example which led Kling's EXTENDER to
propose 17 different analogues.
Conclusions The examples given above show how the two stages of the AOI
combine to find analogues which match well according to the analogy heuristics
and the initial mapping between the problems. The flexibility of both the filter
and the matcher enable good analogues to be found, even if this involves extend¬
ing the mapping with non-identical associations. The map extension is based
on the same general principles as the initial map formation between problems,
rather than special purpose procedures, as with Kling's EXTENDER. The ex¬
amples given above are typical, and were not carefully chosen so that Kling's
procedures failed on them. _
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It would be quite possible to use each stage of the AOI without the other:
we could try matching against all clauses in the knowledge base without first
filtering; or we could just use the filter, and return the candidate list as the
plausible analogues without using the matcher to distinguish between them. The
problem with the first of these strategies would be that the AOI would be very
expensive, and would become even more so as the knowledge base expanded.
The problem with the second is that the AOI will not be so discriminating, and
will not return structural correspondences; however, the latter problem will be
mitigated by the fact that the candidates will be discriminated anyway when an
attempt is made to apply them in plan application; the question is whether the
extra cost of attempting and failing to apply bad analogues is greater than the
cost of matching to find the promising ones beforehand. We cannot settle this
question here, but will return to it again in Chapter 6.
5.5 Mapping Inference Positions
The ACR and AOI procedures described above are used to map the intermedi¬
ate steps and axioms respectively of the base proof. However, important con¬
stituents of the base proof which are not covered by these procedures are the
inference positions - i.e. the positions of the unified literals in their clauses in the
case of binary resolution, and, in addition, the position of the rewritten subterm
and the direction of application of the equality in the case of paramodulation. We
can use an analogy to predict the positions of the corresponding inferences in the
target proof - the analogous positions. For example, suppose we are considering
the following base inference, an application of paramodulation:
STEP:
->a < a U (b ft c) iU0 = I
AXIOM:
->a U 0 <aU{6flc)
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This means that the subterm at position [1,1] in the step, a, is rewritten by the
equation x U 0 = x used from right to left. Suppose also that we have mapped
the step and the axiom, using the ACR and AOI, in the following way:
x U 0 = x
i
x n l = x
Then, using the structural correspondences shown 9, obtained from the mapping
procedures, we can map the entire step, including inference positions to:
STEP: AXIOM:
-ia fl (b U c) < a i = ifll
-ia D(bUc) < a n 1
The inference positions, [1,1] and ([],rl), are mapped via the structural correspon¬
dences shown; without the correspondences, the positions could not be mapped.
The value of the mapped positions is well illustrated by the current example:
there are six ways of applying the axiom x = x D 1 to the clause *->a PI (6 uc) < a;
we can use the mapped positions to try the indicated way first; in the context of
a developing analogy, we have good grounds for expecting the indicated inference
to be the one most likely to lead to success; if it does not, we can return and try
other ways. If the positions were not mapped, we would not have grounds for
choosing between the six possible inferences; over several successive steps, this
could lead to an unmanageable search space, even assuming that the analogous
axioms were the correct ones.
->a D
9Recall that the ACR, described in section 3, produces a structural correspondence
between a term and its analogue as a side-effect
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5.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we have discussed analogical plan formation; in particular, we
have described procedures for mapping the various components of resolution
proofs — goal clauses, intermediate steps, axioms and inference positions; while
we have been concerned with resolution, the techniques described will apply to
most forms of inference system.
The main procedures described are the analogue construction rule (ACR),
for constructing the analogues of intermediate steps, and the analogous operator
identification (AOI), for finding plausible analogues for axioms used in the base
proof. We have seen that special syntax is useful, for the ACR, to represent
uncertainty in the plan caused by symbols having no known analogues, or more
than one known analogue. We have compared the ACR to Munyer's analogical
inference rule (AIR); the latter procedure, while it appears to do the same kind of
thing as the ACR, is too ambiguously and inconsistently described to be analysed
in detail; however, we have seen that it is unable to represent uncertainty in a
plan, which will lead to many plans being unnecessarily flawed.
We have described an AOI procedure which was motivated by the shortcom¬
ings of Kling's procedure EXTENDER, for finding analogues for base axioms;
we have seen that the new AOI is a considerable improvement over Kling's pro¬
cedures, both in the filter and the use of structural matching. The matching
algorithm described in the previous chapter is used again in the AOI.
We have also considered the mapping of inference positions from base to
target, and have seen the potential value of it, in terms of ordering the inferences
which can be made at a step.
While the performance of the proof mapping procedures has been seen to be
satisfactory on individual parts of certain proofs, their main validation comes
from their co-ordination, along with the plan application procedures, to find
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complete solutions to target problems. This validation is provided by the results
of the next chapter.
Chapter 6
The application of analogical plans
In this chapter we investigate the use of analogical plans to guide
the search within a resolution theorem proving system. The plans are
constructed using the procedures described in the previous chapters,
in particular the analogue construction rule (ACR) and analo¬
gous operator identification routine (AOI). We consider various
ways of coordinating the procedures in the construction and valida¬
tion of analogical plans; the different approaches which can be taken
lead to a family of analogy application systems which have been im¬
plemented. The performance of these systems is assessed on some
examples of simple analogies; the systems are compared with each
other, and with an unguided, breadth-first search theorem prover.
The results demonstrate the ability of the application systems to
exploit simple analogies — while the analogies are simple, in an in¬
tuitive sense, the target problems are hard, in the sense of involving
large search spaces. The relative performance of the systems also
enables us to draw some conclusions about the wisdom of the choices
which were made in their design; these conclusions have a bearing
on the assessment of existing analogy systems. We first describe the
resolution system on which the analogy systems are based.
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6.1 A resolution/paramodulation system
All of the analogy systems which we will describe in this chapter make use of
a resolution theorem proving system in order to validate analogical plans. See
[Bundy 83] for an introduction to resolution theorem proving. The system can,
in addition to binary resolution, apply the paramodulation rule of inference
(essentially the replacing of equals by equals). The proofs which the analogy
system accepts as base proofs and those which it produces as target proofs are
thus resolution/paramodulation proofs.
The basic procedures of the system are those which apply the inference rules
to a pair of clauses: the binary resolution procedure takes as input two clauses
(skolemised disjunctions of literals; literals being either atoms or negated atoms)
with a pair of literal positions; resolution of the clauses on the specified pair of
literals is attempted; if successful the derived clause is returned as output. If
the literal positions are unspecified, all possible ways of resolving the clauses are
attempted, and the set of possible resolvents is returned as output.
The paramodulation procedure also takes a pair of clauses as input, with
a pair of literal positions, a direction (left-to-right or right-to-left) for the first
position, and a subterm position for the second; paramodulation of the second
clause by the equality in the specified literal position of the first clause, in the
specified direction at the specified literal and subterm position, is attempted; if
successful the derived clause is returned as output. As with binary resolution,
if the inference positions are not specified, paramodulation is attempted in all
possible ways between the clauses, the set of derived clauses being returned as
output.
The ability to specify the inference positions to the inference rules is impor¬
tant for the analogy systems, since they try, if possible, to make inferences in
the target at analogous positions to those which occured in the base. As ex¬
plained at the end of the previous chapter, this ability can considerably reduce
the branching rate.
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In addition to the basic inference rules, there is an unguided breadth-first
search theorem prover which makes use of the inference rules. This theorem
prover is based on the set of support strategy (see [Bundy 83]); the set of sup¬
port consists of all clauses which are either goal clauses or which have goal clauses
as ancestors in their derivations; inferences (by binary resolution or paramod-
ulation) are made between a clause from the set of support and some other
clause (whether on the set of support or not); i.e. axioms are never resolved or
paramodulated with each other directly.
The breadth-first strategy works as follows: initially the depth of the search
is zero and the goal clauses are assigned depth zero; at a particular depth, each
clause from the set of support at that depth is resolved and paxamodulated with
all other clauses from the search space; any inferred clause which is subsumed by
a previously inferred clause is deleted; similarly, any previously inferred clause
which is subsumed by a newly inferred clause is removed from the search space;
each inferred clause which is retained is assigned depth one greater than the
current depth. This procedure is repeated for successively increasing depths
until either the empty clause is derived, the machine runs out of space, or the
program is stopped by the user.
In addition to the basic inference procedures and uniform theorem prover,
there is a simple interactive proof construction routine; the purpose of this is to
enable new proofs to be added to the data base of potential base proofs relatively
easily; the representation for proofs used by the analogy systems is quite compli¬
cated — a proof is a list of nodes, each of which consists of a clause (an axiom,
goal or intermediate step), pointers to the parent nodes in the proof, pointers to
all daughter nodes in the proof, and inference positions for each daughter; the
proof construction procedure takes care of the details. The user is prompted to
input new clauses (goals or axioms) or to suggest an inference between existing
clauses in the proof; if the user requests an inference he is prompted for the
names of the parent clauses, the inference rule and the inference positions de¬
sired; given these, the system attempts the inference; if successful, the inferred
clause is given a name, added to the proof, and all relevant information is added
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to the existing nodes; if unsuccessful, the user is informed of the fact and asked
to try again.
6.2 A framework for analogy application
The application systems which are described in this chapter are all based on the
same framework for the application of analogical plans: the steps in the plan
are verified successively, starting from the negated goals and continuing to the
derivation of the empty clause in the base proof. Where there is more than
one possibility at a position in the plan, for example if a base axiom has several
candidate analogues, each possibility is tried in turn; if a possibility fails — either
the axiom cannot be applied successfully, or, if it can, the plan fails at a later
stage— another candidate is tried. Thus the strategy for plan execution is depth-
first search through the various choice points in the plan. Note that the choices
will, in general, have been ordered according to an estimate of their plausibility
(by the strength of analogy matches, for example). The most plausible will be
tried first. The ordering may be fixed when the plan is constructed, or derived
dynamically as application proceeds. Thus, the strategy is something between
depth-first and best-first search.
This simple framework will prove adequate for the close analogies which we
consider in this chapter; in the next chapter, we consider how the framework
will have to be improved to allow the successful application of more difficult
analogies. The conclusions about the wisdom of the choices will still apply to
the extended framework.
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6.3 Issues in plan construction and application
6.3.1 What information should the plan contain ?
The tools so far described make the following information available for the plan
for the solution to the target problem:
• Goal analogues: analogues for the goal clauses used in the base proof.
• Intermediate steps: analogues for steps in the base proof, produced by the
ACR.
• Candidate axioms: sets of candidate analogues for axioms used in the base
proof, produced by the AOI.
• The tree structure of the plan, including the inference rules applied (bi¬
nary resolution or paramodulation) and the inference positions, as de¬
scribed above.
Existing analogy systems use plans involving different constituents: Kling's sys¬
tem ZORBA [Kling 71] only makes use of the axioms which were applied in
the base proof; no attention is paid to the intermediate steps from the base
proof, or to the structure of the base proof. The program synthesis system PRL
[Constable & others 86] contains a small analogy component which also pays no
attention to intermediate steps from the base— it uses axiom plans, like ZORBA,
but also takes account of the structure of the base proof. Munyer [Munyer 81]
describes two analogy application systems neither of which pays any attention
to the axioms from the base proof; the analogical plans in these systems consist
principally of intermediate steps, together with the structure of the base solution
(apparently, no inference positions from the base are used, though). ;
i So, previous authors have differed in their opinions about the nature of ana¬
logical plans, just as they have in the heuristics which their systems use; fur¬
thermore, as in the case of the matching algorithms (see Chapter 3), there has
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been no explicit discussion of the relative usefulness of the various possible con¬
stituents of analogical plans. In this chapter, we initiate such a discussion. We
consider the following possibilities for the composition of the plan:
• Axiom Plan. The plan contains a candidate set of analogues for each axiom
which was used in the base proof, produced by a call to the AOI routine.
Intermediate steps are not used at all. This means that only the inference
positions in the axioms can be used, since those in the intermediate steps
depend on the structural correspondence given by the ACR. In terms of
the framework described above, local failure of the plan and backtracking
is caused by the failure to apply any of the possible axioms at a step. That
is, there are no intermediate steps which could be used to prune the search.
However, the checking with intermediate steps (the special unification pro¬
cedure described below) turns out to be an expensive process. So, while
the search space may be larger with an axiom plan, it may nevertheless
be searched more quickly. The (one-sided) inference positions can be used
to order the possible inferences between an axiom and a step - that is,
inferences (if any) at the specified axiom position can be tried first, others
being tried on backtracking if these fail.
As explained above, Kling's system ZORBA, and the analogy facility of
PRL, both use axiom plans. Easy analogies tend to suggest axiom plans
— solving the target problem merely requires applying the same, or sim¬
ilar, axioms to those used in the base, in the same order; checking with
intermediate steps does not seem to be necessary. This view is criticised
in the conclusion to this chapter.
• Step Plan. The plan contains an analogue for each of the intermediate steps
which were passed through in the base proof, constructed by the ACR. No
attention is paid to the axioms which were used. This means that only the
inference positions in the intermediate steps can be mapped, since those
in the axioms depend on the AOI. A step is verified by trying to make
an inference with any axiom from the axiom base, and then checking that
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the inferred clause matches with the next mapped step. Since the mapped
step may contain some of the special symbols produced by the ACR, which
have special meanings, the matching process needs to be an extension of
ordinary unification, and is explained below. Thus, the intermediate steps
are used to prune the search. Again, the (one-sided) inference positions are
used to order the possible inferences between an axiom and an intermediate
step, those at the specified position being tried first.
As explained above, Munyer's application systems make use of step plans.
• Full Plan. Both candidate axioms and intermediate steps are used, calling
both the AOI and the ACR as appropriate. We can either use (a) the two-
stage AOI or (b) just the filter stage, as suggested in the previous chapter.
In the case of (a), all of the inference positions in the base proof can be
mapped and included in the plan. In the case of (b), just the positions
at the intermediate steps can be mapped, since the filter stage of the AOI
alone does not produce structural correspondences between a base axiom
and its potential analogues. A step is verified by attempting an inference
with a candidate analogue, and, if successful, checking that the inferred
clause matches with the next mapped step, using the special unification
described below. Any inference positions which are available are used to
order the inferences, as before.
6.3.2 Should the plan forming and validating procedures
be separate or interleaved ?
• Separation. The entire plan is constructed before any validation is at¬
tempted. This type of system was assumed, for the sake of discussion,
in the previous chapter. It is conceptually easier to grasp a plan which
is entirely formed before it is validated. However, a great deal of time
may be spent mapping the base proof only to find that the validation pro¬
cedure fails on the first few steps. Kling's system ZORBA separates the
construction and validation stages.
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• Interleaving. Steps of the base proof are only mapped as they are needed
for making target inferences. This type of system would have the benefit of
failing relatively quickly on a bad analogy. Munyer's application systems
interleave plan construction and validation.
A related issue is whether the mapping which is passed to the ACR and AOI
should be extended in the course of plan construction/validation — extension of
the mapping can come from either the matching of the AOI or the special unifica¬
tion of inferred clauses with intermediate steps (see below); using the extended
mapping will, in general, make subsequent matching in the AOI and special uni¬
fication quicker and more accurate. However, if the construction and validation
processes are separated, different possible candidate analogues for axioms will, in
general, lead to different extensions to the mapping; over the course of mapping
the axioms in the base proof, this could lead to exponentially many extensions
to the initial mapping. Therefore, in the separated systems which have been
implemented, the initial mapping is used throughout the proof mapping process.
On the other hand, if the construction and validation processes are interleaved,
it is sensible to extend the mapping as they proceed; after backtracking, axioms
and intermediate steps will have to be remapped anyway, so the most up to date
mapping may as well be used. Therefore, in the interleaved systems which have
been implemented, the mapping is extended at each step.
If a step plan, or a full plan of type (b), is chosen as answer to the first
question, it seems advisable to interleave formation and verification of the plan
rather than to have them separate; this is because the plan formation process,
in this case, is essentially just the ACR and possibly the axiom filter, both of
which are relatively cheap; thus it is no great cost to have to re-map the steps
after backtracking; this enables the special unification to be called with as few
special symbols in the mapped step as possible. If the whole plan is formed in
advance, with the initial mapping, there will be many defaults throughout the
plan, which will repeatedly slow down the special unification procedure, which
is much more expensive when many special symbols are present.
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Separate Interleaved
Axiom Plan A B
Full Plan (a) C D
Full Plan (b) - E
Step Plan - F
Figure 6—1: Implemented systems
6.3.3 Summary of possibilities
Figure 6-1 shows the various possible systems within the framework being
discussed, with those which have been eliminated marked with dashes. The
six systems which have been implemented are given letters so that they can be
referred to in the discussion which follows. The various systems are compared
with each other and with an unguided breadth-first search resolution procedure.
There follow descriptions of two of the algorithms, A and D, to summarise how
the choices made fit into the application framework which we are considering.
• A: Axiom plan, construction/verification separate
1. Map base proof: call AOI on base axioms, to produce candidate sets,
and map inference positions.
2. Apply plan:
— (a) find an active1 node; if there is one go to (b). If there is no active
node, and the nil clause has been derived, exit with success; if nil has
not been derived, attempt to refute the clause which has been derived
in place of nil, together with the original goal clauses, by breadth-first
search.
xAn active node is an node each of whose parents has either already been derived, is
an axiom or is a goal clause. —
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— (b) attempt an inference between the current axiom in the candidate
set of axioms and the other parent in the specified axiom position (if
both or neither of the parents is an axiom the procedure is suitably
modified). If successful, update the plan with the newly inferred
clause and go to (a). If unsuccessful, or on backtracking, try to make
an inference at any positions. If successful, update the plan and go to
(a). If unsuccessful, or on backtracking, make the next axiom in the
candidate list current and try again. If all candidates are unsuccessful,
fail and backtrack to the previous step.
• D: Full plan, interleaved construction/verification.
Initially, the plan is just the base proof, and the current mapping is the
initial mapping.
— (a) find an active node (same as for A).
— (b) map the parent clauses, inference positions and daughter clause,
calling the ACR and the AOI as appropriate with the current map¬
ping; try to make an inference at the specified positions (both axiom
and step) between current axiom and the other mapped parent; check
that the inferred clause matches the mapped daughter, calling the spe¬
cial unification procedure; if successful, update the plan, extend the
mapping and go to (a); if not, or on backtracking, try the inference at
any positions, again checking with the mapped daughter; if this fails,
or on further backtracking, make the next candidate axiom current
and try again. If the axiom set is exhausted, fail and backtrack to the
previous step.
Each of the other systems implemented is a straightforward variant of one of the
above.
In system D, stage (b), if the analogue of a base axiom is in the axiom base
(ignoring default symbols), it is tried as the analogue first; the full AOI is only
called on backtracking after subsequent failure. This is merely an efficiency
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measure, and does not affect the functionality of the application system — the
exact analogue would have been chosen first anyway, since it would match with
base axiom with strength 1. Note that this efficiency measure is only open to
the interleaving systems B, D and E.
6.3.4 Special Unification
As mentioned above, there is a special unification procedure to check whether an
inferred clause matches with an intermediate step mapped by the ACR. Firstly,
we explain the need for a special unification. Recall that the steps mapped by
the ACR may contain the following special symbols:
• The function symbol def; def{T) in a mapped step means that the head
function symbol of T, / say, is not in the current match, i.e. / is a default
symbol in the clause. When matching against an inferred clause, / should
be allowed to match with any function symbol. If / matches with </, the
association (/, g) can be added to the existing mapping. In this way the
default is overwritten; in future calls to the ACR, occurrences of / will be
replaced by g without the use of def.
• The function symbol bdef; bdef{T) in a mapped step means that T is
an "optional" argument. The step should be allowed to match with an
inferred clause whether or not T is matched. For example the clause
[(a * b)/b = a, bdef(a — 0)]
should match with both
[(a * b)/b — a]
and
[(a * b)/b = a, a — 0].
A bdef term is allowed to match with any number of terms on the other
side (i.e. more than just one); furthermore, if the term contains variables,
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these are not shared between different bindings. Such terms are produced
by the ACR if symbols have had unmatched arguments in the past.
• The function symbols poss and list] these represent multiple possibilities
arising from inconsistencies in the match (see the previous chapter for more









A special unification procedure, which takes account of these possibilities, has
been implemented. The structure of the procedure is the same as that of ordinary
unification; the main difference is that, in addition to a list of variable bindings,
a list containing information about the special syntax, if any, -in the terms is
maintained; this list records whether a default symbol has been overwritten
yet, and, if so, what it is matched to; whether an optional argument has been
included or omitted; whether a list of possibilities, either in the form list or poss
has been restricted by the matching so far. In ordinary unification, whenever
a variable is encountered, the variable binding list is consulted to see whether
it has been bound; in the special unification, whenever a special syntax symbol
is encountered, the special syntax list is consulted to see whether it has been
overwritten, modified or omitted, as the case may be.
In addition to the above features, the procedure unifies modulo commuta-
tivity, for all known commutative functions and predicates; this enables minor
patches to be made to the plan as a side effect of the unification. The procedure
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produces a list of unifiers; each unifier consists of the usual variable substitu¬
tion together with any extension made to the analogy by overwriting defaults.
Whether or not the latter is made use of depends on choices made elsewhere in
the particular application system.
6.4 Performance
The six systems were tested on seven examples, two from Boolean algebra, one
from rational number theory and four from arithmetic.
6.4.1 Examples
Boolean algebra
The following axioms from Boolean algebra were used:
1. x n o = o
2. x C\1 = x
3. x U 0 = x
4. x U 1 = 1
5. x n (y n z) = (x n y) n z
6. x U (y U z) — (x U y) U z
7. x fl (y U z) — (x n y) u (x n z)
8. x U (y C\ z) — 0c U y) fl (x U z)
9. x fl y = y fl x
10. x U y — y U x
11. x n x = 0
12. x U x = 1
13. -<x < y V ~iy < x V x = y
14. x < x U y
15. x n y < x
16. x < y fl z V -ix < y V -ix < z
17. —>y < x V —>z < x V y U z < x
18. X < X
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together with the reflexivity of equality. 1-12 are standard Boolean algebra
axioms; 13-17 relate the partial order in the algebra, <, to the lattice operations.
The two examples used were:
• Problem 1. Prove x Ux = x by analogy to a given (non-standard) proof of
• Problem 2. Prove x fl x = x by analogy to a given (standard) proof of
xC x — x.
The standard proof uses the standard Boolean algebra axioms; the non-standard
proof uses the extra axioms 13-17. While the goals are essentially the same, the
given proofs are different.
Rational Number Theory
The single example used was
• Problem 3. Prove ->rational(x) V rationally) V x = 0 V -<rational(x ■ y) by
analogy to a given proof of -rational(x) V rationally) V ->rational(x + y).
A large axiom base was used, consisting of 45 axioms, some relevant to the
theory, others not. This was done in order to test the systems on a large base,
where the branching rate for a resolution system would be very high.
Arithmetic
The following axioms for arithmetic were used:
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1. x + y = y + x
2. x • y — y • x
3. x + y + z = x + (y + z)
4. 'sT II H
5. x + 0 = x
6. X ■ 1 — X
7. x + min(x) = 0
8. x • inv(x) — 1 V x = 0
9. x — y = x + min(y)
10. x/y = x • inv(y) Vy = 0
11. II H
12. x + y = x + y
together with reflexivity for equality; min/1 represents unary minus, to dis¬
tinguish it from binary subtraction; similarly inv/1 represents inversion. The
problems set were:
• Problem 4. Prove x/a: = lVx = 0by analogy to a given proof of x — x = 0.
• Problem 5. Prove (x • y)/x = y V x = 0 by analogy to a given proof of
0 + y) - x = y.
• Problem 6. Prove -> inv(x) — inv(y) Vx = yVi = 0Vy-0by analogy to
a given proof of -imin(x) — min(y) V x — y.
• Problem 7. Prove -> inv(x) = inv(y) Vx = yVx = 0Vy = 0by analogy to
another proof of -imin(x) — min(y) V x — y.
6.4.2 Results
The following table gives times for the solution of the various problems by the
various systems, "fail" means that the program either ran out of space, or was
interrupted having got irreperably bogged down. The times refer to compiled
Quintus Prolog on a Sun 3 workstation!
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Problem A B c D E F
1 42s 26s 48s 27s lis 14s
2 lm29s lm50s lmls 47s 17s 2mlls
3 lmlls 2m5s lml9s 2m7s 42s lm37s
4 23s 17s 25s 20s 9s 25s
5 fail fail 45s 27s 23s 57s
6 fail fail lm55s lm3s 57s 30m
7 fail fail 3m45s 2ml6s 2m33s fail
• Problem 1. All the programs find the same proof for the target, without any
backtracking, ie the plan suggests the right inference in every case. Figure
6-3 shows the base and target proofs2 (Figure 6-2 explains the notation
used in all of the application diagrams which follow). This example, and
problem 2, are examples of 'perfect' analogies, where the target and base
proofs are isomorphic, differing only in the identity of the symbols in the
goals, axioms and steps. It is important for analogy systems to be able to
solve easy analogies like this one; if they cannot, their claims on harder
analogies become suspect; we argue below that previous analogy systems
would not be able to solve problems such as 1 and 2.
The axiom plan systems (A and B) find the proof faster than the cor¬
responding full plan systems (C and D); the latter are slowed up by the
checking with mapped steps, which is not necessary in this case since the
right inferences are always suggested anyway. The full plan (b) (E) system
is the quickest of all; this is because the axiom filter which it uses is suc¬
cessful in reducing possibilities, and the extra work which other systems
do to match axioms fully is not necessary. The step plan system (F) is also
quick; the cost of trying to apply axioms and matching the results with the
2The labels on the steps in the proof show the number of the axiom which was used,
and the inference rule which was used ('binres' for binary resolution and 'paramod' for
paramodulation). The plan steps are not shown in the figures.
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intermediate steps turns out to be less than the cost of the full matching
within AOI.
Also, the interleaving systems (B and D) are quicker than the correspond¬
ing separate systems (A and C); their use of the extended match pays off,
and there is no backtracking which would force them to re-match axioms.
Problem 2. Again, all programs succeed and find the same proof for the
target. The full plan systems do so without backtracking, but the axiom
plan systems (A and B) and the step plan system (F) do have to backtrack.
The extra search made by A, B and F is shown with dotted lines.in Figure
6-4; dead ends in the search are represented by triangles; for F, the extra
search is caused by the application of axiom 4 at the second step, which
matches with the corresponding plan step (not shown in the figure) but
leads to a dead end; for A and B, the search arises because there are four
ways to apply axiom 11, in the specified position, at the fourth step, the
third of which leads to the solution; the first two inferences lead to dead
ends after one more step. This extra search is responsible for the slower
times for A and B; the interleaving system, B, is slowed down more by
the extra search than the separate system A, since it involves re-matching
axiom 2 for each branch.
For the same reasons as before the full plan (b) system (E) is quickest of
all, while the step plan system (F) is slowest — in this case much time is
spent trying to apply the wrong axioms.
Problem 3. Again, all programs succeed and find the same proof (see
Figure 6-5). However, all require some backtracking to do so; in all cases,
axiom 1 is tried first at the first step, and leads to failure; the full plan
and step plan systems fail after two steps, since the inferred clauses do not
match with the plan; the axiom plan systems do some extra search since
they do not have the intermediate steps to prune it; this leads to dead
ends in each case after one more step. System A, which does not extend
the mapping as application proceeds, makes a similar mistake again at the
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third step (preferring the association — *-* — to — <->/), and does some
extra search, applying axiom 2 in seven ways before backtracking onto the
solution path.
The backtracking causes the interleaving systems to be slower than the
corresponding separate systems on this example, the cost of re-matching
axiom 2 outweighing the advantage of using the extended match.
Again the full plan (b) system is quickest of all; the lack of inference posi¬
tions in the axioms does not lead to any extra search.
This example is somewhat more difficult than the previous ones, in that
the target and base proofs are not isomorphic— some clauses in the target
have extra conditions, and the target proof contains extra steps; the last
two steps in the target are made by breadth-first search after the plan has
been exhausted without the empty clause being derived.
• Problem 4. This problem turns out to be very easy for all the systems,
which find the proof (not shown) with no backtracking. The relative speeds
are similar, with similar reasons, to those for Problem 1.
• Problem 5. The axiom plan systems both fail on this example, becoming
bogged down in fruitless inferences. The other systems succeed, finding
the proof shown with unbroken lines in Figure 6-6; the axiom plan systems
make the wrong inference (shown with dotted lines) at the second step, get
bogged down in the resulting search and so do not manage to backtrack
to the second step and correct the inference. The wrong inference is made
because of the lack of the inference position in the step, which is what
enables the other systems to avoid the problem.
For the full plan (a) systems, the interleaving one (D) is quicker than the
separate one (C), since there is no backtracking to offset the advantage of
using the extended match. Again, the full plan (b) system is quickest of
all, for the same reasons as before.
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This example, and the two which follow, are similar to problem 3, in that
the proofs are not isomorhpic, the plan being patched by search at the
end; they turn out to be more difficult because the choice of the wrong
axiom can have more severe consequences in a long proof containing many
applications of paramodulation (particularly for the axiom plan systems).
• Problem 6. The axiom plan systems again fail on this example, being
unable to recover from the application of the wrong axiom at the first
step. The other systems make the same mistake, but are able to prune
the fruitless search by the special unification with plan steps. Systems C
and F both do some more extra search later on in the solution, shown
with dotted lines in figure 6-7; the use of the extended match in the AOI
enables systems D and E to avoid the extra search.
Again, the interleaving systems prove to be much quicker on this more diffi¬
cult example. The step plan system (F) is extremely slow; it is slowed down
particularly on steps which contain variables, as many clauses paramodu-
late with these.
• Problem 7. The full plan systems are the only ones able to solve this
problem. The axiom plan systems cannot recover from applying the wrong
axiom at the first step (as all the systems do), getting bogged down again
in fruitless search, and unable to prune it with the plan steps. The step
plan system (F) does not recover from making the wrong inference at the
fourth step. Figure 6-8 indicates the search spaces.
Of the successful full plan (a) systems, the interleaving one, D, is much
quicker; this is because, having backtracked to the first step and corrected
the inference, no further backtracking is required - the use of the extended
mapping means that the next application of axiom 12 in the base proof
is mapped correctly first time; whereas the separate system, C, makes the
same mistake again with the next application of axiom 12, and a similar
mistake with axiom 1, each of which leads to some extra search.
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1. Steps in complete proofs are indicated by clauses joined with un¬
broken lines:
->a U a = a
13,binres
->a U a < a V ->a < a U a
The label indicates that axiom 13 was applied using binary resolution.
2. Search steps not part of a completed proof are indicated with
dashed lines:
-i(a ■ b) • inv(a) = b V a = 0
I
I




In addition to the axiom and inference rule, the label on a search step
indicates which of the implemented systems made the step (in this
case, A and B). Where the systems are not indicated, they are the
same as on the previous step. For search steps, the axiom number
and/or inference rule may be omitted from the label.
3. Dead ends in the search are indicated by the symbol A.
4. Failed searches are indicated by the symbol 1X1.
Figure 6—2: Key to following figures
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BASE: x fl x = x TARGET: x U x = x
-id D a = a
13,binres




ia<aV -ia fl a < a
18,binres
ia D a < a
15,binres
nil




ia<aV -ia < a V -ia <aUa
18,binres
ia < a V -ia < a U a
18,binres
-■a < a U a
14,binres
nil
Figure 6—3: PROBLEM 1
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BASE: x U x — x TARGET: x PI x — x
->a U a = a
3,paramod







a U a) D 1
2,paramod












ia fl a = a
2 ,paramod
->a D a = a fl 1
12,paramod
ia (~1 a = a fl (x U x)
7,paramod




/ , v /






->a D a = a D a
eq,binres
nil
Figure 6-4: PROBLEM 2
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BASE: -irat(x) V rat(y) V ->rat(x + y) TARGET: ->rat(x) V rat(y) V x = 0 V ~>rat(x • y)
rat(a + b)
1 ,binres






rai(a - 6 — a)
A
/ / \ \
ra • 6)
,all:l,binres all:l,binres 3,binres
rai(a) p"->rai(y) V rai(a • fe/y) V y = 0
\
binres.,







rai(a — a • b) rat((a • b)/a) Va = 0
A,B: 2 2 *4 \6 A,B: 2 2 \4X,6 *
I \ N / _ ^ _ A:2,paramod
A ■■■ L X-A A ••• A A ,





' /rat(b) Va = 0Va = 0
rat(b) A •••A rat(b)






1. -irat(x) V -irat(y) V rat(x — y)
2. (x + y) — x — y
1. ->rat(x) V-irat(y) V rat(x — y)
2. (x + y) — x = y :
Figure 6—5: PROBLEM 3
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Generally speaking, the analogy systems handled these simple analogy problems
quite well. We constrast their performance with that of the unguided breadth-
first search theorem prover in the next section. We firstly consider the relative
performance of the various systems.
Full vs step vs axiom plans The most clear answer to any of the issues raised
earlier is that the full plan systems were superior to the axiom plan systems and
step plan systems.
Their superiority over the step plan system is simply accounted for by the
pruning of search enabled by the AOI. Although the special unification with
intermediate steps enables the step plan system F to prune the search, the pre¬
ceding diagrams do not show the many attempts which F makes to apply all
possible axioms, which are blocked by the special unification; this accounts for
the relative slowness of F, even when little extra search is shown on the diagrams.
The axiom plan systems work well for the easy examples, but their perfor¬
mance deteriorates rapidly on the more difficult examples. The full plan (a)
systems are more expensive on the simple examples, but prove much more pow¬
erful on the more difficult examples. There seem to be two main factors in the
shortcomings of the axiom plan systems:
• The lack of inference positions in the steps leads to a higher branching
rate for the axiom plan systems than for the others; the full plan systems
benefit from being able to map inference positions in both axioms and
intermediate steps; the lack of axiom positions in the step plan system
turns out to be less important than the lack of step positions in the axiom
plan system. This is because paxamodulation, which is mainly responsible
for the high branching rate, is usually applied with the equality as axiom
■ and the intermediate step as the rewritten clause. The branching rate
usually arises from being able to apply the equality at various different
subterms of the rewritten clause; thus is it particularly useful to be able to
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BASE: (x + y) — x = y TARGET: x = 0 V (x • y)/x = y
-■(a + 6) — a = 6
9,paramod
i(a + 6) + min(a) = 6
1 ,paramod
->(6 + a) + min(a) = b
3,paramod
->6 + (a + min(a)) = b
7,paramod




















'' \6 , \6
' \
A a • • • A A A • • • A
• 6)/a = 6
10,paramod
i(a^- 6) • inv(a) = 6 V a = 0
2,paramod
t(6 • a) • inv(a) = 6 V a = 0
4,paramod
i6 • (a • inv(a)) = 6 V a = 0
8,paramod
—6-l = 6Va = 0Va = 0
6,paramod
i6 = 6Va = 0Va = 0
eq,binres







Figure 6-6: PROBLEM 5
Chapter 6. The application of analogical plans 182
BASE: -imin(x) = mm(y) V x = y TARGET: ->inv(x) = inv(y) Vx=yVx=0Vy=0
= 6
5,paramod
-ia + 0 = 6
7,paramod
+ (x +- min(x)) = b
1,paramod
ia +- (min(x) + x) = 6
3,paramod




) + 6 = 6
7,paramod
-.0 + 6 = 6
1,paramod












ia • 1 = 6
8,paramod













-■a • (inv(x) • x) = 6 V x = 0
F:2,paramod
/ /
/ ' • \ ^ A
^ 9 ->(a • inv(x)) • x — 6 V x = 0
4,paramod
i i
4 4 4 4
A i rA A A inv(d) = inv{b)
paramod *
i(a • inv(d)) • 6 = 6 V 6 = 0
8,paramod
il-6=6v6 = 0Va = 0
2,paramod
i6-l = 6v6 = 0Va = 0
6,paramod
6 = 0 V a = 0
a = 0
6 = 0
Figure 6—7: PROBLEM 6
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BASE: -imin(x) — min(y) V x = y TARGET: ->inv(x) — inv(y) Va: = yVz = 0Vy = 0
min(a) — min(b)
12,paramod
x + min(a) = x + min(b)
7,paramod
0 = a + min(b)
12,paramod
£ + 0 = x + (a + min(b))
1,paramod
x + 0 = x + (min{b) + a)
3,paramod
x + 0 = (x + min{b)) + a
7,paramod













1 = a^inv(b) V a = 0
2,paramod
A A , a: • 1 = x • (a ■ inv(b)) V a = 0
r:l,paramo.d —" / y '










x • 1 = (x • inv(b)) • a V a = 0
8,paramod
6-l = l- aVa = 0Vi = 0
6,paramod
5 = l-aVa = 0V5 = 0
2,paramod





a = 0 V 6 = 0
6 = 0
a = 0
Figure 6-8: PROBLEM 7
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map the intermediate step inference positions in order to specify a preferred
rewriting.
• The axiom plan systems cannot use intermediate plan steps to reject certain
inferences and so reduce the branching rate, as the other systems can. This
inability to prune the search is what leads to the failure of the axiom plan
systems on some of the examples. In the full plan and step plan systems,
the cost of matching inferred clauses with plan steps, using the special
unification procedure, turns out to be easily outweighed by the benefit of
priming the search which it brings.
Separation vs interleaving The results indicate that the extra matching
involved in interleaving pays off, in terms of avoiding extra search, and quicker
axiom matching and special unification. Of full plan (a) systems, the interleaving
one, D, performs better, on the whole, than the separate one, C. The extra cost
of re-matching axioms after backtracking is outweighed by the advantages of
using the extended match; the extended match not only makes matching with
plan steps more efficient, but can avoid the need to backtrack by dynamically
ordering the candidate analogues according to their consistency with the current
match. The separate system, which computes analogues for all the axioms before
any inference, can perform extra backtracking. This is most evident in Problem
6, in which, as Figure 7 shows, system C makes two further incorrect inferences
which system D is able to avoid by learning from its earlier mistake.
On most of the problems, the full plan (b) system (E) is the most efficient; the
extra time spent in matching candidate inferences with mapped steps, using the
special unification, is outweighed by the time spent by the full plan (a) system
in calling the full analogy matching algorithm to distinguish further among the
candidate analogues for axioms. On the more difficult examples (5, 6 and 7),
there is not much difference between D and E. We cannot conclude from these
results whether or not the two-stage AOI is preferable to the one-stage version;
with the full plan (b) system, the special unification is effectively providing the
second stage of the AOI; on more difficult examples, which require patching, (see
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the next chapter), it may be useful to have strong information about analogues
for the axioms independently of our immediate ability to apply them successfully
— the next plan step may be misleading, for example. In situations such as this,
the two-stage AOI may well be superior to the one-stage version.
6.4.4 Comparison with unguided search and existing anal¬
ogy systems
The same problems were also given to the unguided breadth-first search theorem
prover described earlier; it was unable to solve any of them within 30 minutes.
Furthermore, on only one of the problems (problem 1) had the prover managed
to search beyond depth 2; since the proofs for the seven problems lie at depth
at least 5, there was no point in letting the prover run longer. The average
branching rate (including ancestor resolution and paramodulation) for problem
1 was around 30 (817 mutually non-subsuming clauses were derived at depth 2);
assuming that this branching rate is maintained at lower levels, the search space
at level 5 would have size approximately 2 • 107.
For problem 3, with a large axiom base, the branching rate was about 50 for
the first level, and over 500 for the next level (the increase in branching rate is
caused by the introduction of variables into inferred clauses, which causes them
to paramodulate with many other clauses).
For the arithmetic problems, the average branching rate turned out to be
around 50, which gives an estimated size for the search space to depth 10 (as in
problem 6) of 1017.
So it is clear that the analogy application systems are effective in guiding
search in otherwise explosive spaces. The explosive nature of the search is indi¬
cated by the fact that the axiom plan systems are sometimes unable to recover
from a single incorrect inference. While the analogies involved are intuitively
close, the base and target proofs are significantly different, involving application
of different axioms, and sometimes different numbers of steps. -
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Moreover, existing analogy systems would not be able to apply these analo¬
gies: Kling's system ZORBA, apart from the weaknesses of its matching, forms
unstructured axiom plans; the branching rate for these will be high even if the
right analogues for the base axioms are found — certainly much higher than for
the structured axiom plan systems considered above. Munyer's planning meth¬
ods make heavy use of his analogy matching algorithm, discussed in Chapter 3;
this algorithm has been seen to be inadequate for the type of analogies consid¬
ered in this chapter, which involve many non-identical associations; as a result,
Munyer's systems would not be able even to get started on these examples; more¬
over, Munyer's explicit planning method, which, although not implemented, he
regards as an improvement on his implicit planning method, uses the analogical
inference rule (AIR), discussed in the previous chapter, to construct its plans;
on the examples in this chapter, many symbols are introduced into the proof
which do not occur in the original problem statements; as explained in the pre¬
vious chapter, the AIR maps these symbols over identically into the plan; this will
cause the plan to contain many unnecessary flaws and require it to be patched;
in corresponding situations, the step plan and full plan systems described above
would use the default symbol to represent the uncertainty, allowing the special
unification to succeed and extend the mapping.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen how the techniques developed in earlier chapters
can be used to guide search effectively within a resolution theorem proving sys¬
tem. We have seen the explosive nature of unguided breadth-first search within
the domains we have considered, and have illustrated the dramatically reduced
search spaces involved in the application of analogies.
We have also compared the effectiveness of different approaches to the for¬
mation and validation of analogical plans; we have concluded that the full plan
systems, which make use of both the axioms and intermediate steps from the
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base proof, are more effective than either the axiom plan or the step plan sys¬
tems. Furthermore, the extra work involved in interleaving the construction and
validation of plans has proved to be worthwhile. We have not considered, in
this chapter, any examples which, while intuitively close analogies, cannot be
solved within the simple framework we have considered; we consider some such
examples in the next chapter, and discuss how the application framework will
have to be extended to cope with them. The conclusions we have drawn will
also apply to the extended framework, i.e. the superiority of the full plan and
interleaving systems does not depend on the simplicity of the examples which
we have considered so fax.
Chapter 7
Further Work
In this chapter we propose and discuss some extensions and im¬
provements to the analogy systems which have been described in
the previous three chapters. In particular, we consider the patching
of analogical plans and how an analogy system can become better
at finding and using analogies over its experience. These extensions
have not yet been implemented, and so are discussed as further work.
7.1 Introduction
We will discuss two directions for improvement of the analogy systems described
in the previous chapters: the first (section 7.2) is towards more sophisticated
plan application systems than were described in the previous chapter; the second
(section 7.3) towards an analogy system which can improve its own performance
over the course of its analogical problem solving experience. These directions
for improvement are independent, in that we could pursue one without pursuing
the other, but complementary.
In the next section we consider the patching of analogical plans. The moti¬
vation for this is that the analogy systems described in the previous chapter can
only cope with fairly straightforward analogies. Many matches which are con¬
structed by the matcher described in Chapter 4, while intuitively good analogies,
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lead to plans which cannot be applied by the present application systems. We
will define a notion of correctness for analogical plans, and will see that the
present application systems axe unlikely to be able to apply plans which are not
correct. The purpose of the patching techniques discussed in the next section is
to enable the application system to apply incorrect (or flawed) plans.
In the following section, we consider how an analogical problem solver could
improve its performance by learning and exploiting global analogies (or duali¬
ties) and semantic types. The motivation for this is two-fold: firstly, the analogy
systems so far described would be unable to benefit from a previous successful
attempt at analogy when faced with a new analogy, even if the two situations
involved essentially the same analogy; that is, the analogy systems exhibit an
inability to learn from their analogical problem solving (APS) experience, just
as theorem provers cannot learn from successful proofs when faced with similar
problems. Secondly, the systems described so far fit into the basic APS frame¬
work introduced in Chapter 1. While this is one approach to analogy, and a
natural one, it is not the only one. It would be desirable for an analogy system
to be able to find and use analogies in a variety of ways. In section~£,3.7j we see
how the knowledge of global analogies suggests new ways of using analogy.
7.2 The patching of analogical plans
The purpose of this section is to consider how the analogy application systems
discussed in the previous chapter will have to be improved to cope with a wider
range of analogies. The limitations of the present systems are caused by the
fact that they are unable to apply flawed plans successfully, except in certain
restricted cases. We first define what we mean by a flawed plan, in the context
of the analogical plan language which we are using, and explain how the present
systems fail on most such plans (and how they succeed on a few of them).
We then look more closely at particular examples of flawed plans, and what
an application system would have to do to cope with them.
Chapter 7. Further Work
7.2.1 Flawed analogical plans
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Firstly, we review the structure of the analogical plans which are constructed by
the plan construction procedures described in Chapter 5. An analogical plan is
a binary tree structure1 isomorphic to the base proof from which it was derived.
Just as a base proof tree contains three types of nodes, goal nodes, axiom nodes
and intermediate step nodes, an analogical plan contains corresponding types
of nodes; however, where an axiom node was labelled by the single axiom that
was applied in the base proof, an axiom node in the plan will be labelled by a
list of candidate analogous axioms; where an intermediate step node from the
base proof was labelled by a clause from the object language, the corresponding
node in the plan will be labelled by a formula from the extended plan language
described in Chapter 5; the special function symbols, list, poss, def and bdef
represents different kinds of uncertainty in the plan (see Chapter 5).
We can define an analogical plan to be correct if there is a choice of axioms
from the axiom nodes which allows each of the inferences suggested by the plan
to go through, with the inferred clause matching the plan formula for the result,
in the sense of the special unification procedure described in the last chapter,
and the empty clause being derived at the last step. A plan is flawed if it is not
correct.
To put it another way, we can think of the analogical plan as representing
a large number of possible attempted proofs of the target problem: a plan is
correct if one of these attempts is a valid proof of the target, and it is flawed
otherwise.
The plan application strategy of the systems described in the previous chapter
is to verify the plan steps successively, choosing axioms from the axiom sets,
making inferences, and checking that the inferred clauses correspond to the plan
1Plans are binary trees because we are working in a binary resolution system. The
techniques would extend to non-binary forms of resolution, and the corresponding ana¬
logical plan trees would no longer have to be binary.
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according to the special unification procedure. Thus it seems that these simple
strategies will never be able to apply flawed plans successfully. In fact, a certain
type of flawed plan can be applied by the present systems: when all of the plan
steps go through successfully, except that the final clause derived is not the empty
clause, the system attempts to finish the target proof by refuting the remaining
clause in a breadth-first search. Problems 3, 4, 5 and 6, from the previous
chapter, involve flawed plans of this type which were applied successfully.
A more serious type of flaw is when a step in the plan will not go through
for any choice of axioms at previous nodes, either because none of the candidate
axioms will apply, or, if some do, the inferred clauses do not match with the next
intermediate plan step. This type of flaw will cause failure in all the application
systems of the previous chapter.
Of course, the plan might not be appropriate for the target problem at all,
in which case it is right that it should fail; but many intuitively close analogies
lead to plans which are flawed, in the strong sense (examples of these are given
in the next section). As humans, we feel that these analogies provide useful
guidance towards the solution of the target problem. Only fairly straightforward
analogies lead to plans which Eire correct, in the sense defined above. Thus an
analogy system which can handle more interesting and difficult analogies will
have to be able to cope with flawed plans.
For a flawed plan to be validated, it must be corrected or patched. That is,
inferences other than those suggested by the plan must be made at some stage
during application. As the examples given in the next section will show, flaws
in analogical plans are often "local" problems that is, extra inferences can be
made which will allow the plan to be picked up again after one or a few steps.
If the flaw can be successfully patched, the straightforward application can take
over again.
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The question facing the designer of an improved application system is "what to
do when the next step won't go through ?". This happens if (a) the next indicated
axiom will not apply to the step, or, if it does, (b) the inferred clause does not
match with the next plan step. There are many possibilities that come to mind
— try a different candidate axiom, backtrack to a previous step, try to add steps
to make the axiom apply (if (a)), try to add steps to match with the plan step
(if (b)), try to miss out plan steps, try a different plan altogether, try to develop
some other part of the plan, and others. The plan need not necessarily be flawed
for this situation to arise — it may be that a wrong choice of axiom has been
made somewhere in the application. The first two possible actions mentioned
above, choosing a different axiom and backtracking to a previous step, attempt
to follow up this possibility. But these are the only actions which the present
systems can try. An improved application system will not immediately know
whether a local failure arises because the plan is flawed, or because a wrong
choice has been made. It will not be feasible, in general, to search the space
indicated by the plan exhaustively before deciding on what patching action to
take. Therefore, the application system will have to consider the patching options
along with the first two backtracking options.
The problem is which action to try first, and how to coordinate the inves¬
tigation of the different possibilities. Before we consider the issues of control,
we examine the possible causes of the local failure of a plan, assigning blame to
particular parts of the plan, or choices made during its application. Each type
of cause suggests a way of overcoming the local failure. We give examples of the
different types.
• Wrong Axiom. Perhaps the wrong axiom has been chosen out of the
candidate set produced by the AOI, either at the present step or at a
previous step. The analogy search spaces illustrated in the previous chapter
show cases where the axiom chosen first leads to a dead end, and it is
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another axiom from the candidate set, less favoured initially, which, when
applied, leads to the solution.
The cure for this problem is to try a different candidate axiom, either at
the current step, or at a previous step.
• Wrong Plan. Perhaps the entire plan which is being followed is inap¬
propriate for the target problem, and should be abandoned in favour of
another. In a realistic analogy system, this is bound to happen often be¬
cause of the empirical nature of analogy.
The cure for this is to stop developing the current plan and start on (or
pick up again) another plan.
The above are the only situations which the present analogy systems can deal
with. The system is exploring the wrong branch of the analogy search space, and
should backtrack to another branch. For the rest of the reasons for failure, we
assume that the plan application is basically on the right track, in terms of the
inferences that have been made so far. The failures are classified according to
whether the step and the axiom suggested by the plan are "right" or "wrong"—
that is, whether they turn out to form part of a solution to the target problem.
These distinctions are not clear cut; for example, an axiom suggested by the
plan may turn out to be useful in achieving the next step, but only along with
the application of other axioms; this would somewhat dilute its Tightness. Here
is the classification:
• Step right, axiom right. The hypothesised axiom and plan step for the
next inference are right (in the sense that they both occur in the intended
patch), but extra steps need to be inserted before and/or after the axiom
is applied in order to allow the step to go through. Figure 7-1 shows an
example of a plan step which occurs in the attempt to prove the additive
closure of the binary rationals by analogy to that of the ordinary rationals,
i.e.
binrat(x) A binrat(y) —» binrat{x + y)
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by analogy to
rat(x) A rat(y) —> rat(x -f y).
The suggested analogue, AV, for the base axiom A1, does not apply at the
expected step because the unification of the literals fails (symptom (a)).
The problem is not that either the axiom AV or the next plan step is wrong,
but that an extra step (boxed in Figure 7-1) needs to be added before AV
is applied. When this step is made, AV applies, the inferred clause is
found to match with the plan step, and the plan application proceeds, the
problem having been overcome.
A similar thing can happen with symptom (b), where the axiom applies,
but extra steps need to be added after the axiom in order to match the
inferred clause with the plan step. It may also be necessary to insert steps
both before and after the axiom in order to allow the step to go through.
So the cure here is to make extra inferences before and/or after the sug¬
gested axiom is applied (depending on which of (a) and (b) has happened),
in order to infer a clause which matches with the next plan step.
• Step right, axiom wrong. It could be that, while the next plan step
turns out to be right, none of the candidate axioms is right. This would
happen if the analogue of the base axiom is not in the axiom base, and
needs to be derived from the axioms which are in the base as a lemma.
Similarly, the base axiom may itself have been a lemma, and thus it would
not be surprising that the analogue would have to be proved as a lemma.
Figure 7-2 shows an example of this from Boolean algebra where, in the
base x fl x = x is proved by using the lemma x fl (x U y) = x. Supposing
that the analogous lemma x U (x D y) = x has not yet been derived, it is
conjectured, being the analogue to the base lemma, and an attempt made
to prove it by analogy to the proof of the base lemma.
The cure for this problem is to construct the analogue of the base axiom,
conjecture it to be a theorem, attempt to derive it from the given target
axioms, and then use it to make the next plan step. If a lemma was applied
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in the base, it would be reasonable to attempt the proof of the conjecture
by analogy to the proof of the lemma in the base. The conjecture proving
stage could be omitted, with the conjecture being recorded as a hypothesis
for the taxget problem. Bledsoe [Bledsoe 86] suggests something similar to
this patching strategy.
Alternatively, a number of steps (which would represent the proof of the
lemma) could be inserted directly into the plan, without explicitly proving
the lemma.
• Step wrong, axiom right. Perhaps the fault is not with the axiom, but
with the plan step, which is misleading. Figure 7-3 shows an example of
. 1
this which occurs in the attempt to prove
The boxed plan step proves to be misleading, while the analogous axiom
proves to be (weakly) useful, along with other additional axioms. The step
needs to be ignored, and the plan is picked up again at the next step after
extra inferences are made.
So the cure here is to make inferences, with the candidate analogous axioms
and perhaps others, and attempt to match the inferred clauses with steps
later in the plan.
• Step wrong, axiom wrong. Perhaps the next inference in the base proof
is not needed in the target, and both the axiom and the plan step should be
missed out. Figure 7-1 with base and target swapped provides an example
of this; there is an extra step in the (new) base which is not needed in the
target.
In order to patch in this situation, the following base axiom should be
applied, and the result matched with the following base step. More gen-
odd(x) A odd(y) —> odd(x ■ y)
by analogy to
even(x) A even(y) —> even(x • y).
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B : (x • y)2 - x2 ■ y2
BASE TARGET
Figure 7—1: Extra step inserted
erally, inferences may be made from the current step, and the plan picked
up again at a later stage.
7.2.3 How to implement patching strategies
The patching strategies described above fall into the following categories:
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Figure 7—2: Conjecture made
Patch by backtracking2.
• Patch by conjecture.
• Patch by search.
The first two of these have already been described. The most problematical
is the third; we discuss it in more detail.
Patching by search
Note that, while we use the word search, we do not necessarily mean unguided
search — the patching techniques which we will discuss are still guided by the
2Strictly speaking, it is wrong to refer to backtracking as a form of patching, since
the plan need not be flawed for it to be necessary. However, we classify it along with
the genuine forms of patching, since, as far as the application system is concerned, it is
just another way to attempt to recover from a local failure.
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even(a)
a = 2 • /(a)
even(b)
b — 2 ■ f(b) 4-
a • 6 = (2 •/(a)) • (2 •/(&)) f
A
->oc?<i(a)
-^a = 2 • y(a) + 1
odd(b)
6 = 2-y(6) + l
^ a • b = (2 • y(a) + 1) • (2 • 5(6) + 1)
a • 6 = (2 • 5(a)) • (2 • 5(6) + 1) + 1 • (2 • 5(6) + 1)
a • 6 = (2 -5(a)) • (2-5(6) + 1)
a • b — 2 • (/(a) • (2 • /(&))) a • b = 2 • (g(a) ■ [2-g(6),(2-g(b) +1)])
B
even(a ■ b) ->even(a • b) 4r
nil 4-
+ (2 - g(b) + 1)
A' =A
a • 6 = 2 • (5(a) • (2 • 5(6) + 1)) + (2 • 5(6) + 1)
/
a • 6 = (2 • (5(a) • (2 • 5(6^ + 1)) + 2 • 5(6)) + 1
a ■ b = 2 • ((5(a) • (2 • 5(6) + 1)) + 5(6)) + 1
B'
~^~odd(a • b) -<odd(a • b)
nil
A : x ■ (y ■ z) = (2 • y) ■ z
B: V(-ix = 2 • y, even(x))
A' = A
B' : V(-uc = 2 • y + 1, odd(x))
BASE TARGET
Figure 7—3: Plan step ignored
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Figure 7—4: Schematic Patches
analogical plan, but not as closely as normal plan development. The top part
of Figure 7-4 schematically represents the four examples of patching by search
discussed in the previous section.
The application system could treat these types of patches as separate and
search for them separately. However, we can consider them all to be subsumed
by the lower half of Figure 7-4; the plan is picked up again at some later step,
which could be the next one; the axioms which are applied to make the patching
steps may or may not be candidate analogues for those in the base proof.
In order to search for this type of patch, inferences should be made from the
current step, and inferred clauses should be matched against the following few
plan steps. The application system could use unguided, breadth-first search to
attempt this kind of patch — if the patches required were very small, this would
perhaps be successful. However the example shown in Figure 7-3 suggests that
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a more directed approach will be necessary to make the patches — six inferences
axe made before the plan is picked up again.
Search techniques We outline two methods for guiding the search for a patch,
using the base solution as a guide — while the plan derived from the base has
broken down, we still may be able to extract some assistance from the base proof
in trying to patch the plan.
• Candidate analogues for the axioms used in the base in the next few steps
could be given higher priority than others; i.e. we expect that these axioms
may be applied somewhere during the patch.
• A form of means/ends analysis (MEA) could be used to select low priority
axioms to apply (i.e. axioms other than the high priority ones indicated by
the AOI). In Figure 7-1, for example, the candidate axiom will not apply
because the unification of
/i(a)-flip)2 +ffiQ)2 -/iO) ,
gi(a)'-gi(by an y2
fails. From the unification algorithm it could be seen that the failure is
caused by the two subterms
yi(a)2 • yi(6)2 and y2.
An attempt could be made to rewrite the first so that it unifies with the
second. This attempt could be further directed by considering the head
symbols, multiplication and exponentiation, and how a term having the
first as head symbol may be rewritten into one having the second. Equali¬
ties in the axiom base which produce the same replacement of head symbols
could be used in the attempt to make the terms unifiable. In this case, the
axiom
'(* • y)2 = x2 - y2,
assuming it was in the axiom base, would be selected and applied left to
right, obtaining
/i(a)-yi(6)2 + ff1(q)2-./i(6)
(91(a) • 9i(b))2 -
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The candidate axiom now applies and the inferred clause matches with the
plan step, thus completing the patch described in Figure 7-/.
The above technique applies to cases of symptom (a), where the patch
is made in order to apply the axiom. A similar thing can be done with
cases of symptom (b), where the axiom applies but doesn't match with the
plan step. In this case it is the special unification procedure which will
need to be amended in order to suggest how the two terms fail to match.
Otherwise, the process would be the same as that for symptom (a).
A similar kind of MEA was used by LP [Silver 85] in order to patch the
application of its schemas to new equations; but, instead of single axioms
and their effect on head function symbols, LP used methods and their effect
on meta-level descriptions (LP's methods can be thought of as meta-level
operators, associated with collections of object level axioms).
Co-ordination of techniques The two methods of guiding the search for a
patch to the plan could be combined in the following procedure:
• Decide how many steps ahead will be searched towards.
• Given these steps, form the sets St and Ax, of subsequent steps and can¬
didate analogues for the corresponding axioms applied.
• Attempt to derive a clause which matches with a step from St by breadth-
first search, where expansion of a node is given by the following procedure:
try to apply each axiom from Ax to the current clause, calling the MEA
procedure if necessary. For each new clause derived in this way, try to
match it against each step in St, calling the MEA procedure if necessary.
The procedure succeeds if/when an inferred clause matches against an
element of St.
Directing the search for a patch ... One clear difficulty with this procedure
is how far ahead to look in the plan. This will not be a problem with small
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plans, as all steps can reasonably be included. But, bearing in mind that the
MEA procedure may be quite expensive, it would be useful to direct the search
towards likely plan steps, and away from unlikely ones.
... Towards likely steps. Obviously, the steps nearest to the point of failure
will always be plausible. The following heuristic could be employed to select
other likely steps:
Subsequent steps where symbols which had been introduced into
the proof at an earlier stage (i.e. symbols not occurring in the original
problem statements) have just been removed should be regarded as
plausible.
The motivation for this heuristic is that, where the analogy breaks down locally,
we may be able to identify a subsequent step whose achievement can be thought
of as the purpose of the intervening steps in the base; thus, while the intervening
steps may not go through in the target, if we can reach the analogous goal in the
target in a different way, we can pick the plan up again there. These intermediate
goals can be thought of as the completion of stages of the base proof; steps where
auxiliary symbols have just been removed are likely candidates for intermediate
goals, since they can represent the completion of an inference concerning symbols
we knew about before, which used the auxiliary symbols for the subproof; that is,
these steps can be thought of as places where the base proof was made simpler.
For example, in Figure 7-3, the base step even(a • b) would be picked out as
a likely stage, since the symbols f and 2 have just been removed.
... Away from unlikely steps. It may also be possible to direct search away
from certain steps which can be recognised as being implausible. For example,
in Figure 7-3, the misleading plan step shown could be recognised as such by
the following means: it could be demonstrated that it does not follow from the
previous step using axioms from the underlying theory, by construction of a
counter example; this in itself does not rule the step out as being a useful one,
since goal clauses, as well as axioms, could be used in a patch towardsrit. But
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it does suggest that the step will be difficult to achieve, and so may be regarded
as implausible.
... With bidirectional plan development. Another way of directing the search
for a patch towards promising steps in the plan would be to work backwards from
the end of the plan, attempting to validate a final segment of the plan; if this
could be done, it would give the searching mechanism a firm step to aim at —
it would know that, if the step could be reached, the rest of the plan would go
through. For example, in Figure 7-3, the final two plan steps could be made
backwards, producing the clause
a ■ b = 2 • x + 1
in place of the misleading plan step shown. This clause could give useful guidance
via the MEA procedure outlined above. This proposal would require the reason¬
ing system to be able to make inferences backwards; that is, given an inferred
clause and one of the parent clauses, to construct a clause which could act as
the other parent in the inference. In general, this would be difficult to achieve,
possibly involving multiple possible results. More generally, validation of the
plan could be taken up at any step. As well as the ability to make inferences
both forwards and backwards, this would require the ability to reason directly
with clauses in the extended plan language. This would not present many prob¬
lems — the ordinary unification procedure within the inference rules would be
replaced by the special unification procedure described in the last chapter.
An alternative approach
When attempting to patch by search, the various techniques tried would become
successively more loosely based on the analogical plan, and successively closer
to general theorem proving techniques. An alternative approach would be to
design domain-specific patching procedures which were based on a meta-level
analysis of the base solution, and the current state of search. The purpose of a
meta-level analysis would be to abstract out the important features of the base
solution (i.e. those responsiblgTor its structure). An attempt could be made to
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construct a sequence of steps in the target which had analogous features. The
hope would be that, while the solutions may not be perfectly analogous at the
lowest level, they may be so at a slightly higher level of abstraction.
This way of attempting patches is intuitively appealing since it seems that
the clue to the use of an analogy often lies in finding the level of description at
which the analogy holds. As discussed in Chapter 2, Gick and Holyoak regard
the ability to change levels of description as an important part of analogical
reasoning. However, finding a computational model of this process which would
be of practical use in patching analogical plans will be difficult: it is not clear
where the description language which expresses the crucial features comes from;
if it is provided by the user there is a danger of circularity, rather similar to the
problems with semantic types in Kling's matcher; that is, that the description
language has been designed with the particular analogy in mind; alternatively,
if a single language can abstract out the important features of a wide range of
solutions, this suggests that the domain is so well understood that we would
not have to bother with analogy in order to solve problems; techniques such as
precondition analysis [Silver 85], discussed in Chapter 2, could be used to learn
solution schemas instead. As argued in Chapter 2, a certain lack of understanding
of the domain is necessary in order to make analogy an attractive method of
solving problems, as opposed to methods of spontaneous generalisation.
From a pragmatic point of view, this direction for analogy research is prob¬
ably best pursued within a context where meta-level planning is being used
anyway, for separate purposes. This could help to avoid the circularity problems
associated with the approach. Work being carried out on proof plans for guiding
inductive proofs [Bundy & Wallen 86] might provide such a context.
7.2.4 Coordination of patching strategies
The procedure for coordinating the various patching strategies described above
should take account of the following points: __
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• We do not want to spend too much time attempting patches by search or
conjecture at genuine dead ends; that is to say, we would like to preserve
the backtracking behaviour on the easy examples discussed in the previous
chapter; i.e. if there is an alternative, and quite plausible, candidate axiom
either at the present or at a previous step, we should backtrack to it before
spending a great deal of time (if any) attempting to patch the current
branch.
• On the other hand, we do not (necessarily) want to search exhaustively
through all the candidate axiom sets in the plan before attempting any
other sort of patch; some of the candidate axioms will not be very plausible,
and should only be tried after some attempt is made to patch with the more
plausible alternatives.
• For similar reasons, we would not want to spend too much time on patching
by search without trying patching by conjecture, and vice-versa.
• As more time is spent on a particular patching strategy, without success,
our expectation that it will ever lead to success will diminish; thus other
strategies, initially less favoured, become more attractive by comparison.
However, of course, we may want to return to the present strategy later.
These points clearly indicate that a fixed backtracking control structure for
the patching strategies is insufficient. The present systems are based on Prolog
backtracking; even with the restricted forms of patching of which they are capa¬
ble (backtracking to another axiom, another step, or another plan), the Prolog
control structure is not really suitable. We are forced to consider all candidate
axioms at a step (which may involve much search), even the least plausible ones,
before we can return to a previous step. Yet an untried candidate axiom may
be waiting at the previous step which is just (or nearly) as plausible as the one
which was originally applied there.
An agenda-based system is needed to support the kind of flexibility called
for above. Each patching strategy would be given a numerical assessment of the
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expectation of its success, on encountering a local failure. The most promising
strategy is pursued first; after a while, it is re-assessed; if it has not been success¬
ful, its assessment may drop below that of another strategy, which would then
be pursued instead.
There is some evidence to be had initially for the relative promise of the
strategies, which can be used to set their initial assessments:
• if there are untried candidate analogues at previous steps which have match
assessment nearly as high as those already tried, backtracking is suggested.
The assessment for backtracking would be directly related to the most likely
alternative axiom at some previous step.
• if there are no good untried analogues at present or previous steps, patching
by conjecture is suggested.
• if the local failure occurs with symptom (b), i.e. the candidate axiom
applied but the inferred clause did not match with the plan step, patching
by MEA search is suggested, rather than patching by conjecture.
The above evidence is not very strong however, and certainly not strong enough
to fix a permanent ordering on the strategies. The evidence is used to put an
initial ordering on the strategies, which may be altered later.
Note that the agenda may include nodes from previous steps, as well as those
from the latest step; i.e. the present step could be the result of a patch made
at a previous step; so, if the present step proves fruitless, alternative strategies
at the previous step may need to be investigated. It seems wise to reward a
node for the number of plan steps which have been made to reach it; that is, we
should be prepared to put more effort into patching (by conjecture or search)
after many plan steps have gone through successfully.
A problem with the agenda-based approach would be the number of partially
developed plans which would have to be stored, putting a strain on memory. It
would be possible to implement a sort of plan-sharing between nodes on the
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agenda, where the plan for a node could be computed from that for another, if
the first node was ever made active. Additionally, if the space consumed by the
system rose above a threshold, pruning of the agenda could be cued, in which
less promising nodes would be deleted to reclaim space.
7.2.5 Comparison with Kling, Munyer and Carbonnell
As described in Chapter 1, Kling's approach to the search for a target proof by
analogy to a given base proof is simply to use a uniform search procedure, but
to restrict its axiom set to the set of candidate analogues for the axioms which
were applied in the base. If we are to consider the candidate set as representing
an unstructured plan, the plan can only be flawed if the target theorem is not
actually provable from the candidate set. Thus Kling avoids all flaws resulting
from the structure of the plan and the intermediate steps. This may give Kling's
system an advantage on very seriously flawed plans, where structured application
systems would struggle to find patches, being misled by the structure of the
plan. However, on correct and moderately flawed plans, structured application
systems would have a great advantage: recall thatj on problems 5, 6 and 7
of the previous chapter, the axiom plan systems fail, being unable to search
exhaustively, in reasonable time, the portion of the analogy search space from
which they need to backtrack; this indicates that the search spaces within even
correct analogical plans can be large if intermediate steps are not used; they will
be much larger still if the order of axiom application is ignored as well, as is the
case with Kling's system.
Munyer's application system ([Munyer 81]) is able to use breadth-first search
in order to overcome gaps in an analogy (flaws, in our terminology). This is
similar to the "patch by search" strategy discussed above, except that Munyer
does not attempt to guide the search in any way.
Carbonnell [Carbonnell 83b] describes a number of '.'transformations" which
can be made to a base solution in the hope ofdurning it into a solution to the
target problem. Examples of such transformations are
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• Swap two operators in the solution sequence.
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• Reverse the solution sequence.
• Insert an operator into the solution sequence.
• Delete an operator from the solution sequence.
The various transformations give rise to a search space of possible operator
sequences which can be obtained from the initial base solution. A goal, or
success, state is any operator sequence which is a valid solution to the target
problem. This space is known as the "T-Space". Carbonnell proposes search in
the T-space as a means of analogy application.
In Chapter 1, we remarked that Carbonnell's system contains no solution
mapping stage; that is, the initial state of the application phase, the base so¬
lution, which can be thought of as the plan for the target solution, will involve
vocabulary (function, predicate and constant symbols) from the base problem
rather than that of the target. If the target vocabulary is different from that of
the base, as in most of the examples considered in this thesis, the application
stage will be faced with an enormous, and largely unneccessary, search prob¬
lem: each axiom applied in the base will have to be replaced by an analogous
but different one in the target, by the transformation rules; additionally, any
genuine patching required will have to be done as well by more applications of
transformation rules. This appears to result in a T-space search of more than
twice the depth of the final solution to the target. Furthermore, note that the
branching rate in the T-space will be much greater than that in the object search
space, since some of the operators are parametrised by at least one object-level
operator.
It may be that Carbonnell intends his system to be used within a domain on
analogies which involve no significant translation from base to target; for these
types of analogies, the plan construction phase shrinks in importance. However,
Carbonnell presents his system as a general model for reasoning by analogy, and,
as such, it is open to the criticism made above: the most interesting analogies are
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those involving superficially different entities; these are bound to involve genuine
translations between base and target.
However, we may nevertheless regard Carbonnell's T-space search as a model
of plan patching during application, and thus compare it with the proposals
made earlier in this section: given a local plan failure, we could invoke a search
in the T-space to patch the plan. The T-space approach corresponds to what
we have called patching by search above, and would certainly be an alternative
to the MEA procedure outlined above. As presented in [Carbonnell 83b], the
T-space search is not directed in the same way as the MEA procedure (towards
the step in the plan where failure occurred, towards analogues for base axioms
and towards likely steps where the plan can be picked up again). However,
it would certainly be possible to define T-space operators, and heuristics for
searching the T-space, which would emulate the MEA procedure. Thus there
is no fundamental difference of approach between the two techniques. Without
guiding heuristics, the T-space search still looks explosive. Carbonnell does not
consider specific ways of guiding the search.
7.2.6 Summary
We have discussed how and why straightforward application of analogical plans,
of the type considered in the previous chapter, can break down. We have con¬
sidered what kind of remedial action needs to be taken in order to recover from
the local failure and resume normal plan application. We have described various
kinds of patches which can be made to analogical plans, and have addressed the
problem of the control structure which coordinates the investigation of the vari¬
ous possibilities. We concluded that an agenda-based application system would
be necessary to allow the necessary flexibility, and discussed some of the issues
in the design of such a system.
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7.3 Improving Analogical Reasoning By Learn¬
ing Global Analogies and Semantic Types
In this section we consider how an analogical reasoning system of the type de¬
scribed in this thesis could improve its ability to reason by analogy in a domain,
by learning global analogies within the domain or between domains. The moti¬
vation for this is that the analogical reasoning systems so far described exhibit
a similar kind of dumbness as ordinary theorem provers, one level up: that is,
APS systems are called for so that theorem provers will be able to learn from
their experience, and not repeat exactly the same behaviour when faced with
a problem similar to one which they have solved before. However, the analog¬
ical reasoning systems, as described so far, in searching for and then applying
an analogy which was essentially the same as one which had been encountered
before, would go through the same steps of matching, plan construction and
application as they would have done had they never encountered the previous
analogy. Just as superficially different problems can sometimes be solved in anal¬
ogous ways, superficially different examples of analogical reasoning, where the
respective base problems and target problems may be very different, can involve
essentially the same analogy.
We claim that, by abstracting out important aspects of successful attempts
to solve problems by analogy, we can re-use them beneficially in new attempts
at APS. The aspects which will be abstracted will amount to a description of
the analogy which was found and used, without details which are specific to
the problems that were involved. Since the description is not tied to particular
problems, but could potentially apply to any from the domain in question, we can
think of it as describing a global analogy within or between domains. Thus, our
technique for transferring experience over different instances of APS is to learn
global analogies, which we hope will be relevant to many different situations.
In Chapter 3, we criticised Kling's analogy matching algorithm because of
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its use of semantic types. Recall how analogy matchers, such as Kling's, can
make use of semantic types:
Associations between symbols of the same (or similar) semantic
type are preferred over those of disparate types.
How strong the preference is and how a given matcher implements it are separate
matters. In Kling's case, the preference is very strong (in fact proscriptory) and
is built into the structure of his algorithm. We argued (Chapter 3) that the types
which Kling provided for the matcher encoded a global analogy between group
theory and ring theory; the matcher merely reconstructed parts of this global
analogy between individual problems from group theory and ring theory respec¬
tively. However, we also argued that the use of semantic types would be valid as
long as the types could be learnt automatically in some way. In this section, we
consider the construction or refinement of type hierarchies corresponding to the
global analogies that are learnt over the course of APS experience.
We then consider how the global analogies, or semantic types, can be used
within the Basic APS framework as described in the previous chapters; that is,
how they can improve the performance of the analogical reasoning system. This
includes their use in matching, as discussed earlier, but also extends to other
parts of analogical problem solving.
We also discuss how the knowledge of global analogies, independent of par¬
ticular pairs of problems, would enable a broader and more varied approach to
the construction and use of analogies; we discuss how this more varied approach
reflects better the use of analogies by humans than does Basic APS alone. How¬
ever, we argue that the Basic APS process, which has been the main concern of
this thesis, is a necessary part of the alternative uses of analogy.
7.3.1 Semantic types and dualities
Before we describe the techniques for learning global analogies and semantic
types, we define more closely the structures which we intend to learn.





Figure 7—5: An example hierarchy
Semantic Types
The simplest definition of a type hierarchy is as a tree, the leaves3 of which are
labelled with symbols (function symbols, for instance) from the object language,
and each non-terminal node is labelled with a set of symbols— the set containing
just those symbols which label leaves below it in the tree. Figure 7-5 shows an
example hierarchy. (This example is intended to illustrate the definition — no
significance should be attached to the particular choices of node made here.)
However, it is sometimes useful to consider more general structures than these,
such as is shown in Figure 7-6. so some researchers [Plotkin 81] have defined a
type hierarchy as an upper semilattice. This definition is motivated by the
desire to make the version spaces/focusing algorithm [Mitchell 78] work (i.e. for
there to be unique least upper bounds in the hierarchy), rather than by any
direct reasons why concepts should be clustered in this way. For example, the
dotted line in Figure 7-6 would not be allowed, but there seems to be no good
reason why the resulting concept structure should not occur.
3The leaves of a tree are nodes which have no daughter nodes.
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Dualities
We have argued that we should learn global analogies within or between domains;
that is, analogies that are not tied to particular pairs of problems, as those which
we have considered so far are. We will use the term duality to refer to such a
global analogy, in order to distinguish it from the local analogies between pairs
of problems. We give the following somewhat vague definition of a duality within
a domain:
A duality is (a) an association between some of the symbols in the
domain together with (b) an association between axioms/theorems
of the domain such that associated axioms or theorems are approxi¬
mately mapped to each other by the symbol association.
Remarks
• The definition is phrased for dualities within a domain. Dualities between
domains are defined in the same way, except that, of course, corresponding
symbols or clauses must belong to corresponding domains. All of what
follows applies equally well to this kind of duality.
• The definition is vague because we have not said what "approximately
mapped" means. However, the notion is the same as that encountered in
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analogies between individual problems. We could define a measure of the
closeness of a duality, reflecting the degree of correspondence between the
associated axioms, based on the assessment procedure for analogy matches
described in Chapter 4.
Examples
A: Real number theory.
+ <—> •
(a) - <—♦ / (b)
0 *—♦ 1
B: Boolean algebra.
x + 0 = x *—y x • 1 — x
x + y — y + x *—> x • y — y • x
x — x = 0 <—y x = 0 V x/x — 1
etc.
U <—y fl a: U y = y U a: * > x fl y = y D x
, . n <—y u ... x n l = l <—> x u o = o
(a) (b)
0 <—y 1 i U 0 — i * y x D 1 = x
1 *—y 0 etc.
C: Trigonometry.
. . sin <—y cos . sin2(x) = 1 — cos2(x) < > cos2(x) = 1 — sin2(x)
(a) (b)
cos <—y sin d/dx(sin(x)) = cos(x) < y d/dx(cos(x)) = —sin(x)
D: Abstract algebra.
group < > ring
->subgroup(h, g) V group(g)
. . subgroup <—y subring
normal • , , (b) 4 * ^subring(h,g)\/ ring(g)
subgroup <—* ldeal etc
etc.
Remarks on examples.
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• Example A shows the need for the word "approximate" in the definition
— one of a pair of associated sentences has a condition which the other
doesn't have.
• There is no need for a duality to apply to all axioms/theorems on each
side; we fully expect that some properties of one side will not have close
analogues (or analogues at all) on the other. For example the equation
sin{2 • x) = 2 • sin(x) • cos(x)
does not have a syntactically close analogue in C.
• Example B is an example of a formal duality, where the symbol map¬
ping represents a perfect symmetry in the axiomatisation of the domain,
which ensures that, for any theorem in Boolean algebra, its dual under
the mapping is also a theorem. Other dualities may be regarded as partial
symmetries.
The idea behind the definition of dualities given is to be able to represent,
and hence exploit, situations where a part of a theory has similar structure to
another part (or a part of a different theory). Formal dualities, such as B, are
a limiting case of dualities, and do not seem to arise nearly so often as partial
dualities do. Thus we claim it is worthwhile to study the more general kind,
involving approximate mappings.
We discuss the exploitation of dualities in section 7.3.6; to give a brief idea
here, they can be used in matching (in a similar, although potentially more
powerful, way to semantic types), in plan construction (by implicitly extending
the mapping between problems, thus making the plan more accurate) and in
making and proving conjectures.
For partial dualities, successful exploitation will involve taking advantage of
the duality where it applies, while not wasting too much time trying to use it
where it doesn't.
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In Chapter 3. we argued that the semantic type heuristic would be effective in
analogy matching if the types encode global analogies (what we are now calling
dualities). The means of encoding provides the basic connection between types
and dualities (which we will explore further in section 7.3.3):
Symbols which are associated by a duality should have the same
or similar semantic type (i.e. are sibling leaves, or close to being
sibling leaves, in the hierarchy).
Recasting the effectiveness argument in terms of dualities (i.e. using the connec¬
tion just given), we get a similar argument in justification of the use of dualities
in matching:
Analytical justification. Pairs of symbols associated by a dual¬
ity are plausible as analogues because they have structurally similar
axioms/theorems associated with them: thus, given that the dual
symbols occur in structurally similar formulae, and regarding a solu¬
tion as a sequence of structural rearrangements leading from a start
to a finish, each arising from an axiom or theorem, it is likely that
the two formulae will have similar solutions.
We could also take a more pragmatic approach to the justification for dualities,
as in the following argument:
Empirical justification. Analogies between individual problems of¬
ten contain part of a global analogy (a duality) as well as more
problem-specific elements: the associations
+ «-—» • , — «—>;/ and 0 <—> 1
often form part of specific analogies between problems, together with
associations which do not belong to the global analogy. For this
reason, symbols which are associated by a known duality axe plausible
as analogues within specific problems.
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Just as it is possible to take both an empirical and an analytical approach to the
justification of the use of dualities, we will see below that we can take both an
empirical and an analytical approach to learning them.
Comparison with version spaces
As a brief digression, let us look at the success criterion for the use of the
semantic type hierarchy in the inductive generalisation system LEX [Mitchell 78],
discussed in Chapter 2: the hierarchy is used, by the version spaces technique,
to bias the program towards making some generalisations, those that involve
types from the hierarchy, rather than others. Once made, a generalisation will
be applied to new problems containing symbols of the appropriate types in the
appropriate places, i.e. if corresponding function symbols between the new and
old problems are of similar types. The technique will be successful if the new
problems, which match the generalisation, can be solved in suitably similar ways.
This will be true if the types encode global analogies within the domain; i.e. the
success criterion for the use of types in version spaces is the same as that in
analogy matching.
This point is significant as it indicates that hierarchies may be shared between
the different techniques. A refinement or addition to the hierarchy made by one
of the techniques would be available for use by the other. Both uses for type hier¬
archies have associated methods for learning and refining them: [Utgoff 83] and
[Wielemaker & Bundy 85] describe learning methods for generalisation; section
7.3.5 describes learning methods for analogy.
7.3.3 Connection between types and dualities
In Chapter 3 we introduced the basic connection between semantic types and
dualities:
Symbols which are associated by a duality are given the same or
__ similar semantic type in the hierarchy. —
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structure relstructure
group ring subgroup subring
Figure 7—7: Algebraic hierarchies
structure relstructure
subgroup subring subfieldgroup ring field
Figure 7—8: Extended algebraic hierarchies
Now that we have been more specific about the nature of the types and dualities,
we can look at the connection in more detail.
Notice, first of all, that some of the information in a duality is lost when it
is represented as types. For example, the duality
might be represented as in Figure 7-7. Analogous symbols are given the same
type, but the dependency between the associations in the duality (i.e. if groups
are seen as rings then subgroups are seen as subrings) is lost in the type structure.
In Section 5, we will see that this information could be relevant for inductive
generalisation.
On the other hand, dualities, as presented up to now, cannot directly model
type situations such as shown in Figure 7-8. where a node has more than two
descendants. We need to extend the definition to where the associations (of
symbols, or axioms/theorems) could be ordered tuples. For example, a three-
way symbol association is represented as (si,S2,S3); clearly the more expressive
group * > ring
subgroup <—-» subring
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arith
Figure 7—9: Arithmetic hierarchy
notation x y available for binary associations cannot be used for ternary (or
higher) associations.
Furthermore, dualities do not explicitly represent the hierarchical structure
of types: suppose we had the fragment of type structure shown in Figure 7-9:






and the arith node corresponds to the duality
(+,-•,/)
(—>+?/ >')
together with the four-way associations of axioms and theorems that justify this
duality.
But the dualities do not, as presented, explicitlyrepresent the subset con¬
nection between the two. However, such connections could easily be derived in
going from dualities to types.
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Outline of learning methods
In the last section, two arguments were given justifying the use of dualities in pro¬
viding a priori plausibility judgements in analogy matching: one was empirical,
claiming that dualities frequently recur as parts of matches between individual
problems; the other was analytical, arguing that two symbols having structurally
similar axioms/theorems associated with them suggests that they make good
analogues.
These two lines of argument directly indicate two different ways that an
analogy system can learn dualities within a domain (or between domains), over
the course of its APS experience.
Empirical method The first method, the empirical one, would work by exam¬
ining analogy matches which the system had constructed when solving problems
by analogy with other problems. The method would look for recurring sub-
matches and for the operators (axioms or theorems) which had been found to be
analogous by the application routine. The recurring submatches would form the
(a) part of the dualities, and the associated operators would form the (b) part.
Analytical method The second method, the analytical one, would work by
examining the knowledge base (composed of axioms, theorems and possibly un¬
proved conjectures) and constructing explicit analogy matches between the con¬
stituents. From the successful matches, the method would group together those
that were consistent with each other. The union of the matches in a group would
form the (a) part of a new duality, and the pairs of axioms/theorems which gave
rise to the matches would form the (b) part.
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The above are rough outlines of how the two methods would work. Before
considering them in more detail, we consider some aspects of dualities which the
methods will have to cope with.
Dualities are statistical Within arith = —,/}, we can find evidence
for different dualities which are inconsistent with each other. Apart from duality
A of Section 2, we could find evidence for
< y




sin(x + y) — sin(x) • cos(y) + cos(a:) • sin(y)
<—y sin(x — y) = sin(x) • cos(y) — cos(x) • sin(y)
x-(y-\-z) = x- y-\-x-z





(b) (x + y)-z = x-z + y-z < * z = 0 V (x + y)/z = xfz + y/z
If we tried hard enough, we could probably find evidence for almost any possible
association within arith. We must be wary of this when looking for dualities.
There is no reason why mutually inconsistent dualities should not be constructed
and used, but there would be a danger of being swamped by too many. We
would construct those which either (a) recur frequently (relative to others) or
(b) are supported by at least several inter-related axiom/theorem matches such
as duality A of section 2. It may also be useful to weight certain sentences,
perhaps on syntactic grounds, as being important (for example, a statement of
the form f(x,x) — const might be regarded as important) and to favour dualities
involving important sentences.
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Rewriting problem Even if a strong duality "exists" in a domain, it is likely
that the axioms will not be presented in a form which makes the duality clear,
and thus amenable to the analytical method. In cases where the duality is clear,
this is often because the provider of the axioms knows about the duality, and
deliberately presents the axioms in an elegant, symmetrical form. We would like
the learning technique to work in unfamiliar domains which had not been tidied
up in this way. (In fact, the technique, where successful, would have the effect of
doing the tidying up itself.) What would happen would be that axioms on one
side would correspond to theorems on the other which would have to be proved
from the (non-dual) axioms. In simple cases, it might be feasible to perform
the inference when looking for matches within the analytical method (that is,
if the necessary theorems had not already been proved). But, in general, this
would present a massive search problem, and a rather unmotivated one, since
the system would have little reason to believe that there was a duality there to
be found until it had performed the inference.
In general, the establishment of the duality could involve an arbitrarily dif¬
ficult re-expression of the axioms on one side, which would be beyond the scope
of our techniques. However, if the difference between the forms of the axioms
was relatively superficial, we might be able to combine the two learning tech¬
niques to overcome the difference. If a potential duality is masked by superficial
differences between the axioms, we should still find that analogous theorems are
provable. If these proofs are successfully achieved by analogy, we would find that
the plan would have been patched: where a single axiom had been applied on
one side, several axioms, or a single lemma (perhaps conjectured by analogy),
would have been applied on the other side. Analysis of the trace of the successful
APS by the empirical method would then suggest that the analytical method
should attempt a corresponding rewriting in the axiom base in looking for its
direct matches.
This suggests a control strategy for the two learning methods something like
as follows:
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1. Use the analytical method, without trying to do much, if any, inference.
(This will only pick up obvious fragments of dualities).
2. Use any dualities derived from 1 to help with solving problems by analogy.
3. After some successful attempts had been made, use the empirical method
to suggest new dualities.
4. Attempt to justify and extend these new dualities by the analytical method.
Where extra steps were needed on one side of an analogy, use this to suggest
what inferences to make.
5. Go to 2.
A more sophisticated approach would be to perform an agenda-based best
first search, making progress on any of 1 to 4, whichever seemed most promising.
Making conjectures and refutations An addition to the analytical method
as described so far is its use in making conjectures. Suppose the empirical method
suggests a duality with some axioms/theorems to back it up. At stage 4 above,
the analytical method tries to extend the duality to other axioms/theorems as¬
sociated with the symbols already involved in the duality: that is, it tries to
find new axiom/theorem pairs which have analogy matches consistent with the
existing duality. However, it may find, say, a theorem on one side with no ap¬
parent analogue on the other. If the duality is strong enough, the method could
construct the analogue of the given theorem via the analogue construction rule
(see Chapter 5), and conjecture it to be true. It would pass the problem to the
application routine, which would try to prove the conjecture by analogy to the
proof of the theorem from which it was constructed.
It would be necessary to use a falsification routine (search for counter-examples)
to prune out obviously false conjectures before much effort was expended in try¬
ing to prove them. If the conjecture turned out to be false, this information would
be passed back to the duality, where the fact would be recorded. An attempt
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could also be made to modify the conjecture so that the proof would go through.
Negative information is important in dualities as well as positive information;
negative information is usually provided by omission: when we give the duality
sin <—-» cos it is implicit that it cannot be extended to, say, (sin, cos, tan) i.e.
that the analogous conjectures for tan do not in general hold. However, in order
to distinguish cases when conjectures had been falsified from those where they
hadn't been made at all, we will need to add negative information explicitly as
part of the dualities.
An example
We illustrate this technique on a database containing axioms for arithmetic.
We consider three 'scenarios' arising from different possible axiomatisations of
arithmetic.
Suppose that a four-way duality connecting the four arithmetic operators is
known to the system; it could have been provided by the user or derived from
the axioms/theorems shown (either at stage 1 or stage 3):
(a) (+' ' '
("+,/,•)
(rat(x) A rat(y) —> rat(x + y) ,
^ rat(x) A rat(y) —> rat(x — y) ,
rat(x) A rat(y) —* rat(x • y) ,
->y = 0 A rat(x) A rat(y) —> rat(x/y) )
( possibly others )
(rat stands for rational)
(It should perhaps be possible for the user to specify a duality without a (b)
part and force the system to consider it even if there is no apparent evidence for
it; this would amount to specifying the type arith with no justification for why
it is a type.)
Scenario 1
At stage 4 of the control strategy, the analytical method tries to extend the
/)
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duality, by looking at axioms/theorems involving arithmetic operators and trying
to find their analogues. Suppose for now that the axiom base has been set up
symmetrically with respect to + and •; we would have among the axioms and
theorems:
x-y = yx x ■ (y z) = (x • y) ■ z (*))
WWWW
x y = y + x x + (y + z) — (x + y) + 2
1 • x = x x = 0Vx/x = l
0 + x = x x — x = 0
The analogy matcher would produce the matches shown above. No obvious
analogues for (*) involving - and / have been found, and similarly for the rest.
So the following conjectures are made:
x - y = y - x x -(y - z) = (x - y) — z
bdef(y = 0) V x/y = y/x bdef(y = 0) V x/{y/z) — (x/y)/z
and so forth
The bdef terms are produced by the ACR as a result of the extra condition in one
of the original analogy matches; recall the interpretation of these terms, normally
enforced by the special unification procedure: the bdef term can stand for any
number (usually 0 or 1) of occurrences of terms which match its argument, with
the convention that variables are not shared between different occurrences, or
with the rest of term; thus
bdef(y = 0) V x/y = y/x
would match with all of the following
x/y = y/x , y = 0 V x/y = y/x and x — 0 V y = 0 V x/y — y/x .
In the case of proving or refuting conjectures, corresponding interpretations
would be made; for example, in this case, the refutation procedure would only
succeed if all the variables in the counter-example failed the extra condition.
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The falsification routine should be able to refute each of these conjectures
easily. So these sentence forms are not true for the whole of arith; this indi¬
cates that there is a more specific duality within arith, which would then be
constructed:
+ < > • 0 + x = x <—> 1 • x = x
(a) - < j- / (b) x + y = y + x < ► x ■ y — y ■ x
0 < » 1 etc.
together with the information that this duality does not extend to the whole
of arith. Even this duality is not perfect: the axiom x • (y + z) = x • y + x ■ z
has no obvious analogue among the axioms. The best guess at an analogue,
x + (y • z) = (x + y) ■ (x + z), would be rejected by counter-example.
Scenario 2
Now let us retract the assumption that the axiom base had been set up sym¬
metrically, and consider a slightly more difficult situation where the axiom base
had not been set up quite symmetrically. Suppose we had:
1 • x — x x ■ (y ■ z) = (x • y) • z
and
but x + 0 = X but x + (y + z) = z + (x + y)
as axioms.
In fact, the matcher, given access to the commutativity axioms for + and
•, would be able to straighten the matches out itself. However, for the sake
of illustration, let us assume that it could not. Furthermore assume that the
matches that were found by the analytical method at stage 4 were not strong
enough to activate the conjecture-making process; whether or not this was so
could depend, among other things, on whether the system had "spare time"
which it could use making and testing conjectures.
The system returns to stage 2, i.e. solving problems by analogy. Suppose the
system has a proof of
(y + x) -x = y - . —
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in its knowledge base and, when asked to prove
x = 0 V (y • x)/x - y
decides to do it by analogy to the stored result. Assuming that the application
procedure was able to do this, we might have the analogous proofs for the two
statements shown in Figure 7-10. (Again, the existing application routines take
into account any known commutativity of functions, and so would not need to
make even this simple patch in this case; again, for the sake of illustration, we
assume that the ability to deal with commutativity has been "turned off".) The
third step in the base proof corresponds to two steps in the target. At stage 3
of the learning process, the duality
+ « ♦ •
(a) - < * /
0 < ♦ 1
(y + x) — x = y + (x — x) < ► (y • x)/x = y • (x/x) V x = 0
(b) x — x = 0 < > x/x = 1\/ x = 0
y + 0 = y <—* y ■ 1 = y
would be suggested, where y ■ 1 = y is a theorem, proved during the course of
the larger theorem, which is the analogue of the single axiom on the left hand
side.
At stage 4, the analytical method would extend the duality with
x • y = y ■ x < y x + y = y + x
0 + y = y *—> 1 • y = y
etc.
where 0 + y = y would be conjectured and proved, perhaps by analogy to the
proof of y • 1 = y.
Thus the asymmetry in the knowledge base would be removed, the dual¬
ity would have been learnt and would be available for future use in the ways
described in Section 6.
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-i (6 + a) — a = 6
->b 4- (a — a) = 6





t(6 • a)/a = 6
t6 • (a/a) = 6 V a — 0
i6-l = 6Va = 0Va = 0
+ • 6 = 6Va = 0Va = 0
i6 = 6Va = 0Va = 0
a=0Va=0 —a = 0
a = 0 —a = 0
TARGET
Figure 7—10: Analogous proofs
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Scenario 3
Finally, we consider a much more serious case of misleading asymmetry in the
knowledge base. Suppose that the axiom base for arithmetic had been set up in
a different way from that given and used in section 5.1.3 of the previous chapter,
where analogous axioms for addition and multiplication were used. Suppose that
the additive axioms
7. x + min(x) = 0
9. x — y — x + min(y)
were retained, but the analogous multiplicative axioms
8. x.inv(x) = 1 V x = 0
10. x/y = x.inv(y) V y = 0
were replaced by the superficially non-analogous
8'. x/x = l\/x — 0
10a'. inv(x) = 1/x V x — 0
10b'. x.(y/z) = (x.y)/z V z — 0
The equivalence between the two sets of multiplicative axioms (modulo the rest
of the multiplicative axioms) is sufficiently obscure for it to be out of the question
to make the necessary inferences during matching.
Suppose the system was asked to prove
->x ■ y — 1 V x = inv(y) V y = 0
and decided to do it by analogy to a stored proof of
-ix + y = 0 V x = min(y)
using the following match constructed by the matcher
-ix • y == 1 V x — inv(y) V y = 0
Chapter 7. Further Work 230
Assuming that the application system was able to do this (a big assumption,
since a major patch is required), we might have the corresponding proofs shown
in Figure 7-11. The axioms applied have been left out at the easy steps, those
that go through without patching. Corresponding to the two applications made
in the base of the axiom
7. x + min(x) = 0
there are applications of a lemma in the target,
x ■ inv(x) = 1Vi = 0 ,
which would have been conjectured by the existing analogy, and proved, as in
Figure 7-12 (or perhaps left as an unproved assertion). Thus, we assume that
"patching by conjecture" has been used. Alternatively, "patching by search"
could have been used, with extra steps being put in the target proof (effectively,
the proof of the lemma would need to be transcribed into the plan for the target,
twice.)
With the analogies between the two theorems, and between the axiom and the
corresponding lemma having been established, there would be enough evidence
for the empirical method to propose the duality
+ ♦—> •
min < > inv
0 < > 1
In order to extend the duality, the analytical method would need to conjecture
and prove analogues for axioms 9, 8', 10a' and 10b'. If this could be done, the
equivalence of the alternative multiplicative axiomatisations would effectively
have been proved.
The proofs of the conjectures made by analogy in this example are quite hard,
— and would need a quite powerful theorem prover to be found automatically. This
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BASE: -ix + y = 0 V x = mm(y) TARGET: -ix ■ y = 1 V x = inv(y) V y = 0
a + 6 = 0
a + (b + z) = 0 + z
(x -f mtn(x) = 0)
a + 0 = 0 + min(b)
a — 0 + min(b)
a = min(b) + 0




a • b = 1
a - (b • z 1 • z
(x • inv(x) = 1 V x = 0 — lemma)
a ■ 1 = 1 • inv{b) V 5 = 0
a = 1 • im> 6) V 6 = 0
a = inv{b) • 1 V 6 = 0
(x • tnv(x) = 1 V x = 0 — lemma)
a — inv(b) V6=0V6=0
.a = inv(b)





Figure 7—11: Analogous proofs with lemma
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x ■ inv(x) = 1 V x = 0
-ia • inv(a) = 1
10a'
->a • (1 /a) = 1 V a = 0
10b'
-i(a • 1 )/a = 1 V a = 0
-<a/a = 1 V a = 0





Figure 7—12: Proof of lemma
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is simply because the equivalence between the two axiomatisations is not at all
obvious.
The control strategy proposed for the coordination of the learning methods
is just one way it might be done, and the details should not be taken too seri¬
ously; the important point is that the two methods should be able to help each
other, especially when one gets stuck — the empirical method suggests symbol
mappings, axiom associations and inferences to the analytical method, while the
latter makes conjectures and extends the proposed dualities so that the empirical
method becomes better at solving problems by analogy.
7.3.5 Learning Types
We have argued that dualities provide a means for type formation, and that they
provide the justification for the use of type hierarchies in analogy matching and
inductive generalisation. In order for the creation of types to be of much use,
the new types will have to be assimilated into the existing hierarchy, which may
have been prespecified by the user, previously learnt, or derived by some other
means.
We should also note that the remarks about the statistical nature of dualities,
made in Section 3.4.2, apply equally to types — the types that -we form should
correspond to strong dualities. Consider the arithmetic example of the last sec¬
tion. Having done all the work to learn about the new duality, the corresponding
refinement to the type structure is easy. Initially, we had the type structure:
corresponding to the known duality ( or this type could have been specified by -
the user. ) Following the principle that symbols associated in a duality should
be given the same type, we obtain ~~
arith
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arith
from the new duality. The dotted lines indicate that the connected symbols
were on the same side of the duality; this is the dependency information that
is traditionally excluded from the hierarchy. However, the following example of




group ring field subgroup subring subfield
Positive instances:
subgroup(h ,g) > group(g)
subring(h, g) > ring(g)
The version space technique, briefly described in section 7.3.2, would gener¬
alise them to
Pi(h,g) —> p2{g)
where pz £ {group, ring, field}
and pz £ {subgroup, subring, subfield} independently.
This is a large over-generalisation. Attention to the dependencies indicates the
generalisation
Pi(h,g) —► p2(g)
where (pi,P2) £ {(group, subgroup),(ring, subring),(field'subfield)},
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which is the intuitively reasonable generalisation to make. It may be that types
which were once thought significant become superceded by stronger types for
which evidence accumulates. Just as we have a notion of strength for dualities,
we will map over a corresponding notion of strength for types. If a type is too
weak, we may wish to remove it from the hierarchy altogether, linking any types
below it directly to any above it. For example:
By being able to both add and delete types from the hierarchy, the system
will be able to adjust its own bias without necessarily diluting it.
The main claim of this section is that learning dualities within a domain will
allow an analogy system to get better at analogical reasoning within the domain
over time. Just as analogical reasoning itself is learning from past problems, the
learning and use of dualities amounts to learning from past analogical reasoning.
We now consider how dualities, and semantic types derived from them, once
learnt, can assist the processes of analogical reasoning. We also consider how
dualities can be useful outside the framework of Basic APS with which we have
been mainly concerned in this thesis: we briefly mention some alternative uses
for analogy within an automated reasoning system, which, together with Basic
APS, may begin to reflect the variety of uses made for analogy by humans.
Within matching
One of the original motivations for the introduction of dualities was the desire to
make the use of the semantic type heuristic within matching "respectable".
7.3.6 The use of dualities
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The idea behind the semantic type heuristic was to favour associations between
symbols of the same, or similar, semantic type over those of disparate types.
Expressing this in terms of dualities, we should favour the association of pairs of
symbols which are associated often in known dualities more than those which are
not. Obviously the strength of the dualities (as discussed above, involving the
consistency of the mapping, and the number of associated axioms) which involve
a given symbol pair would contribute to the judgement of semantic closeness.
The flexible matching algorithm, described in Chapter 4, makes the incorpo¬
ration of extra heuristic criteria straightforward. Firstly, the match assessment
procedure would be modified to reflect the degree of semantic closeness of sym¬
bols in the mapping, whether arising from types, dualities or both. Since all
candidate matches are reassessed after each stage of match development, this
would have the effect of moving matches consistent with the types and dualities
towards the top of the agenda, and thus preferring them for development. Ad¬
ditionally, a heuristic development criterion could be added to the set which the
matcher already uses — that is, semantic closeness could be used as a criterion
for proposing new associations for a developing match, rather than just assess¬
ing those which had been made. The criterion, being a default criterion, would
presumably be put in at level 2, along with the identical symbols criterion which
it generalises.
Furthermore, just as the dependency information within dualities is relevant
to inductive generalisation, it is relevant to analogy matching as well. Rather
than just making a priori plausibility judgements for isolated pairs of symbols,
we could also regard associations as more plausible if they occur in a match with
other associations from the same duality than if the dualities are separate. Thus
the first of the following two matches would be judged to be more plausible than
the second:
(x+-y)-y = x (x + y) - y = x
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A refinement to this would be to increase the plausibility attached to the first
match if the solution to the base problem involved the use of axioms or lemmas
which were known to be associated in the duality, and to decrease it if not.
Within Application
Dualities contain information about analogous axioms or theorems. So, if a
duality is involved in a particular match between problems, and the solution to
the base problem involved application of some of the axioms or theorems (as
lemmas) from the duality, then the duality can be used to suggest the probable
analogues for these in the solution to the target. This would avoid having to
search for these analogues during the application phase, and so would speed up
the process.
In a similar way, if a symbol occurs in the solution to the base problem which
does not occur in the problem statement (and thus is not in the problem match)
but does occur in a duality involved in the match, then its analogue can be
predicted from the duality. Where applicable, this replaces the default clause in
the analogue construction rule, and is likely to save time in application by making
the right prediction straight away. This use for dualities would find application
in problem 3 of the previous chapter: as the right hand side of Figure 6-5, of
that chapter, shows, all of the application systems make the wrong inference at
the first step, and only recover after varying amounts of fruitless search. The
problem is caused by a marginal preference for the association
— < ► —
over
/
given an initial mapping containing the associations
rat <—> rat
+ ♦—> •
This preference would be reversed- given knowledge of the duality




since the dependency implicit in the duality would suggest / as analogue for —.
7.3.7 Conjectures and refutations — alternative uses of
analogy
(The title of this section is taken from [Popper 68].) We have already seen that
the ability to make and test conjectures is a necessary part of duality formation,
as well as being interesting and useful in its own right. It is possible to use the
same mechanism in the problem solving phase; given a problem to solve which has
no close analogue among previously solved problems, but which involves symbols
from a duality, we could apply the mapping from the duality to the given problem
in order to construct a new problem; we would then attempt to solve the new
problem and, if successful, try to map the solution back to a solution to the
original problem. This is the paradigm for reasoning by analogy used by Brown
[Brown 77]. Similarly, if the dual problem was rejected by counter-example, we
could try to construct a counter-example to the target problem by analogy.
It would be useful to have some measure of the relative difficulty of the two
sides of a duality in order to make the technique successful — we would want to
map problems from the harder side to problems on the easier side, and then to
use the solutions to the easier problems as models for the solutions of the harder
ones. For example, we might map a problem in three dimensional geometry to its
analogue in two dimensional geometry rather than the other way around. One
way of deriving such a measure would to be to consider the relative complexity of
the solutions to pairs of dual problems which had previously been encountered;
this would involve the number of steps in the solution, the number of applicable
operators and other relevant factors.
A more radical departure from the Basic APS framework, but one which
has been suggested as an important use Tor analogy by humans, is to use a
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hypothesised analogy to refine the axiomatisation of a domain; that is, rather
than taking the axiomatisations and the problems as given, and constructing an
analogy based on these, we would take a complete axiomatisation of the base
domain, a partial/provisional axiomatisation of the target, (part of) an intended
global analogy, or duality, between the domains, and some properties of the base
domain which we wanted to hold in the target; the aim of the process would
be to extend or refine the axiomatisation of the target domain and the analogy
mapping, so that the specified properties of the base would have analogues in
the target. We could approach this vaguely specified, but interesting, problem
as follows: we take the proof of one of the specified properties in the base and
attempt to transfer it to the target, using the analogy mapping provided to
construct a plan for the target proof. As we attempt to validate the plan, we
will probably be unable to find analogues for the axioms used in.the base; we will
use the patch by conjecture strategy to assert analogous axioms in the target,
except that, rather than conjecturing them as lemmas, we will propose them
as axioms. In the process, the duality between the domains will presumably
be extended; its extension may involve the introduction of new symbols into
the target as analogues for known symbols in the base. This can therefore be
thought of as a kind of definition by analogy.
Examples of this kind of use of analogy are, by definition, hard to find in
standard mathematical literature, since, by the time textbooks are written, the
domain axiomatisations have been fixed, and the exploratory processes involved
in arriving at a good axiomatisation are not discussed. However, by looking at
the historical development of certain branches of mathematics, we can see how
axiom systems have evolved by analogy to other areas. For example, the theory of
vector spaces developed from coordinate geometry to basis-free axiomatisations
by analogy with existing branches of abstract algebra.
Notice that, while these more varied uses of analogy extend the Basic APS
framework, the process of solving a problem by analogy to another one is still
at their heart; the differences lie in where the problems and underlying axioma¬
tisations come from. We therefore suggest that a competent Basic APS system
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is a pre-requisite for the more exotic uses of analogy. This is why we have been
almost entirely concerned with Basic APS in this thesis.
Inductive generalisation
Inductive generalisation programs such as LEX are based on type hierarchies.
The learning techniques described in this chapter provide mechanisms for the
creation/refinement of type hierarchies. Moreover, by the discussion in Section
3.2, the hierarchies produced in this way will be particularly suited to inductive
generalisation. Thus it seems like a good idea for the analogy system to suggest
new types to the generalisation system.
One problem might be that, since we have put no restrictions on the type
structure derived from dualities, it might turn out not to be an upper semilattice
ie least upper bounds may not be unique. One way of getting around this would
be to pick out a maximal substructure which is an upper semilattice. The choice
could be made on the basis of the strengths of the types. However, the problem
really seems to lie with the generalisation technique which requires an upper
semilattice; the solution could be to extend the version spaces technique to deal
with more general structures.
7.3.8 Summary
We have argued for the learning of global analogies, or dualities, as a means of
transferring experience from successful attempts at solving problems by analogy,
£
to subsequent attempts. We have outlined two complementary learning tech¬
niques, one analytical and one empirical, for constructing dualities; we have also
considered how the techniques can be coordinated, with each other and with
normal analogical problem solving. Using the link between global analogies and
semantic types, established in Chapter 3, we have discussed the creation and
refinement of type hierarchies, based on dualities which have been learnt.
We then considered how dualities and semantic types, once learnt, can be
used to improve performance within the Basic APS framework. We also dis-
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cussed some alternative uses of analogy which are suggested by the use of global
analogies, which persist over varying problem situations. We argued that basic
APS is a crucial component in the extended systems.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This chapter summarises the work described in the thesis. In par¬
ticular we will review the achievements, limitations and motivation
for our study of analogical reasoning. In discussing the achievements,
we will consider how far we have got towards fulfilling the motivation,
and in what respects we have got further than previous work. In dis¬
cussing the limitations, we will consider how much further there is to
go in order to fulfill the motivation; we will summarise the avenues
for future research which we have discussed in previous chapters.
8.1 Motivation
As we have explained earlier, the motivation for our study of analogical reason¬
ing is to enable problem solvers to learn from their experience. In Chapter 1, we
called a system which can do this an extensible deductive system. As dis¬
cussed in that chapter, learning from experience via analogy can take a number
of forms: the Basic APS model with which we have been concerned in this the¬
sis; definition by analogy, conjecture by analogy, generalisation from analogy; we
have argued, in Chapter =1, that a competent Basic APS system is a significant
and necessary step towards these alternative uses of analogy. The potential of
analogical reasoning can only be fully realised within a discovery and reasoning
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system such as that proposed in [Bundy 85], in which many different discov¬
ery and reasoning activities, including definition, conjecture and generalisation,
would be co-ordinated.
In this thesis we have developed a system which can effectively exploit a range
of analogies to control the search of a conventional theorem prover. This has
involved making developments in each of the component processes involved in
The work of this thesis has been grounded in analysis and reconstruction of
previous analogy systems, in particular those of Kling and Munyer. Over the
course of previous chapters, we have seen how these systems are unable to handle
even very close analogies of the kind that occur in mathematics. The system
described in this thesis is able to exploit at least such simple analogies, and can
also apply some analogies which are not quite so close.
Another contribution of this thesis is the analysis of analogy systems in terms
of the analogy heuristics which they make use of. The assumptions and heuris¬
tics behind the system developed have been made clear. This makes the system
easier to understand, and easier to develop, for example by changing the sig¬
nificance attached to heuristics, or adding new ones which are appropriate for
a particular domain. By contrast, the previous systems we have analysed have
been presented, by their authors, in obscure ways: the underlying assumptions
have not been brought out from their algorithms. We have been able to shed
light on the systems, and understand their limitations, by analysing them in
terms of the analogy heuristics.
Matching
8.2 Achievements
the Basic APS model sections describe these for each.
The matching stage has formed the focus for the identification of the analogy
heuristics. In Chapter 3 , we identified the heuristics "underlying existing anal-
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ogy matchers and discussed their justification. We have shown that the existing
matchers rely too heavily on weak heuristics, which seriously restricts their gen¬
erality.
In Chapter 4, we described the design and implementation of a new analogy
matching algorithm. The algorithm is based around the flexible application of
analogy heuristics to guide the matching process. We have demonstrated the
greater power and flexibility of the new matcher, compared with the old ones.
As a consequence of its design, the new matcher lends itself to modification
and extension; the algorithm implemented is just one of many possible within
the same framework.
Plan construction
In Chapter 5, we described procedures for constructing a plan for the solution
of the target problem, given the solution to the base problem, and a match
between the two problems. The procedures are able to produce plans which
make use of all available information from the base proof, including both axioms
and intermediate steps; previous systems have only made use of part of the
information.
The analogous operator identification routine (AOI) finds a candidate set of
analogues for an axiom applied in the base proof. We have seen that the AOI
improves considerably on Kling's corresponding EXTENDER routine, which was
seen to rely too heavily on a weak heuristic (but strangely a different weak
heuristic than the one relied on by his matcher), as well as having other curiosities
in its design. The AOI uses an initial filter to cut down possibilities, and then
calls the full matcher to sort between the candidates. The filter is designed to
be flexible and modular with respect to the heuristics. The second stage clearly
inherits the flexibility of the full matcher.
The analogue construction rule (ACR) produces a plan step for each interme¬
diate step in the base proof. It improves on Munyer's corresponding component
in the following ways: it is able to express uncertainty in a plan step, arising from
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either an inconsistency or a gap in the existing analogy match; in corresponding
situations, Munyer's procedure would be forced to choose a single possibility,
since his plan language does not include any features for expressing uncertainty.
The effect of this is that Munyer's plans would often be unneccessarily flawed
(in the sense defined in Chapter 7). Munyer's ACR makes heavy use of the weak
identical symbols heuristic, which is not used by the new ACR.
The plan construction procedures developed in this thesis also construct ana¬
logues for the inference positions of the base plan — i.e. the literal and sub-
term positions at which the base inferences were made. The structural correspon¬
dence of the analogy match is used to produce hypothesised inference positions
in the plan. We saw in Chapter 6 that these inference positions provide useful
guidance for the plan application procedure.
Plan application
In Chapter 6, we demonstrated the ability of our analogy system to solve a range
of problems by analogy to given solved problems (in fact we considered various
application systems built in different ways out of the components developed in
earlier chapters). We demonstrated how the application system was able to
apply analogical plans effectively. We also demonstrated the dramatic reduction
in search made possible by the guidance of the analogical plan, compared to a
uniform search technique.
The application routine includes procedures for exploiting the uncertainty in
analogical plans: the ability to try alternative analogous axioms when previous
choices lead to failure, and the use of an extended unification procedure to test
derived clauses against corresponding plan steps which involve uncertainty.
Our experimentation with a number of application routines, some involving
different types of plans, has led us to conclude that full plans are the most
effective overall; that is, the effort of constructing a full analogical plan is paid
back by greater reduction in search. We have also concluded that the plan
construction and application routines should be interleaved.
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8.3 Limitations
The limitations of the work described in this thesis fall into two main categories:
• Limitations within the Basic APS framework; i.e. in what respects we have
fallen short of building a powerful Basic APS system which can realise the
goal of an extensible deductive system.
• Limitations of the Basic APS framework; i.e. how would a powerful Basic
APS system fall short of realising the potential for analogical reasoning in
an advanced discovery and reasoning system.
The second of these categories was discussed in Chapter 1; since we have
said very little, in the intervening chapters, about alternative uses for analogy,
we do not have much to add to these here. To recap, some of the potential
alternative uses for analogy are conjecture by analogy, definition by analogy,
explanation by analogy; in addition, we indicated how Basic APS could be
embedded within a larger-scale problem solving activity — for example, using
Basic APS recursively on subproblems generated during the application of
analogical plans; using Basic APS to solve subproblems of a problem by analogy
to subproblems of the same problem. This latter possibility is appealing, since
it corresponds to a common technique in mathematics problem solving: solving
a subproblem, then recognising that further subproblems are analogous to the
first, and hence simplifying the overall solution.
Some of the proposals made in the previous chapter have a bearing on the
alternative uses for analogy. In order to allow a Basic APS system to get better at
finding and using analogies in a domain, we were led to consider global analogies,
which are persistent across instances of Basic APS. As well as (potentially)
improving performance of Basic APS, the knowledge of global analogies indicates
alternative uses of analogy — in particular conjecture and definition by analogy
as discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, we discussed how patching
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by conjecture would be a potentially useful part of a flexible analogy application
system. Thus, it seems that improvements in a Basic APS system will necessarily
involve increasing its range of activities beyond the Basic APS framework. These
tentative conclusions reflect the argument put forward in [Bundy 85] — namely,
that separate discovery and reasoning activities can become more powerful by
co-operating with each other.
We now turn to the first of the categories mentioned above— the limitations
of our work within the Basic APS framework. Overall, the obvious limitation
is that our system is only able to exploit quite straightforward analogies. As
discussed above, the main bottleneck is in the application system, which has
not been developed as much as the matching algorithm within this thesis. In
the following sections, we describe limitations of each of the components of Ba¬
sic APS which we have developed, and suggest corresponding areas for future
development.
Matching
As discussed at the end of Chapter 4, there are various limitations of the current
matcher:
Unification The current matcher is not guaranteed to find a first-order uni¬
fication between two formulae, if one exists. This is a clear defect — while a
first-order unification between the base and target is no guarantee of the base
solution being of use for the target, the information must be considered rele¬
vant for the analogy system. An unsatisfactory solution to the problem would
be to append a first-order unification algorithm onto the matcher; this is un¬
satisfactory because we would probably still miss matches which were "nearly"
first-order unifications, which violates the flexible match approach behind the
matcher. The most direct approach to the problem would be to change the syn¬
tactic structure criterion (see Chapter 4) to take account of possible variable
bindings. The danger of this approach would be that the discriminatory power of
the criterion would be diminished, leading to an explosion of candidate matches,
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which would bog the matcher down. Whether this would be so is an issue for
further work.
Pairing selection The pairing selection criteria are simple in the current
matcher. That is, given possible pairings proposed by the criteria, sets of pair¬
ings which are actually made are arrived at in a fairly simple way. While this
has proved adequate for the analogies we have considered in this thesis, it is
likely that more sophisticated procedures will be needed for further development
of the matcher. In particular, a more flexible weighting scheme could be useful
in giving some pairings more weight than others.
Syntactic types The matcher takes no account of syntactic types, other than
variables, in considering potential pairings or assessing evolving matches. That
is, it does not distinguish between predicates, functions and constants. While
this has not been a significant limitation for the matches considered in this
thesis, it may prove useful to enable the matcher to prefer associations which
respect syntactic types. This ability would be more significant within richer
formalisms which have a greater variety of syntactic types than skolemised first-
order logic; for example logics with sorts and sorting operations, and logics with
extra quantifiers such as modal logics.
There are two ways in which we could build such discrimination into the
matcher: in the assessment procedure, where matches which did not respect
syntactic types would be penalised; or, more directly, in the match refinement
procedure, by blocking pairings which do not respect syntactic types from ever
being made.
Adding domain-specific information In the long term, the most important
area for development of the matcher will be in the exploitation of domain-specific
information to guide matching. The power of the current matcher is limited "in
that it makes use of very fit tie domain-specific information. We first discuss with
some short-term possibilities, and go on to discuss more ambitious and longer-
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term possibilities.
Semantic types and dualities
We have already discussed (in Chapters 4 and 7 ) the feasibility and poten¬
tial benefits of allowing the matcher to prefer matches consistent with known
semantic types and dualities in a domain (or between domains). This provides
a channel for learning from past analogies.
Given the machinery for generating and refining types and dualities, their
incorporation into the matcher would be straightforward. Given that they rep¬
resent a fairly weak heuristic, it would be appropriate to use them only in the
match assessment procedure.
Matching modulo a theory
The superficial difference problem, discussed in Chapter 4, will clearly be
an obstacle to the development of the matcher. To recap, it is where a potential
analogy is obscured by superficial differences in presentation between the base
and target problems. To overcome the problem, the matcher will need to have
access to, and apply, the domain-specific rewritings which remove the difference.
The difficulty of doing this automatically has already been discussed. Perhaps
the most tractable approach would be to attempt to extend the way the current
matcher treats prepositional equivalences; if the propositional structures of the
two formulae are not identical, they are both normal-formed, and matching is
resumed; if the propositional differences between the formulae were superficial,
they will be removed by this process. The availability of suitable normal forms
will be a limiting factor in such an endeavour.
It is tantalising that humans seem to be able to see through superficial dif¬
ferences without even trying to, in many cases. Perhaps this results from a more
general ability to switch between alternative representations of a situation. No
such ability has been emulated so far in AI.
A particular type of superficial difference is that resulting from a definition
being expanded on one side but not on the other. The current matcher takes no
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notice of possible expansions, or contractions, of definitions. With definitions, a
normal form does exist, namely the formula with all definitions expanded. This
would not be a suitable solution for analogy matching for two reasons:
first, the complexity of the matching problem could increase enormously; sec¬
ond, differences might well be introduced between the formulae, resulting from,
say, functions which occurred in analogous positions but which had different
definitions.
Meta-level matching
The current matcher is limited to matching problems at a single, basic, level of
representation. It is commonly argued that a key to problem solving power lies
in the ability to maintain alternative levels of representation; in particular, con¬
trol of inference resulting from meta-level descriptions of object level problems
has been demonstrated in a number of domains [Bundy et al 79,Sterling et al 82,
o
Silver 85]. If the meta-level inference philosophy is successful, it is likely that mul¬
tiple representations of problems will be common in future automated reasoning
systems.
In earlier chapters, we have argued that analogy matching should take ac¬
count of relevant meta-level descriptions of problems, as well as the object level.
We have argued that the matching techniques themselves are not at fault, but
that they should be applied at the more abstract levels of representation. This
will become an important area for the development of analogical matching, when
such meta-level descriptions become common in reasoning systems. We give an
example which illustrates one of the matching issues which will arise — the co¬
ordination of the matching between different levels. Consider the following two
equations (each to be solved for the unknown x):
sin(2 * x) + sin(3 • x) -f sm(4 • x) — 0
cos(3 • x) + cos(5 • x) + cos(7 • x) = 0
These equations axe analogous in that they can both be solved by the same
method, which relies on the fact that they both have trigonometric terms whose
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arguments are in arithmetic progression. The solution method proceeds by
adding the first and the third terms, using the identity for the sum of two sines,
factoring out a resulting common factor (this is why the arithmetic progression
is important), splitting the equation, and solving the resulting equations by iso¬
lating a single occurrence of x. If we present this pair to the analogy matcher,
six matches are produced, resulting from the six possible pairings of the terms
between the equations; of these, the one involving a 3 <-> 3 association would be
marginally preferred by the identical symbols heuristic. The matcher is unable to
see that the arithmetic progression of arguments is the crucial factor (how would
it know?). But suppose that the first of the equations was the base, and that
the system had inferred that the arithmetic progression property was important
and represented it as follows:
sm(2 • x) + sin(3 • x) + sin(4 • x) = 0 where arith-prog([2,3,4])
The arith-prog term can be thought of as a meta-level description of the object-
level equation. The knowledge of the relevant property, expressed at the meta-
level, can now be used to guide the object level matching by choosing between
the six candidate matches: the matcher would try to extend the object level
matches to the meta-level by finding meta-level properties of the target equation
which correspond with that of the base consistently with the object-level match.
This would pick out two of the six as being better than the rest." One of these is
shown below:
Thus, knowing (or believing) a relevant feature of the base can guide the matcher
towards promising matches.
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In a more developed system, features of the target could be derived automat¬
ically and matched directly with corresponding features of the base.
To end this section, we give an example in which there is a close meta-
level match between problems but no obvious object-level match. Consider the
following two problems from geometry:
Oppos
1. The three lines joining the vertices of a triangle^intersect in a single point
(the orthocentre).
2. The four lines joining the vertices of a tetrahedron to the orthocentres of
the opposite faces intersect in a single point.
These problems can be illustrated as follows:
These problems would normally be considered analogous since (a) the second
seems to be an extension of the first from two to three dimensions and (b) they
can be solved in intuitively similar ways. We can represent the problems as
follows:







point(o(x,y,z)), point(p(x,y, z, w))
lies-.on(o(x, y, z), lies..on(p(x, y,x,w),
line(z, midpoint(x, y))), line(w, orthocentre^x, y, 2))),
Zzes_on(o(x, y, z), lies-on(p(x, y, z, w),
line(x, midpoint(y, z))), line(x, orthocentre(y, z, re))),
lies-on(o(x, y, z), lies-on(p(x, y, z, re),
line(y,midpoint(z, x))) Zme(y, orthocentre(w, z, x))),
/zes_on(p(x, y, z, u>),
line(jz, orthocentre(w, x, y)))
(The functions o and p are introduced by skolemisation.) However, although
there is a clear similarity between these formulae, we cannot give a symbolic
correspondence without omitting parts of the target; such matches, while not
necessarily useless, do not express the full correspondence between the problems.
To do that, we need to realise that the four points in the target are treated in a
corresponding way to the three points in the base when viewed as sets:
s^^£\point(x) —> point(o(S)) A / \j,ies-on(o(S), line(x,midpoint(S \ {x})))
\>oint(x) —h-> point(p(S')) A /i\.lies-on(o(S'), line(x, orthocentre(S' \ {x})))
How could we hope to derive the latter expressions and the resulting match
automatically? It is clearly necessary to have the ability to re-represent object-
level geometry problems in terms of sets. The alternative representation can be
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regarded as either a meta-level description of the object-level formulae, or as an
equivalent object-level representation (this depends on how the knowledge in the
geometry system is structured); if we choose the former, we describe the problem
as one of meta-level matching; if we choose the latter it becomes analogy modulo
a theory. It is clear that these two concepts can be different ways of expressing
the same thing.
One approach to constructing the new descriptions, and the match between
them, would be by analysing how an object-level match fails to define a close
correspondence: i.e. certain of the atoms are unmatched; this could suggest ways
of coalescing the formulae, using the set language, so as to remove the defects
from the match. We could imagine that the final descriptions and correspondence
could be derived by repeatedly applying this process to parts of the match until
the entire match has been "straightened out". We should not over-simplify what
would undoubtedly be an extremely difficult procedure. However, perhaps this
would be a way of approaching the meta-level matching problem.
To sum up this section: there are many analogies which we cannot handle
using the existing matcher at the object level alone; this is often because there
is no adequate object-level correspondence. However, we can often construct a
good symbolic match between alternative (perhaps meta-level) descriptions of
the problems; thus the matcher will need to be integrated with an ability to
switch between descriptions in order to capture these analogies; the nature of
this integration is an important but difficult area for future research. have
Plan construction
Given the use of the matcher within the AOI, the plan construction routines are
the most straightforward and least problematic of the stages of Basic APS. Any
limitations of the matcher will result in limitations of the AOI; hence alt of the
discussion of the previous section refers to the AOI stage as well as to initial
matching. In a system able to reason at more than one level of description, as
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referred to in the previous section, the plan construction procedures would need
to be extended to deal with the alternative descriptions.
In order to construct a plan corresponding to a meta-level match, we would
need to be able to relate the base solution to the meta-description of the base
problem; that is, we need to be able to see the solution in the same terms as the
problem; in some cases we may be able to re-express the solution completely at
the meta-level, in which case the analogy task simply moves to the meta-level,
with the existing techniques being applied.
Alternatively, the meta-level "proof", while coherent in itself, may not rep¬
resent a complete proof of the formula, but rather an explanation of the object
level proof. LP's analysis of a base proof resulted in plans of this form. In this
case, both the object-level and meta-level parts of the base solution are eligible
to be mapped into the target plan. Whether or not they can be would depend
on whether there was a match, between the problems, at the object-level, the
meta-level, or both.
Another possibility might be that the meta-level descriptions associated with
the base problem are just annotations to the solution, without containing op¬
erators at the meta-level. For example, with the geometric analogy discussed
above, the system would need to be able to relate the base solution to the set
notation used in the meta-description; this would probably amount to chunking
the solution into three parts, each a subproof proving one of the conjuncts in the
conclusion; each subproof would be annotated with the vertex, from the set S,
corresponding to the conjunct; the annotations would be related in a member_of
fashion to the conclusion:
/^^\lies-on(o(S), line(x,midpoint(S \ {:r})))
oceS
In order to construct a target plan, analogous chunks would be constructed for
each element of the analogous set S'] within each chunk, extended versions of
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the ACR and AOI would be applied to fill out the chunk in the target plan. For
example, the ACR would need to compose the object annotations, the meta-
level match and the target annotations to obtain plan steps for the target. The
extended procedures would have to "understand" the relationship of the set
notation of the meta-level to the object-level formulae.
Plan application
Plan application is the bottleneck of the present analogy system — many in¬
tuitively promising matches lead to plans which cannot be applied. Examples
of these were given in the previous chapter. As discussed in the previous chap¬
ter, the application system is limited in that it cannot patch analogical plans
significantly in applying them. It is clear that a powerful analogy application
system will need to apply plans flexibly. The addition of patching ability is thus
an important area for future research.
The current application system is inflexible in another way as well: a given
plan is pursued completely, leading either to success or failure, before any al¬
ternative plans are considered. Similarly, a given choice of axiom in the plan is
pursued completely before any other candidate axioms are tried. It would be
desirable to remove both of these inflexibilities by controlling the plan applica¬
tion procedure from an agenda of partially developed plans. This area for future
research has been discussed in the previous chapter.
The current application system is only able to make use of single level plans.
It thus cannot make use of any structuring or annotation which might be avail¬
able in the plan. We briefly extend our discussion of what a multi-level analogy
system might look like, to consider how it might apply plans.
As discussed in the previous section, there would be a variety of possible forms
that meta-level plans could take: the meta-level component could be very strong,
in the limit representing a complete proof plan at the meta-level — the plans
used by LP were of the strong form; or it may be restricted to annotations on an
object level proof plan. The equation solving and geometry examples considered
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above would probably be of this form. The general idea behind two level plans
would be that the meta-level component represents important features of the
plan, whereas the object level part contains more details, but is more likely to
need to be changed. The application procedure would need to coordinate the
two levels, while giving greater precedence to the meta-level. For example, the
meta-level steps might be validated in turn; for each, the validation would first
be tried with the object-level chunk corresponding to the meta-level step; if this
failed uniform search could be tried for the particular meta-level step; if this
failed a patch could be attempted to the meta-level plan. Thus the structuring
of the plan would be used to add flexibility to the application process.
Again, this is only a rough discussion of a hypothetical situation; there are
many variable factors which prevent us from being more precise. However, the
model that we suggest is, once again, one of the existing analogy techniques
being applied and co-ordinated across the different levels of description.
8.4 Summary
In this and previous chapters, we have discussed two main areas for extensions
to the work of this thesis:
• Embedding the Basic APS system in a system able to use analogy in more
ways than Basic APS alone.
• Improving the Basic APS system itself.
In this chapter, we have concentrated on the second of these two areas. We
have identified limitations of the present system and indicated how they might
be tackled. In the short term, work can be done to make the Basic APS system
more flexible, particularly the application stage. The ability to learn from past
analogies, as discussed in Chapter 7, would also be a useful and feasible extension
in the short term.
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In the long term, we believe that the most fruitful area for developing the
analogy system will be in adding the ability to switch between representation
levels, and all that this entails for the analogy process. We have argued that the
techniques developed in this thesis will still be present in such powerful analogy
systems; but the techniques will be applied to different levels of description, as
necessary, and coordinated between the levels.
Analogy systems capable of finding and using analogies at multiple levels are
a long term goal. Many difficult issues would need to be addressed, such as how
re-representation (whether of the rewriting or the meta-description form) can be
done automatically. It is understandable how such a system would be capable
of powerful analogical reasoning — the more different ways in which you can
look at a pair of problems, the better your chance of finding a correspondence
between them. Some of the most difficult issues, those relating to multiple
representations — their development, the connections between different levels,
and their co-ordination with problem solving techniques — apply more generally
than to just analogy. Development of analogy systems in this direction may have
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Appendix A
Comparison of the three matchers
A.l Introduction
Munyer's matcher, and the matcher developed in this thesis accept the examples
given below in the form in which they are presented. Kling's matcher, however,
only accepts formulae which do not contain function symbols. Therefore, the for¬
mulae have been transformed into a suitable form before presentation to Kling's
matcher. For example, the formula
even(x) —» x = 2 • f(x)
is transformed to
(•(£3,2, x2) A f(x2,x) A even(x)) —» x = x3
where • and / are now predicates. Any match obtained between the resulting
formulae can be interpreted as one between the original formulae (the variables
which have been introduced correspond to subterm positions; thus associations
between these variables correspond to positional associations). The matches
below are presented in this interpreted form, as this facilitates comparison with
the other matchers.
For the abstract algebra examples (17-20) the semantic templates from [Kling 71]
were used, although we also say what happens when the templates are weakened;
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for the other examples, general semantic templates were chosen— relfn for func¬
tional relations, rel for other relations and prop for negation and where a relation
is treated as a function due to being nested inside propositional functions.
We start with very simple examples, and gradually move on to more difficult
ones. The philosophy is the same throughout: between each pair of formulae
there is at least one correspondence which is, to a greater or lesser extent, in¬
tuitively obvious. We regard the matchers as being successful if they find the
intended matches. As analogies become more obscure, this means of assessment
becomes increasingly suspect. However, as will be seen below, the matchers are
clearly distinguishable even on simple analogies. Therefore we claim that a more
sophisticated analysis is not necessary in this case.
Choice of examples The examples used here have not been chosen specially
to show the previous matchers in a bad light. They have been chosen as il¬
lustrative of the kind of simple analogies which we would expect a matcher to
be able to find. For example, examples 2,3,5,6 and 7 are perfect isomorphisms
from Boolean algebra. We have argued that any analogy matcher should be able
to find the analogies here. Many other examples of this type could be listed,
with similar results. Examples 4, 8 and 11 are variations on the same analogy
(discussed in [Carbonnell 83b]) — again they have not been chosen carefully. Ex¬
amples 3,9,10 and 12 are examples and variations from [Munyer 81]. Examples
15 and 16 are taken from [Silver 85], where they were discussed in the context of
schema learning. Examples 17-21 are taken from [Kling 71], and include the ex¬
amples aroun^? which Kling designed his algorithm. Other examples, which have
been provided by the present author, have been chosen because they represent
intuitively clear analogies, some of which have been used in the solution of target
problems in Chapter 6.






All three matchers find the match shown above, which is the intended one.
Example 2
xfii = x x n l = x
a: U 0 = a:
Ivling and Owen Munyer
Kling's and Owen's1 matchers find the intended match; Munyer's finds a differ¬
ent match which does not seem to represent an intuitive correspondence between
the problems. Note that the symbols fl, U and = are commutative; if arguments
to these are permuted, Munyer's and Owen's matchers would find the same sym¬
bolic correspondence, since they take the commutativity into account. However,
Kling's matcher would find a different correspondence, for example
x fl 1 = x
mil
0Ui = I
xIn this appendix, we refer to the matcher described in Chapter A as Owen's matcher.
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Whenever commutative symbols are present, Kling's matcher is very sensitive to
the order of presentation; it will only find the intended match if the formulae are
presented so as to make the match clear. We have frequently presented formulae
in this way, in this thesis; but, for the other matchers, this has been purely for
the sake of presentation; for Kling's, it is crucial to the matcher. This makes
it difficult to compare Kling's matcher with the other two. For the remaining
examples, we present Kling's matcher with the formulae in a form which makes
the intended correspondence as clear as possible; the resulting matches produced
by Kling's matcher should therefore be judged with this qualification in mind.
Where this qualification is relevant, we label Kling's match with a "q".
Example 3
root(x, 2) = a
roof(x, 4) = b
All three matchers
All matchers find the match shown above (remember, however, the qualification
on Kling's result).
Example 4
even(x) A even(y) —> even(x + y) even(x) A evenly) —► even(x y)
even(x) A evenly) —-» even(x • y) even(x) A evenly) —> even(x ■ y)
Kling(q) and Owen Munyer
Owen's matcher also constructs the symmetric match in which x and y are
swapped, and the arguments to • and + are permuted, and then deletes it els being
a variant of that shown above. Munyer's matcher again produces an unlikely
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a: < lUy x < x U y x < x\Jy
x f]y < x x PI y < x x C\y < x
Munyer Kling Owen
Munyer's matcher finds a plausible match, although not the intended one. Kling's
matcher finds an implausible match. The current matcher finds the intended
match.
Example 6
x < y D z V -i£ < y V ->x < z x < y fl z^V -ix < y V —>x < z x < y fl z V -ix < y V ->x < z
i|/<xV-iz<xVi/Uz<x -iy<xV-iz<xVyUz<x nj/<xViz<xVi/Uz<x
Munyer Kling(q) Owen
Owen's matcher finds the intended, consistent match; the others both involve
inconsistencies. Kling's suffers from being unable to permute arguments to <;
Munyer's again seems to involve part of several possible matches.
Example 7
x fl (y U z) = (x fl y) U (x fi z) x fl (y U z) = (x n y) U (x D z) x fl (y U z) — (x n y) U (x fl z)
2J teiocs I
x U (y fl z) = (x U y) fl (x U z) x U (y fl z) = (x U y) 0 (x U z) x U (y: fl z) = (x U y) f! (x U z)
Munyer Kling(q) Owen
Munyer's match is completely implausible; Kling's is incomplete because of the
deficiencies of MULTIMATCH1; Owen's matcher constructs two equally good
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consistent isomorphisms, and discards one as being a variant. Note that Kling's
match is particularly susceptible to the presentation here, with so many commu¬
tative symbols. In fact, the order of presentation dictates, in a very simple way,
what match is constructed.
Example 8
even(x) A evenly) —> even(x • y) even(x) A evenly) —> even(x • y)
odd(x) A odd(y) —> odd(x ■ y) odd(x) A odd(y) —► odd(x • y)
Munyer Kling(q) and Owen
Munyer's match is again implausible; Kling constructs the match indicated by
the presentation; Owen's matcher constructs both plausible matches and discards
one as a variant.
Example 9
root(x) -f a — b root(x) -f- a = b
root(x) — a = b root(x) — a = b
Kling(q) and Owen Munyer
Kling and Owen find the intended match. Munyer's match lacks some associa¬
tions.
Example 10
root(x + 1) + a — b root(x + 1) + a = b root(x + 1) + a = b
root(x) — a = b 5 root(x) — a — b root(x) — a = b
Munyer Kling(q) Owen
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Munyer's match is deficient in a similar way to the previous example. Kling's
match lacks associations because of the SINGLEMATCH/MULTIMATCH dis¬
tinction. Owen's matcher finds the intended match.
Example 11
even(x) A odd(y) ► odd(x + y) even(x) A odd(y)
even(x) A odd(y) even(x • y) even(x) A odd(y)
odd(x 4- y) even(x) A odd(y)
[/
K





Munyer's match is along the right lines, but has some associations missing. In
general, Munyer's matcher is bad at matching non-identical symbols, for the
reasons explained in Chapter 3. Kling finds a plausible match, but it involves
an inconsistency. Owen's matcher finds the intended, consistent match.
Example 12
root(x) + a = b root(x) + a = b
root(x) A root(x + 1) = b root(x) + root(x + 1) = b
Munyer Kling
root(x) + a — broot(x) + a — b
root(x) -f root(x + 1) = b root(x) + root(x + 1) — b
Owen Owen
In this example, intuitions are not so strong as to what is a sensible match (or
if there is one at all). Kling and Munyer both find partial matches. Owen's
matcher finds two plausible matches (of equal strength).
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(x + y) - x = y (x + y) — x = y (x + y) - x = y
x — 0 V (x • y)/x = y x = 0 V (x ■ y)/x — y x = 0 V (x ■ y)/x = y
Kling Munyer Owen
Kling returns the null match2. Munyer's match is implausible. Owen's matcher
returns the intended match, which involves an unmatched atom, x = 0, on one
side.
Example 14
rational^x) A ->rationally) —> -rational(x + y)
rational(x) A -irationally) A ->x — 0 ► -<rational(x * y)
i
Munyer
rational(x) A rationally) —> ->rational(x + y)
rational(x) A -'rationally) A -*x — 0 —»• —>rational{x * y)
Owen
Kling's matcher fails on this example. Munyer's returns an implausible match.
Owen's matcher finds the intended match; this is a consistent mapping, but
leaves an unmatched condition, x — 0, on one side.
2For Kling's matcher, returning a null match is distinct from failing to return a match
at all; this is not an interesting distinction, however.
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3 • x) + cos(4 • x) 4- cos(5 x) = 0 cos(3 • x) + cos(4 • x) + cos(5 • x) = 0
x) = 0 cos(5 • x) + cos(6 • x) -f cos{l • x) = 0
Munyer Kling
cos(3 • x) + cos(4 • x) + cos(5 • x) = 0
cos(5 • x) + cos(6 ■ x) + cos(7 • x) = 0
Owen(eg)
Munyer finds an implausible match; in this example, and in many others, Mun-
yer's matcher finds matches which are unions of parts of plausible matches; but
since there is no recognition of the different components, the entire match is im¬
plausible. Kling's match is partial. Owen's matcher actually finds six matches, of
which that shown above is one. The other five correspond to the other five ways
of pairing up the cos and sin terms; the two matches which pair 5 with itself
are marginally preferred to the other, by the identical symbols heuristic. Note
that, as explained in chapter 8, the successful matches would be the two which
pair up the terms in corresponding arithmetic progression, but the matcher has
no way of knowing this.
Example 16
cos(x) + cos(3j^x) + cos(5 ■ x) = 0 cos(x) + cos(3 • x) + cos(5 • x) — 0
cos(3 -xj -h cos(4 • x) + cos(5 • x) = 0 cos(3 •_ x) + cos(4 • x) + cos(5 • x) = 0
Munyer . _ Kling(q)
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cos(x) + cos(3 • x) + cos(5 • x) = 0
cos(3 • x) + cos(4 • x) + cos(5 • x) = 0
Owen(eg)
Munyer finds an implausible match. Kling finds part of a plausible match (the
one indicated by the presentation), but is unable to complete it. Owen's matcher
finds 12 matches; 6 of these correspond to those of the previous example, with
x associated with itself wherever possible( such as (a) above); the other 6 have
some occurrences of x bound to numbers. The first set have greater strength
than the second and so are preferred.
Example 17
A(grp(g,*), pnorm(m,g,*), fstx(x,g,m), sgrp(x,*)) —* mnorm(m,g,*)
A( rg(r, **, ++), pidl(n, r, **, ++ ), fstx(y, r, n), srg(y, **, ++)) —» mid{n, r, **, ++ ))
Munyer
A(grp(g,*), pnorm(m,g,*), fstx(x,g,m), sgrp(x,*)) —► mnorm(m,g,*)
\
■ - r——^ . / « - , x
A( rg(r, **, ++), pidl(n, r, **, ++ ), fstx(y, r, n), srg(y, **, ++ )) —> mid(n, r, **, ++ ))
Kling
A( grp(g, *), pnorm(m,g, *), fstx(x, g,m), sgrp(x, *)) —► mnorm(m, g, *)
A( rg(r, **, ++), pidl(n, r, **, ++), fstx(y, r, n), srg(y, **,++)) —> mid{n, r, **, ++))
Owen (eg)
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grp: group
pnorm: proper normal subgroup
sgrp: simple group






Munyer finds an implausible match. With the guidance of strong semantic
templates, Kling finds the intended match. Owen's matcher finds two matches
(displayed in chapter 4); these (one of which is shown above) are effectively
equivalent to Kling's match.
The semantic templates consist of types for each predicates, and types for
each argument position of each predicate. If the predicate type information is
removed (i.e. all predicates are given the same type), Kling's matcher finds the
same match. If the argument type information is also removed (i.e. if Kling's
matcher is given no more guidance than Owen's matcher), the matcher fails.
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A(grp(g, *), abgp(hi,*), abgp(h2, *), sbgp(hx,g, *), sbgp(h2,g, *), int(hx,h2, h3)) -* abgp(h3.*)
A(rg(r, *, + ), crg(sx, *, +), crg(s2, *, +),srg(s1, r, *, +), srg(s2,r, *, +), int(s1,s2,s3)) -» crg(s3, *, +)
Kling.
A{grp(g, *), abgp(hi, *), abgp(h2, *), sbgp(hx,g, *), sbgp(h2,g, *), int{hx, h2,h3)) -*■ abgp(h3.*)
//
A(rg(r, *, +), crg(sx, *, +), crg(s2,*, + ), srp(si, r, *, + ), srp(s2, r, *, +), »n<(«i, s2, s3)) ->• cr£f(s3, *, +)
Owen(eg)
h(grp(g, *), abgp{hx, *), abgp(h2, *), sbgp(hx,g, *), sbgp(h2,g, *),int(hx, h2,h3)) -> abgp(h3.*)
,g(s2,r,*,+),int(s1,s2,s3)) crp(s3,*,+)
Munyer
abgp: abelian group erg: cummutative ring
pnorm: proper normal subgroup pidl: proper ideal'
s6gp: subgroup srg: subring
int: intersection
Kling's match is close to the intended one but lacks the expected group rinj
association. Without predicate types, Kling's matcher fails. Munyer's match
is implausible. Owen's matcher finds four matches, Of these two are equally
strong; these are the intended matches (one is shown above, the other is the
same except that * is associated with + instead of *). These two matches are the
only consistent mappings in which all of the first formula is matched. The other
two are weaker and involve some inconsistencies in the variable associations.
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Example 19
grp(g, *) A nml(h\,g, *) A nml(h2,g, *) A int(h\, h2, h3) —► nmZ(/i3,<7, *)
r<?(r,*,+) A idl(si, r, *, +) A idl(s2, r, *, +) A int(sus2,s3) —> idl(s3, r, *, +)
Munyer
grp(g, *) A nml(hi,g, *) A nml(h2,g, *) A int(hlth2, h3) —> nml(h3,g, *)
//i ///X llll WW 1.1 j/l
~<7(r, *, +) A A idl(s2, r, *, +j A m<(si,s2,s3) —^ idl(s3,r, *, +)
Kling
grp(g, *) A nml(h\,g, *) A nml(h2,g, *) A int(h\, h2, h3) —> nml(h3, g,*)
rg(r+) A idl(si,r, *, +) A idl(s2,r+) A int(si, s2, s3) —> idl(s3,r, *, +)
Owen (eg)
ram/: normal subgroup idl: ideal
Munyer's match is again implausible. Kling finds the intended match. With
just argument types, it still finds the intended match, but without these it fails.
Owen's matcher finds six matches, one of which is shown above. These matches
are equally strong — they are the six consistent mappings which map all of the
first formula. Without argument type information and preference, these matches
cannot be distinguished further.
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Example 20
/\(grp(g,*i),grp(h,*2),gphm(0,g,*1,h,*2),sbgp(g1,g,*1),im(g1,0,h1)) —► sbgp(h\, h, *2)
A(rg(3,*i,+i),rp(/i, *2,+2).»"g/iTn(0,5,*i,+i,/i, *2,+2)>s'""3(3i,3,*i,+i),tm(3i,0,/ii)) —► sbrg(hi, h, *2, +2)
Munyer
A(prp(p, #1), grp(h, *2),gphm(0, g, *1, h, *2),sbgp(gi, g, *1), t'm(pi, 0, )) —► s6pp(/ii ,h,*2)
Kling
*{grp(g, *1 ),grp(h, *2), gphm(0,g, *1, h, *2),sbgp(g1 ,g,*i), im(gi, 0, /ii)) —«• s6pp(/ii, fc, *2)
^r////mw vwmww
A(rfl(g,*j,+i),r3(/i, *2,+2)>i-3'»m(0,3,*i, + i,/i, *2,+2),«trp(pi,3,*i,+i),tm(pi,e,/i!)) -+ sbTg(hi, A, *2, +2)
Owen (eg)
gphm: group homomorphism rghm: ring homomorphism
im: image
Kling finds the intended match. Without predicate types he finds the same
match; without argument types as well, he fails. Munyer's match is again im¬
plausible. Owen's matcher again finds six matches, one of which is shown above,
which once again represent the six consistent mappings which map the whole of
the first term. Once again, these are equally strong, unless argument types are
used to distinguish between them.
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Example 21
A [grp(g, *1), grp(h, *2 ),gphm(B,g, *, h, *2),sbgp(gi,g, *1), abgp(gi, *), im(g i, 6, hi)) —;+ A(sbgp(hi, h, *2),abgp(hi
A(rg(g, *1, +1), rg(h, *2,4-2), rghm(6,g, *1, 4-1, hi*pP^2psVrg(gi, g, *774-"
A(sbrg(hi,h,*2,+2),crg(hi
Munyer







A (grp(g, *1), grp(h, *2),gphm(0, g,*,h, *2),sbgp(gi ,g,*i),
*{rg{g,*i,+i),rg(h,*2,+2),rghm(0,g,*i,+i,h,*2,+2),sbrg(gi,g,*1,+i),
Owen (eg)
Munyer's match is again implausible. Kling finds the intended match. Owen's
matcher finds six matches. Two of these are stronger than the rest, and are
the intended matches, corresponding to Kling's. The other four are weaker,
involving inconsistent variable associations. Without predicate types, Kling's
matcher fails.
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Example 22
A(col(r,o,y),col(r,n,y),dist(r,o) — dist(n,y)) ——+ dist(o,y) = dist(r,n)
n,x,y)) —» angle(o,x,y) = angle(r,x,n)
Munyer
—► dist(o,y) = dist(r,n)
I U I ! W
angle(o,x,y) = angle(r,x,n)
Kling
A(col(r,o,y),col(r,n,y)idist(r,o) = dist(n,y)) —> dist(o,y) = dist(r,n)
A(col(r,o,y),col(r,n,y),angle(r,x,o) = angle(n,x,y)) —► angle(o,x,y) = angle(r,x,n)
Owen
/\(col(r,o,y),col(r,n,y)idist(r,o) = dist(n,y)) —► dist(o,y) = dist(r,n)
A(col(r, o, 2/), col(r, n, y), angle(r, x, o n,x,y)) —> angle(o, x,y) = angle(r,x,n)
Owen
di-st: distance angle: angle
co/: colinear
Munyer's match is implausible. Kling's is along the right lines, but his matcher
fails to develop the match to the point of variable associations. Owen's matcher
finds two matches, which are the intended ones. Once again, they are the only
two consistent mappings which map the:whole of the first term.
A(co/(r, o,t/),
A (co/(r, o, y), co/(r, n,
Appendix A. Comparison of the three matchers
Example 23
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A(col(r,o,y),col(r,n,y),dist(r,o) = dist(n,y)) ► dist(o,y) = dist(r,n)
angle(r,x,o) = angle(n, x,y) —► angle(r,x,n) = angle(o,x,y)
Munyer
A(co/(r, o, y),col(r, n, y),
Kling
A(col(r,o,y),col(r,n,y),dist(r,o) = dist(n,y)) > dist(o,y) = dist(r,n)
Owen (eg)
Munyer's match is implausible. Kling's match again does not include variable
associations. Owen's matcher finds 11 matches, four of which are stronger than
the rest, and equally strong as each other; one of these is shown above. The
other strong matches contain different (but still consistent) variable mappings.
As with other examples, it was one of these strong matches which was intended.
However, we must accept that the other three are equally good. The weaker
matches contain inconsistent variable associations.
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Example 24
A(col(r,o,y),col(r,n,y),dist(r,o) — dist(n,y)) —* dist(o,y) = dist(r,n)
[A
A(col(r,o,y),col(r,n,y),dist(r,o) > dist(n,y)) —* dist(r,n) > dist(o,y)
Munyer
A(co/(r, o, y),col(r, n, y), dist(r, o) = dist(n, y)) —> dist(o, y) = dist(r, n)
A(col(r,o,y),col(r,n,y),dist(r,o) > dist(n,y)) >■ dist(r,n) > dist(o,y)
Kling




Munyer's match is implausible. Kling's is along the right lines but incomplete.
Owen's matcher finds one match, which is the intended one.
A.3 Conclusion
The examples given in this appendix illustrate the superiority of Owen's matcher
over the previous ones. The flexibility and persistence of Owen's matcher enables
it to construct intuitively correct matches in a wide range of examples (and to
find other, equally good, matches which had not been foreseen). We have already
discussed the deficiencies of the previous matchers in depth; we merely remark




Appendix A. Comparison of the three matchers 281
Munyer
• Inability to construct plausible matches involving significant proportions
of non-identical associations (examples 2,5-8,13,17-24).
• Inability to consider more than one match between a pair of terms (exam¬
ples 4,6,7,8,12,15,16,17-24).
Kling
• Inability to permute arguments inside atoms (examples 5,6 and all those
marked "q").
• Rigid use of semantic types (examples 10,12,13,14).
Appendix B
Sample output of matcher and
: application system
In this appendix, we give some sample output from the analogy matcher and
one of the application systems developed in this thesis. The application system
we illustrate is system D of Chapter 6. The text is exactly that produced by the
systems with the following qualifications:
• We have annotated the text with explanatory comments, preceded by the
sign %.
• Lists of associations in matches have been alligned to improve readability.
• Some sections have been removed, where they are repetitive; this is indi¬
cated by text within angular brackets < .... >.
B.l Matcher
We give output from two examples, examples 14 and 17 from Appendix A.
Example 14 In this example, matching is completed with a single development
of the top-level and-agenda. Each match found (in this case one) is presented
with its strength and its constituent associations. For each association, a list
of argument pairings is returned. The process of match development for this
example is described in detail in Section 4.4.
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MATCHING
imply(&(rational(x), not(rational(y))), not(rational(x + y)))
AND
imply(&(rational(x), not(rational(y)),




Strength 0.84965; Assocs 12
Mapping :
Association Argument pairings
+ < > * [ [p(2, 2), p(l, 1)]]
y < > y [term]
not < > not [Cp(l, 1)]]
x < > x [term]
rational < > rational [[p(l, 1)]]
& < > & [[p(l, 1), p(2, 2), p(u, p(3, not(x = 0)))]]
imply < > imply [[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
Example 17 This example takes several stages of development of the and-
agenda before matching is completed. The partial match is split in the last stage,
and leads to two completed matches. Again, the details of the development are
given in Section 4.4.
MATCHING
imply(&(group(x, wl), propernormal(y, x, wl) ,
factorstructure(z, x, y) , simplegroup(z, wl)),
maximalgroup(y, x, wl))
AND
imply(&(ring(x, wl, w2), properideal(y, x, wl, w2),
factorstructure(z, x, y), simplering(z, wl, w2)),
maximalring(y, x, wl, w2))
DEVELOPING THE MATCHING AGENDA
'/, matching takes more than one stage
NEW STATE OF AGENDA:
Best completed matches so far:
'/, no complete matches yet
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Partial matches so far:
'/, one partial match
Match 1 : '/, with two associations
Strength 1.0; Assocs 2
DEVELOPING THE MATCHING AGENDA
i, develop partial match further
NEW STATE OF AGENDA:
Best completed matches so far:
'/, still no complete match
Partial matches so far:
'/, seven associations added
Match 1 :
Strength 0.988889; Assocs 9
DEVELOPING THE MATCHING AGENDA
NEW STATE OF AGENDA:
Best completed matches so far:
Partial matches so far:
Match 1 :
Strength 0.975; Assocs 16
DEVELOPING THE MATCHING AGENDA
NEW STATE OF AGENDA: '/, match split into two, and both
'/. offspring completed
Best completed matches so far:
Match 1 :
Strength 0.934546; Assocs 20
Match 2 :
Strength 0.934546; Assocs 20
Partial matches so far: */, no more partials, so matching complete
MATCHING COMPLETE




Strength 0.934546; Assocs 20
Argument pairings
[term]
[[p(1, 1), p(2, 3),
p(u, p(2, wl))]]
[[p(2, 2), p(l, 1), p(3, 4),
p(u, p(3, wl))]]
[[p(1, 1), p(2, 3),
p(u, p(2, wl))]]





factorstructure < > factorstructure [[p(3, 3), p(2, 2), p(l, 1)]]
[[p(3, 3), p(4, 4), p(2, 2),
p(l, 1)]] x
[[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
Association
wl < > w2
group < > ring
propernormal < > properideal
simplegroup < > simplering
maximalgroup < > maximalring
z < > z
x < > X




imply < > imply
Strength 0.934546; Assocs 20
Argument pairings
[term]
[[p(l, 1), p(2, 2),
p(u, p(3, w2))]]
[[p(2, 2), p(l, 1), p(3, 3),
p(u, p(4, w2))]]
[[p(l, 1), p(2, 2),
p(u, p(3, w2))]]





factorstructure < > factorstructure [[p(3, 3), p(2, 2), p(l, 1)]]
& <—-> & [[p(3, 3), p(4, 4), p(2, 2),
Association
wl < > wl
group < > ring
propernormal < > properideal
simplegroup < > simplering
maximalgroup < > maximalring
z < > z
x < > X
y < > y
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p(l, 1)]]
imply < > imply C[p(1, 1), p(2, 2)]]
B.2 Application system D
We show the output from Problem 3 of Chapter 6, which was to prove
-irational(x) V rationally) V x = 0 V ->rational(x ■ y)
by analogy to a given proof of
-irational(x) V rationally) V ->rational(x + y).
Figure 6-5, which illustrates the search of all the application systems, may be
followed while reading the output below.
As Figure 6-5 shows, system D only solves the target problem after some
search. The wrong axiom is chosen first at Step 1; this leads to local failure at
Step 3; on backtracking, the same axiom (still wrong) is applied in a different
way at Step 1, and likewise leads to local failure at Step 3; on backtracking this
time, the correct axiom is chosen at Step 1, which leads to a solution without
further incorrect steps begin made. Note the applications of the AOI, involving
the axiom filter and then full matching, and that the AOI is called again at a
step which is returned to after backtracking. Note also the applications of the
special unification procedure, between candidate inferences and plan steps; it is
this which is effective in controling the search.
MATCHING PROBLEM STATEMENTS
INITIAL MATCHING TOOK :
2900ms
1 MATCH FOUND
Match 1 with present :
Strength 0.850909; Assocs 11
Mapping :
Association Argument pairings
[term]x < > x
not <—■—> not
+ < > * [[p(2, 2), p(l, 1)]]
[[p(1, 1)]]
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y < > y [term]
rat < > rat CCp(1, 1)]]
or < > or [[p(2, 2), p(3, 4), p(l, 1),
p(u, p(3, x = 0))]] I
NOW TRY TO USE STRONGEST MATCH TO PROVE TARGET
SKOLEM PART: '/ partition and negate the initial
x < > x [term] '/, mapping
y < > y [term] !
NON-SKOLEM PART: |
+ < > * [[p(2, 2), p(l, 1)]]
not < > not [[p(l, 1)]]
rat < > rat [[p(l, 1)]]
or < > or [[p(2, 2), p(3, 4), p(l, 1),
p(u, p(3, x = 0))]]
NEGATED CLAUSE: &(rat(skx), not(rat(sky)), not(skx = 0), rat(skx * sky))
NEGATED MAPPING:
a < > skx [term]
b < > sky [term]
ATTEMPTING TO REFUTE:
&(rat(skx), not(rat(sky)), not(skx = 0), rat(skx * sky))
FIRST STEP
Step 1 */, Exact analogue found for first axiom
EXACT ANALOGUE '/, hence no need to call AOI yet
or (not (rat (x) ) , not(rat(y)), rat(x - y)) '/. NB WRONG AXIOM CHOSEN
FOUND FOR BASE AXIOM '/. LEADS TO DEAD END
or (not (rat (x)) , not(rat(y)), rat(x - y)) '/, AT STEP 3
HENCE TRY IT FIRST
Step 1
TRYING AXIOM: or(not(rat(x)), not(rat(y)), rat(x - y))
or(not(rat(y)), rat(skx * sky - y))
DERIVED BY binres BETWEEN '/, axiom applies, and result
or (rat (skx * sky)) '/, matches plan step (note
AND '/, special syntax in plan
step
or(not (rat (x) ) , not (rat (y)), rat(x - y) ) '/. step)
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AND MATCHES WITH PLAN STEP
or(not(rat(y)), rat(def(skx * sky - y)), bdef(xl09 = 0))
HENCE WE MAKE THIS STEP AND MOVE ON
MOVING TO STEP 2 */, try next step
'/, which does not
or(rat(skx * sky - skx) ) '/, an axiom -
DERIVED BY binres BETWEEN '/, goes through
or(rat(skx))
AND
or(not(rat(y)), rat(skx * sky - y))
AND MATCHES WITH PLAN STEP
or(rat(skx * sky - skx), bdef(xllO = 0))
HENCE WE MAKE THIS STEP AND MOVE ON
MOVING TO STEP 3
APPLYING AXIOM FILTER .. '/, no exact analogue, so
CANDIDATE ANALOGUES FOR: '/, first the filter
0M /"NX + 1 X II V!
Strength: 3 Axiom: or(x * y = y * x)
Strength: 3 Axiom: or(x * y = x * y)
Strength: 3 Axiom: or(x + y - x = y)
Strength: 3 Axiom: or(meet(x, - x) = 0)
Strength: 2 Axiom: or(exp(x, 2) = x * x)
Strength: 2 Axiom: or(not(divides(x, y)),
y = x * h(x,
Strength: 2 Axiom: or(x =0, x * y / x = y)
Strength: 2 Axiom: or(join(u, - u) = 1)
Strength: 0 Axiom: or(x * 1 = x)
Strength: -1 Axiom: or(x - y = x + min(y))
NOW USE THE FULL MATCHER ON THE CANDIDATES
3 MATCHES PRODUCED
Match 1 with or(x + y - x = y) :
Strength 0.883871; Assocs 7
Mapping :
Association Argument pairings
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+ <—-> + [[p(2, 2), p(l, 1)]]
x < > x [term]
y < > y [term]
= < > = [[p(i, i), p(2, 2)]] |
+ < > * [[p(1, 1), p(2, 2)]]
not < > not [Cp(1, 1)]]
rat < > rat [[p(1, 1)]]
or < > or ECpCu, p(3, x = 0)), p(l, 1),
p(3, 4), p(2, 2)]]
a < > skx [term]
b < > sky [term]
- < > - [[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
Match 2 with or(x = 0, x * y / x = y) :
Strength 0.779924; Assocs 8
Mapping :
Association Argument pairings
x < > x [term]
- < > / [[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
y < > y [term]
= < > = [[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
+ < > * [[p(2, 2), p(l, 1)]]
not < > not [[p(l, 1)]]
rat < > rat [[p(l, 1)]]
or < > or [[p(l, 2), p(u, p(l, x = 0))],
[p(u,p(3,x=0)),p(l,l),p(3,4),p(2,2)]]
a < > skx [term]
b < > sky [term]
- < > - [[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]





x < > 1
x + y - x < > x * 1





[[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
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not < > not
rat < > rat
or < > or
+ < > * C[p(2, 1), p(l, 2)], [p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
CCpd, 1)]]
[CpCi, 1)]]
[[p(u, p(3, x = 0)), p(l, 1), p(3, 4), p(2,
2)]]
a < > skx
b < > sky
- < > -
[term]
[term]
[[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
Step 3
TRYING AXIOM: or(x + y - x = y)
or(rat(skx * sky - (x + skx
DERIVED BY paramod BETWEEN
or(rat(skx * sky - skx))
AND
or(x + y - x = y)
BUT FAILS SPECIAL UNIFICATION WITH PLAN STEP
or(rat(sky), bdef(xll3 = 0))
HENCE WE REJECT THIS STEP
TRY AGAIN WITH SAME AXIOM
or(rat(skx * (x + sky - x) - skx))
DERIVED BY paramod BETWEEN
or(rat(skx * sky - skx))
or(x + y - x = y)
BUT FAILS SPECIAL UNIFICATION WITH PLAN STEP '/. same thing happens again
or(rat(sky), bdef(xll3 = 0))
HENCE WE REJECT THIS STEP
TRY AGAIN WITH SAME AXIOM
<THREE MORE ATTEMPTS WITH SAME AXIOM ALL FAIL TO MATCH>
Step 3
NO MORE POSSIBLE INFERENCES WITH CURRENT AXIOM - TRY NEXT ONE
Step 3
TRYING AXIOM: or(x =0, x*y/x=y)
<TEN ATTEMPTS WITH THIS AXIOM ALL FAIL TO MATCH PLAN STEP>
AND
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Step 3
NO MORE POSSIBLE INFERENCES WITH CURRENT AXIOM - TRY NEXT ONE
Step 3
TRYING AXIOM: or(x * 1 = x) S
<FIVE ATTEPMTS WITH THIS AXIOM ALL FAIL TO MATCH PLAN STEP>
Step 3
NO MORE POSSIBLE INFERENCES WITH CURRENT AXIOM - TRY NEXT ONE
Step 3
NO MORE AXIOMS TO TRY AT THIS STEP - LOCAL FAILURE - '/. all three axioms
BACKTRACK TO PREVIOUS STEP */. tried and failed
'/, (because of wrong axiom
'/. choice at Step 1
RETURNING TO STEP 2
Step 2
NO MORE AXIOMS TO TRY AT THIS STEP - LOCAL FAILURE - '/. no more possibili
BACKTRACK TO PREVIOUS STEP '/. here; i.e. infere
'/, originally made at Step 1
has
RETURNING TO STEP 1 '/. lead to failure
or(not(rat(x)), rat(x - skx * sky))
DERIVED BY binres BETWEEN
or(rat(skx * sky))
AND
or(not(rat(x)), not(rat(y)), rat(x -
AND MATCHES WITH PLAN STEP
or(not(rat(y)), rat(def(skx * sky -
HENCE WE MAKE THIS STEP AND MOVE ON
MOVING TO STEP 2
or(rat(skx - skx * sky))
DERIVED BY binres BETWEEN
or(rat(skx))
AND
or(not(rat(y)), rat(y - skx * sky))
AND MATCHES WITH PLAN STEP
/ another application of
'/. the exact analogue at
'/, step 1 is successful
y))
y) ) , bdef(x!09 =0))
'/. unfortunately, the wrong
'/. axiom can be applied in
'/, another way; this will
'/, again lead to failure
'/, goes through
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or(rat(skx - skx * sky), bdef(xl26 = 0))
HENCE WE MAKE THIS STEP AND MOVE ON
MOVING TO STEP 3
APPLYING AXIOM FILTER
CANDIDATE ANALOGUES FOR:











y = x * h(x, y))
NOW USE THE FULL MATCHER ON THE CANDIDATES
3 MATCHES PRODUCED
< SAME AXIOMS AND SAME MATCHES PRODUCED AS AT STEP 3 BEFORE.
AGAIN, EACH IS TRIED MULTIPLY AND FAILS TO MATCH WITH PLAN STEP
>
Step 3
NO MORE AXIOMS TO TRY AT THIS STEP - LOCAL FAILURE - '/. another local
BACKTRACK TO PREVIOUS STEP '/. failure as a result
of
I, wrong axiom being
RETURNING TO STEP 2 7. chosen at Step 1
Step 2
NO MORE AXIOMS TO TRY AT THIS STEP - LOCAL FAILURE -
BACKTRACK TO PREVIOUS STEP
RETURNING TO STEP 1
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EXACT ANALOGUE UNSUCCESSFUL,;HENCE LOOK FOR OTHERS
'/. now AOI called to look
APPLYING AXIOM FILTER . . . . ' '/, for alternative analogues
'/, for first base axiom
CANDIDATE ANALOGUES FOR:
or(not(rat(x)), not(rat(y)), rat(x - y)):
Strength: 10 Axiom: or(not(rat(x)), not(rat(y)), rat(x - y))
Strength: 9 Axiom: or(not(rat(x)), not(rat(y)),
y = 0, rat(x / y))
Strength: 9 Axiom: or(not(rat(x)), rat(y), not(rat(x + y)))
'/, NB exact analogue returned by filter, but removed before
'/, full matching as already has been tried
NOW USE THE FULL MATCHER ON THE CANDIDATES
2 MATCHES PRODUCED '/, the first of these turns out to
'/, be correct
Match 1 with or(not(rat(x)), not(rat(y)), y = 0, rat(x / y)) :
Strength 0.830909; Assocs 11
Mapping :
Association
y < > y
x < > x
- < > /
+ < > *
not < > not
rat < > rat
or < > or
a < > skx




[[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
[[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
[[p(l, 1)]]
[[p(l, 1)]]
[[p(3, 4), p(2, 2), p(l, 1),p(u,p(3,y=0))],
[p(u,p(3,x=0)>, p(l, 1), p(3, 4), p(2, 2)]]
[term]
[term]
Match 2 with or(not(rat(x)), not(rat(y)), y = 0, rat(x / y))
Strength 0.830909; Assocs 11
Mapping :
Association Argument pairings
y <- > x [term]
x < > y [term]
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- < > / [ [p (1, 2), p(2 , 1)]]
+ < > * [[p(1, 1), p(2, 2)]]
not < > not [[p(l, 1)3]
rat < > rat [ [p(1, 1)]]
or < > or [[p(3, 4), p(2,
[p(u,p(3,x=0)),
1), p(l, 2), p(u,p(3,y=0))] ,
p(l, 1), p(3, 4), p(2, 2)]]
a < > skx [term]
b < > sky [term]
Step 1 |
TRYING AXIOM: or(not(rat(x)), not (rat (y)), y = 0, irat(x / y))
or (not (rat (y)) , y = 0, rat(skx * sky / y)) '/. the right inference
DERIVED BY binres BETWEEN '/, is finally made at the first
or(rat(skx * sky)) step - after this it's easy
AND
or(not(rat(x)), not(rat(y)), y = 0, rat(x / y))
AND MATCHES WITH PLAN STEP
or(not(rat(y)), rat(def(skx * sky - y)), bdef(xl42 =0))
HENCE WE MAKE THIS STEP AND MOVE ON
MOVING TO STEP 2
or(rat(skx * sky / skx) , skx = 0) '/. right step is made
DERIVED BY binres BETWEEN '/, first time for this
and
or (rat (skx)) '/, and next step
AND
or(not(rat(y)), rat (skx * sky / y) , y = 0)
AND MATCHES WITH PLAN STEP
or(rat(skx * sky / skx), bdef(x!44 = 0))
HENCE WE MAKE THIS STEP AND MOVE ON
MOVING TO STEP 3
APPLYING AXIOM FILTER
CANDIDATE ANALOGUES FOR:
or(x + y - x = y):
. Strength: 7 Axiom: or(x =0, x * y / x - y)
Strength: 3 Axiom: or(x * y = y * x)
Strength: 3 Axiom: or(x / y = x *' inv(y) , y = 0)
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Strength: 3
Strength: 3
Axiom: or(x / y = x / y)
Axiom: or(x * y = x * y)
NOW USE THE FULL MATCHER ON THE CANDIDATES
1 MATCH PRODUCED




X < > X [term]
y >>A
111V [term]
= < > = [[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
+ < > * [[p(2, 2), p(l, 1)]]
not < > not [[p(l, 1)]]
rat < > rat [[p(l, 1)]]
or < > or [[p(l, 2), p(u, p(l,
[p(u,p(3,x=0)), p(l,
a < > skx [term]
b < > sky [term]
- < > / [[p(l, 1), p(2, 2)]]
Step 3
TRYING AXIOM: or(x = 0 , x * y / x = y)
'/, single candidate
'/, returned is the right
'/, one
8
or(rat(sky), skx = 0, skx = 0)
DERIVED BY paramod BETWEEN
or(rat(skx * sky / skx), skx = 0)
AND
or(x =0, x*y/x=y)
AND MATCHES WITH PLAN STEP
or(rat(sky), bdef(xl48 =0))
HENCE WE MAKE THIS STEP AND MOVE ON ..
'/. step 3 goes through this time
'/, right inference is made first
MOVING TO STEP 4
or(skx = 0, skx = 0)
DERIVED BY binres BETWEEN
or(not(rat(sky)))
to
'/, again right inference
'/, is made, leaving just
'/, the extra conditions
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AND
has
or(rat(sky), skx = 0, skx = 0)
AND MATCHES WITH PLAN STEP
[or(bdef(xl51 = 0)), nil]
HENCE WE MAKE THIS STEP AND MOVE ON
or(skx = 0)
derived by binres
'/. be refuted; i.e. the plan
'/. been applied; the proof is
'/, now finfished off with
'/. breadth-first search
'/, proof finished off by search
nil
derived by binres
SUCCESS !! - ANALOGICAL PLAN VALIDATED
APPLICATION TOOK : 207650ms








We analyse the heuristics that underlie analogy matching algorithms, in particular the matchers
of Munyer and Kling. These matchers are reconstructed, tested, modified and assessed, and the
underlying heuristics are abstracted. We propose a more principled approach to analogy matching,
involving flexible application of the heuristic criteria.
Keywords
Analogy, Partial Matching, Problem Solving.
1 Introduction - Motivation for Analogy
The desirability of having computers which can reason by analogy has been argued for many times
in the AI literature, usually by reference to the usefulness of the analogical abilities of humans. My
area of interest is analogical reasoning within automated or interactive problem solvers working within
mathematics. Given a problem to solve which is suitably similar or analogous to one which has previously
been solved, such a system would use its experience of solving the previous problem to help it solve the
given problem. The time taken to solve the given problem in this way could be much less than that if
the analogy had not been used.
If previously solved problems were stored together with their solutions, and could be retrieved efficiently,
the problem solver could become more efficient and powerful over the course of its problem solving
experience.
Analogy would also give a useful way of providing advice to an interactive proving system such as PRL
[Staff 85).
Matching and Application
There are two main stages involved in solving a problem by analogy: firstly finding and then using the
analogy. Finding an analogy means retrieving a previously solved problem and constructing an analogy
match between the two; this stage is known as analogy matching. Using the analogy means applying
the match obtained in the first stage to the solution of the solved problem (the base problem), and using
the result to guide the search for a solution to the given problem (the target problem); this stage is
known as analogy application. The process is illustrated in figure 1.
1..1 Matching
The matching stage is performed by an analogy matching algorithm. This takes as input logical
representations of the two problems and either outputs an analogy match between them, or fails. A
match is a correspondence between symbols in the logical representations of the two problems. Previous
systems have differed in their representation of matches: in Kling's system, ZORBA [Kling 71], the
correspondence is between symbols alone, the information about where the symbols occur in the problem
statements being discarded. Thus, when given the two statements,
P(f(b, c), g(b)) Q(g(s), f(s.d)),
the following match might be returned :
Predicates : { P < > Q }
Functions : { f < > f, g < > g }
Constants : { b < > s, c < > d }.
(In the Kling-matches displayed below, the distinctions between predicate, variable and constant associ¬
ations are not shown, in order to show the order in which associations are made.) So analogy matches
in ZORBA are translations. In Munyer's system [Munyer 81], the information about where the symbols
occur in the formulae is retained in the match. The match is a correspondence between nodes in the
trees which represent the statements. Thus, given the same statements, his matcher might return
Munyer calls the individual associations in a match local maps.
1..2 Application
Analogy systems apply analogies by first constructing the analogues of either the steps in the base
solution (Munyer), the axioms used in the base solution (Kling), or perhaps both (see [Owen 85a]),
according to the match between the problem statements. This is done with an analogue construction
rule, the purpose of which is to produce a best guess at what the analogue of a given term is under
a given analogy match. The result of the analogue construction is then used to guide the search for a
solution to the target problem in some way. In Kling's system, this latter stage is very simple - the axiom
base used for the target proof attempt is restricted to the set of analogous axioms. Munyer's system is
more ambitious in that it uses the analogues of the base steps as plan for the solution of the target. The
details of application, while important, will not concern us in this paper.
2 Motivation for reconstructions
There seems to be no general, formal rule which tells us what constitutes a good analogy match. It is in
the nature of analogy that it is partly empirical - that is, we only know for sure whether a particular match
is good or not after the application procedure has used it in trying to solve the target problem. Therefore
P(f(b, c), g(b))
Q(g(s) , f(s, d)).
Target Base
match
PI < > P2 Problem
apply
SI > S2 Solution
Figure 1: Overview
analogy matching algorithms use heuristic criteria to guide them in searching for good analogies. The
heuristics that a particular matcher uses determine its idea (or rather its designer's) of what is a promising
analogy.
But the descriptions given in the literature of existing matchers do not make it at all clear what heuristics
they are using - there has been little discussion of the assumptions which matchers make. This makes it
very hard to compare the existing matchers as to their performance - how much they achieve relative to
the information they are given (see the discussion about semantic types below) - and hard also to extend
and improve them.
I have reconstructed the matchers of Kling and Munyer (both in Prolog) in order to analyse their
performance and underlying assumptions. The rationale behind such rational reconstructions of previous
work is as follows: firstly, the discipline of having to transform the sometimes ambiguous descriptions of
the algorithms given by their authors into computer programs forces one to examine the algorithms much
more closely than one might do otherwise; secondly, having a working version of an algorithm makes
it easy to test it on different examples from those around which it was designed, and thus to assess its
generality.
Analogy matching, being in a poor state of explanation as described above, seemed a suitable area for
rational reconstruction. More detailed reports of both reconstructions are available from the author.
3 Descriptions of algorithms and reconstructions
The first analogy matcher which I reconstructed was that of Munyer [Munyer 81].
3.1 Munyer
Munyer calls the terms input to his matcher logical terms. They are not necessarily first-order, since
variables can have arguments (i.e. there can be variable functions and predicates). Munyer's matcher
makes no distinction between predicates and functions. If logical formulae are to be matched, the
logical connectives in them are treated as predicate/function symbols. So the matcher operates with an
unrestricted and rather uniform syntax. Furthermore, it uses only the problem statements, and so has
no semantics for the symbols in the statements. It is thus purely syntactic.
3.1.1 The algorithm
Munyer's matcher works in three stages, constructing intermediate matches from the first two. They are
: grounding, deleting and adding.
Grounding
In this stage, an initial map is created in which
• Any pair of identical symbols, one from each term, are associated.
• Any variable in either term is associated with all symbols in the other term.
Deleting
This stage takes as input the output of the previous stage, ie two terms and an initial map between
them, and deletes some (or all or none) of the local maps in the initial match. To explain how this stage
works we need some definitions.
For symbols a and b in a term, define a > b if b occurs in the (unique) subterm headed by a. For
local maps (al,a2) and (bl,b2), (al,a2) dominates (bl,b2) if al > bl and bl > b2. (al,a2) directly
dominates (bl,b2) (in a match M) if (al,a2) dominates (bl,b2) and there is no (cl,c2) in M, dominated
by (al,a2), which dominates (bl,b2).
If (al,a2) directly dominates both (bl,b2) and (cl,c2), (bl,b2) and (cl,c2) left-compete (w.r.t. (al,a2))
if bl and cl are in the same argument position of al. (bl,b2) left-supports (al,a2) if it has minimal
left penalty among the maps with which it left-competes. The left penalty of (bl,b2) w.r.t. (al,a2) is
defined as
where C.P., the containment penalty, is the number of unmapped symbols between al and bl in the
tree structure of the left term, and P.P., the permutation penalty, is 1 if (bl,b2) permutes arguments of
(al,a2) and 0 if it doesn't. Right-competing and right-supporting are defined analogously.
Lastly, (bl,b2) reinforces (al,a2) if it either left-supports or right-supports (al,a2).
The deleting stage works by first calculating the reinforcement relations in the initial match, and then
deleting any local maps which (a) share a node with another map and (b) do not reinforce any other
map in the match. The latter stage is iterated, as a map which is deleted may be the only map which
another had reinforced, so the latter should be deleted also.
The motivation behind this complicated procedure seems to be that we should retain a set of local maps
which preserve the structure of the terms (this is behind the notion of direct dominance), and remove
any alternative sets (this is behind the notion of competition).
This stage takes as input the result of the deleting stage and adds a local map between any pair of nodes
in the two terms which are both unmapped in the existing match but whose parent nodes are mapped
to each other.
Also, if the head symbols of the two terms are both unmapped a local map between them is added.
This step is not iterated.
3.1.2 Reconstruction
The reconstruction of Munyer's algorithm in Prolog proved to be fairly straightforward, although the
details of the deleting stage are fiddly and make the program larger than might be expected. I have not
been particularly concerned with efficiency, which I am sure could be improved, but the algorithm seems
to be unavoidably expensive.
The structure of the entire program corresponds closely with the description of the algorithm given above,
with predicates corresponding to the concepts of the algorithm (directly_dominates, perm_penalty, con-
tainment_penalty etc.). It has therefore been quite easy to modify the program when definitions in the
algorithm have been changed (the program is modular).
The program has 60 Prolog predicates and 132 clauses.
3.1.3 Performance and modifications
Among the examples of analogy matches which Munyer claims his matcher finds are the following four:
C.P. + P.P.
Adding
f(X) f (a . g (a) )
/ / \ \ /
f (a,f(b,c)) f( g(a, h(a)) „ g(b, h(b)) )
f(g(a)) h (a) f (f (a , b) ,c)
, \ \ i /
f( X(a). X(b) )
(Note the second order variable, X, in the fourth example). Munyer does not go into why these matches
are suitable analogies, but lists them as matches which a matcher should be able to construct. The
matches produced by my reconstruction on the same examples are as follows:
f(X) f(a. g(a)) f(a.f(b,c)) f( g(a, h(a)), g(b, h(b)) )
I \ \(\
f (g(a)) h(a) f(f(a,b),c) f(X(a). X(b) )
(I subsequently confirmed these matches by going through the algorithm by hand). Analysis of the
third example suggested that it is wrong to count only unmapped intermediate nodes in computing the
containment penalty - this is why the internal (f,f) map is deleted in favour of the (a,a) and (c,c) maps.
If this restriction was dropped, (f,f) would have equal left penalty with (c,c) and equal right penalty with
(a,a) and would thus be exempted.
I made this change to the program, and tested the new version on Munyer's examples. The only change
in result was in the third example above, for which the desired match was found. Since the performance
wasn't worse on any of the examples, I will call this an improvement to the algorithm - improvement A.
Note that the first example should produce a first-order unification. But Munyer gives a 'proof' that
his algorithm is complete for first-order unifiable terms (i.e. finds the m.g.u.). Analysis of the obviously
faulty proof suggested that the proof would be valid if (B) the definition of reinforcement is strengthened
so that (bl,b2) reinforces (al,al) if it supports (al,a2) both on the left and on the right, and (C)
any map which is maximal in the match w.r.t. partial dominance (a suitably defined refinement of
dominance) is exempted from deletion.
With these changes made to the program, I tested it again on Munyer's examples. It got the right
answers on all but one, the remaining one being the example with which Munyer illustrates his algorithm!
Again, performance is not impaired on previously successful examples. I therefore call these changes
improvements as well - improvements B and C. First-order completeness is finally achieved. (Without C,
the algorithm is not even complete for identical first-order terms, a(a(a(b))) being a counter-example!)
3.1.4 Assessment of the algorithm
Munyer's matcher is extremely expensive computationally: since variables are associated with all symbols
in the other term in grounding, the match which is passed to the deleting stage is usually large. In
deleting, complex computations are performed on this match: this is where most of the c.p.u. time is
spent. For example, in constructing the match
even(X) & even(Y) --> even(X*Y)
I I I / / i I III
odd(X) & odd(Y) --> odd(X*Y)
the program took 30 seconds of c.p.u. time. Considerable computational cost seems inherent to the
structure of the algorithm. However, there are ways in which the matcher could be guided more than it
is:
• consistency: no attention is paid, during matching, to the consistency of the match, particularly
the variable bindings which it entails. Matches with inconsistent variable bindings are rejected at
a later stage of the analogy process (see [Munyer 81]). But the complexity would be reduced if
only consistent sets of variable bindings were considered in the first place. This would involve the
development of several possible matches between a pair of terms which Munyer, for some reason,
seems to want to avoid. The (relative) consistency of the predicate and variable mappings could
be used to prune unpromising matches.
• syntactic types: Munyer's matcher blurs some syntactic distinctions which analogies tend to re¬
spect, for example the special status of the propositional connectives, and the distinction between
predicates and functions. One way of exploiting these would be to construct only those local maps
which respect the syntactic types during grounding, and put in those which don't, if at all, during
adding.
3.1.5 General assessment of syntactic matching on terms
A purely syntactic analogy matcher, such as Munyer's is based on the hope that there will be enough
clues about an analogy in the syntax for the solution of the base problem to be of use in the search for a
solution to the target. In studying Munyer's matcher, the following problems with this philosophy have
become apparent:
• Sometimes the analogy is not apparent in the syntax, for one of the following reasons:
— Ambiguous syntax problem: there are several plausible syntactic matches and no syntactic
clue as to the 'correct' one: in the following example, the correct match is given, which pairs
cosine terms whose arguments are in corresponding arithmetic progression, but note that a
syntactic matcher would have no reason for distinguishing this map from the other possible
pairings of terms :
cos(x) + cos(3*x) + cos(5*x) = 0
l\ vwwwww
cos(3*x) + cos(5*x) + cos(7*x) = 0.
— Superficial difference problem: the syntactic structures of the terms are substantially
(but unimportantly for the analogy) different:
even(X) —-> even(X~2)
/>\\\W
even(X) & even(Y) > even(X*Y).
A purely syntactic matcher is not able to 'see through' the irrelevant differences in represen¬
tation (e.g. X~2 for X*X ). Yet the analogy is clear to a human.
• Multiple matches problem: even if the analogy seems clear in the syntax, and one would expect
a syntactic matcher to find it, for example
a + root (X) = X
a - root(X) = X,
it may well be that other, non-analogous, formulae would match just as well:
a + root(X) = X
y, wv\
log(a, root(X)) = X,
for example, would be an equally valid match - the two pairs are syntactically indistinguishable -
but would not be a fruitful one (the equations cannot be solved in the same way).
Of these three problems, we could live with the first two - we would just miss a proportion of useful
matches. The multiple matches problem is more serious: as the knowledge base of solved problems
expands, the chances of finding a fruitless match would increase until it was not worth the effort of the
application routine.
The problems show that syntactic matching is not strong enough: it can't distinguish different plausible
matches with the same term or with different terms.
3.1.6 Possible solutions
Adding extra (semantic) information along with the terms could help to solve the problems of the last
section:
Ambiguous syntax
The method of solution for the base problem relies on the cosine arguments being in arithmetic pro¬
gression. Numerical features of problem statements are often crucial to their solutions. By applying
constraint back-propagation [Utgoff 83] (or related techniques), these features could be extracted
from the base solution and used to guide matching - fruitless matches could be rejected quickly in favour
of those which (approximately) preserve the features of the base.
Superficial difference
In order to 'see through' irrelevant syntactic differences between formulae, the matcher will need to
construct analogies modulo a theory. In the example given above, it would need to know that X*2 =
X*X and that A&A <—> A. This is very similar to 'built-in' unification [Raulefs 78]. The incorporation
of such ability into a matcher would not be easy, involving extra search; it would also permit extra
matches to be found, while not, in itself, blocking any; and so it would be best used along with the
suggestions for guiding the matcher made above and below.
Multiple matches
It might be possible to use knowledge about the symbols in the terms to distinguish the promising
matches from the bad ones. One fairly obvious way of doing this would be to use a type hierarchy
so that, the closer two symbols were in the hierarchy, the more plausible they would be considered as
analogues.
Kling uses 'semantic templates' in his matcher, which seem very similar to a type hierarchy. I went on
to a reconstruction of Kling's matcher, with particular reference to its use of semantic types, which I
describe next.
3.2 Kling
Kling's analogy matcher, INITIAL_MAP, is part of his analogy system ZORBA. INITIAL_MAP accepts
as input two theorem descriptions, each of one of the forms
Hy&Hik.... k.Hn —► Ci&C2&;... &Cm or C\&C2& ... &Cm,
where each of the H's and C's is of the form
P{x1,..., xr),
P being a predicate and the x's variables. The variables are implicitly universally quantified. Thus there
are no functions or constants. Note that this is a more restricted syntax than that accepted by Munyer's
matcher. Kling's claim that this syntax is suitable for mathematics is surely unfounded, but the algebra
theorems around which Kling designed his matcher do fit naturally into this form.
INITIAL_MAP also has access to semantic templates for each of the predicates in the sentences to
be matched. For example, the predicate group/2 has semantic template
structure(set, operation).
3.2.1 The algorithm
I.M. matches the hypotheses of the theorems with each other and similarly the conclusions; it does one
of these first, then the other, using the match obtained from the first to guide the second.
Kling doesn't say in what order the two sub-matches are attempted. In my reconstruction, whichever
of the conclusions and the hypotheses contains fewest atoms is attempted first, on the basis that it is
usually easier to match smaller structures.
So, if the theorems to be matched are
Ax&A2&... k.An —► Bi &zB2& ■ ■ ■ &Bm and Cl1&C,2&...&Cn -t
and m+ s < n+r, the module SETMATCH is called first on the conclusions, then the hypotheses.
SETMATCH breaks up into two submodules, SINGLEMATCH and MULTIMATCH. SINGLEMATCH
pairs up the atoms in the sets which have unique semantic templates, and then MULTIMATCH pairs
up the rest using the partial match from SINGLEMATCH as guidance.
Whenever a pair of atoms is associated, ATOMATCH is called to extract predicate and variable corre¬
spondences, which are added to the evolving match. If the atoms have identical semantic templates, the
correspondences added are just those which preserve argument order. But Kling also wants to be able to
find analogies in which, for example, group(Set, Op) is associated with ring(Setl, Opl, Op2), and these
predicates do not have the same semantic templates. Their templates are structure(set,operation) and
structure(set,operation,operation) respectively. Kling's solution to this problem is a hack. He allows a
variable in one of the atoms to be associated with a consecutive sequence of variables in the other as
long as (a) all the types involved are the same and (b) the correspondences preserve argument order. In
this case, he would get
group <--> ring, Set <--> Setl and [Op] <--> [0pl,0p2].
If conditions (a) and (b) cannot be satisfied, ATOMATCH fails. I describe this as a hack because there
is no reason, in general, why associations should preserve argument order - this depends on arbitrary
choices made in formally representing the theorems.
The job of SINGLEMATCH and MULTIMATCH, then, is to decide on pairs of atoms to pass to ATOM¬
ATCH. SINGLEMATCH uses the following criteria in its decision:
1. If there is only one unpaired atom left on each side, associate them by default.
2. Associate pairs of atoms having the same semantic template.
3. Associate pairs of atoms whose predicate symbols are associated in the existing match.
4. Associate pairs of atoms whose predicate symbols have the same type.
1 is checked after any association is made. Otherwise 2, 3 and 4 are checked in that order.
If SINGLEMATCH cannot pair up all the atoms with unique semantic templates on each side, it fails. If
it can, the partial match produced is passed on to MULTIMATCH, which considers the atoms on each
side which have the same semantic templates as others. First, the atoms are grouped into their semantic
blocks; then blocks are paired up using the following criteria in the same way that SINGLEMATCH
used its criteria:
1. If there is only one unpaired block on each side, associate them by default.
2. Associate pairs of blocks which contain atoms whose predicate symbols are associated by the
existing match.
3. Associate pairs of blocks whose atoms have predicates with the same semantic type, where this
gives a unique association.
When a pair of blocks is associated by the above criteria, the submodule MULTIMATCH 1 is called to
pair up the atoms within the blocks. MULTIMATCH1 has a single criterion for doing this, based on
the existing variable associations: if there is a pair of variables associated by the existing match, each of
which occurs in only one atom in the appropriate block, then pair up the two atoms.
This completes the description of INITIAL_MAP.
3.2.2 Reconstruction
The reconstruction of INITIAL_MAP in Prolog turned out to be straightforward - considerably easier
than Munyer's algorithm. The code has 46 predicates and 102 clauses. The modules in Kling's description
of the algorithm translated easily into Prolog predicates.
3.2.3 Performance and modifications
I first tried the matcher on the algebra examples that Kling gives in [Kling 71]. There are several different
ways of translating these (given in natural language) into logic. If 'corresponding' ways for analogous
theorem pairs are not chosen, I.M. will almost certainly fail (there would be a superficial difference
problem).
The performance of the reconstruction was satisfactory on most of the algebra examples that Kling gives
in [Kling 71]; where there were representation choices, the matcher was successful on at least one of


































The reader is encouraged to work through this example by hand.
While the program performed as desired on Kling's algebra examples, the heavy use of the semantic
templates worried me. All of Kling's theorem pairs come from essentially the same global analogy
between group theory and ring theory. It seemed to me that it was Kling's knowledge of this global
analogy which led him to choose the particular semantic templates which he did for the examples. Thus
it is no surprise and no great achievement that the algorithm finds the correct matches in these cases.
There is a strong suspicion of circularity about this.
After going through Kling's algebra examples, I tried the matcher on some new examples. One of these
was the following pair:
-(x + y) = -x + -y and l/(x.y) = 1/x .1/y














where new functional predicates are introduced to replace the functions. I chose very general types -
'relfn' for all the functional predicates and 'reP for equal/2. I.M. fails on this easy example, because
MULTIMATCH fails on the hypotheses, not being able to pair up the semantic blocks with condition
3. If MULTIMATCH is given the extra semantic template condition that SINGLEMATCH has, the
problem would be solved. With this change made to the program, performance is not impaired on any
previous examples.










General semantic templates were again used. The matcher fails on this example, since it requires a 1-1
association of atoms in order to succeed. The failure occurs in SINGLEMATCH. Since extra conditions
on one side often occur in analogies, allowing SINGLEMATCH to succed if there is one atom left on one
side seems sensible. With this change made, the matcher finds the right match, and, again, performance
on previous examples is not impaired.



































The match lacks the expected group <—> ring association. This is because MULTIMATCH1 cannot
pair up the group and ring atoms within the first pair of semantic blocks shown.
There seem to me to be two possible solutions to this problem:
• MULTIMATCH1 could be given a default condition, like those in SINGLEMATCH and MULTI-
MATCH. The group and ring atoms would then be ATOMATCHed by default and the final match
would be complete.
• The application ofMULTIMATCHl to the pairs of semantic blocks could be more flexible, allowing
it to interleave work on the various pairs, so that if it gets stuck on one, it can move on to another
one and return to the first if progress is made on the second.
The second modification is more principled than the first (defaults should be avoided if possible). Again,
performance is not impaired on previous examples.
3.2.4 Assessment
SINGLEMATCH, MULTIMATCH and MULTIMATCH1 all try to pair up parts of the sentences by
reference, in part, to the existing partial match. But all of the tests are monotonic in the existing match
- that is, they force an association if some related association has already been made. The existing match
is never used to explicitly inhibit an association, which might be a good thing to do if the association in
question would be inconsistent with the match. The lack of lateral inhibition in INITIAL_MAP may be
the result of the fact that it never had to search for analogies in a knowledge base of solved problems
(Kling fed it with pairs of problems which he knew were analogous). In the more realistic situation, it
is important for the matcher to fail on non-analogous problems as well as to succeed on analogous ones,
and this is where consistency checks (and other strength criteria) could be useful.
A more serious problem with the matcher is shown up by the following example:
Equation In Kling's syntax
root(x) + a = b root(x,z) t plus(z,a,x) k equal(x,b)
root(x+l) + a = b plus(x.l.y) fc root(y.z)
k plus(z,a,x) k equal(x,b)
In the first sentence, all the atoms have unique semantic templates, whereas in the second the two plus
atoms are in a semantic block together. Thus, SINGLEMATCH pairs up the two root atoms and the
two equal atoms, and leaves the plus atom in the top sentence un-matched. Then MULTIMATCH is
called between a single block on one side and nothing on the other, and so fails.
It is the basic SINGLEMATCH/MULTIMATCH distinction which is at fault here: where there is an
atom which ought to be unmatched, its semantic template may coincide with that of another which
ought to be matched by SINGLEMATCH, which will prevent the latter from ever being considered by
SINGLEMATCH. It seems likely that this situation will occur often in non-trivial analogies, and thus
that the whole matching strategy of INITIAL_MAP will have to be changed to cope.
3.2.5 Assessment of the use of semantic types in matching
The idea behind the use of semantic types in analogy matching is that symbols of the same/similar
type make good analogues. Thus types are used to give a priori plausibility judgements for analogies.
Semantic types can be thought of as expressing information about global analogies within the domain;
i.e. symbols of the same/similar type are likely to have structurally similar axioms/operators associated
with them. Thus, given that the symbols occur in structurally similar formulae, and regarding a solution
as a sequence of structural rearrangements leading from a start to a finish, each arising from an axiom
or operator, it is likely that the two formulae will have similar solutions. Thus semantic types will be
effective, when used along with the partial homomorhism heuristic (see below).
However, as noted earlier, there is a danger of circularity in the use of types i.e. that the types encode
the analogies that the matcher is supposed to find for itself. This will be so if (a) the types are specified
by the user and (b) the matcher does not go beyond the analogies encoded in the types. These conditions
are, unfortunately, met by Kling's matcher, which repeatedly reconstructs the global analogy between
group theory and ring theory which is represented by the types.
To avoid (b), the matcher would need to use the types more flexibly than Kling does - it ought not to
be based around the enforcement of type preservation, as I.M. is. A more structured type hierarchy
would be helpful for this, as it would give a notion of similar type.
To avoid (a), the analogy system could create/refine its type hierarchy over the course of its analogical
problem solving experience: roughly, the new types would be sets of symbols which had often been
associated in previous analogies. In [Owen 85b], the learning of types using analogies is gone into in
detail.
4 Summary and conclusions
Neither of the algorithms described provides a robust and useful analogy matcher. Munyer's algorithm,
even with the improvements, is dogged by the fact that it is purely syntactic, and thus suffers from
all the problems of synactic matching discussed above. Kling's algorithm has no solution to the first
two problems, and its solution to the third is inflexible and circular. Furthermore, Kling's matcher is
incapable of producing matches which involve (a) any argument permutation and (b) matched predicates
with one or more unmatched arguments, both of which occur often in analogies.
The purpose of this paper is to describe heuristics for analogy matching. The following five heuristics
are the basis of the matchers which have been reconstructed:
• partial homomorphism heuristic: an analogy match is likely to be a partial homomorphism between
the terms to be matched i.e. the associations in a match are expected to respect the structure of
the matched terms. Kling uses this heuristic in ATOMATCH, where variable associations which
preserve argument order are extracted from prior associations of the containing predicates. Munyer
uses the heuristic both in the deleting and adding stages, which are based around the idea that
associations in a match should reinforce each other if the pairs of symbols they connect are in the
same relative positions within their terms.
• syntactic type heuristic: symbols which are associated in a match are likely to be of the same
syntactic type. This heuristic is built in to the structure of Kling's algorithm, which never considers
associating symbols unless they have the same syntactic type. Surprisingly, Munyer makes no use
of this heuristic.
• consistent/efficient translation heuristic: the translation between symbols implied by an analogy
match ought to be consistent, in the sense that the mapping should be as near to 1-1 as possible,
and efficient, in the sense of matching relatively large structures with a relatively small mapping.
(This heuristic is used in the related field of inductive generalisation [Diettrich 79].) Kling uses
a form of the heuristic in SINGLEMATCH, MULTIMATCH and MULTIMATCH1, when atoms
are paired whose predicates or variables are already associated in the match; i.e. the expected
consistency of the match is used to enforce correspondences which in turn increase the efficiency
of the match. An additional use of the heuristic, not made by Kling, would be to explicitly inhibit
associations inconsistent with the developing match. Munyer does not use this heuristic at all
during matching.
• identical symbols heuristic: symbols which are associated in a match are (a priori) likely to be
identical. Munyer uses this heuristic in order to get his algorithm going, and then proceeds with
the partial homomorphism heuristic. Kling does not use this heuristic.
• semantic type heuristic: symbols which are associated in a match are (a priori;) likely to have the
same (Kling) or similar (more general) semantic type. This heuristic dominates Kling's algorithm,
being the main source of possible predicate associations. As discussed above, this heuristic is
important but problematic.
These heuristics all have validity. My criticism of the matchers discussed here is that they are used
rather inflexibly (particularly the last two). It seems that any heuristic criterion will only be valid some
of the time. Therefore it would be better to use the heuristics flexibly within a best partial match
framework, such as that proposed by Hayes-Roth [HayesRoth 78]. The matcher would prefer, and be
guided towards, matches which respect the heuristics, but would not be precluded from finding those
which didn't. This is particularly important for the learning of types, which can only be achieved when
existing type information is overridden.
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